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LETTERS

CONCERNING

EDUCATION:

ADDRESSED

TO A GENTLEMAN

ENTERING

AT THE UNIVERSITY.

By Peter Williams, M. A.
Chaplain of Christ Church, Oxford.
Since Master of Bangor School, & Vicar.

Suſcepiſti onus grave et ATHENARUM et CRATIPPI; ad quos cum tanquam ad mercaturam Bonarum Artium ſis profectus, inanem redire turpiſſimum eſt, dedecorantem et Urbis auctoritatem et Magiſtri: Quare quantum conniti animo potes, quantum labore contendere (ſi diſcendi labor eſt potius, quam voluptas) tantum, fac, ut efficias; neve committas, ut, cum omnia ſuppeditata ſint "ab amicis," tute tibi defuiſſe videare — Multa etiam ad te cohortandi gratiâ ſcripſimus.

CIC. *De Offic.* III. 2.

LONDON:

Sold by Meſſ. RIVINGTON in St. Paul's Church Yard, and T. PAYNE and SON at the Mews-Gate: Meſſ. MERRILL at Cambridge: J. FLETCHER in the Turle, and W. JACKSON, High Street, Oxford.

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PREFACE.

THE following Letters, ſuch as they are, were in reality written from motives of Friendſhip: From the ſame motives they are now ſent into the world; for the Author of them wiſhes to be a Friend to every man living. Their firſt and great aim is to direct the attention of Young men to things Fair *and* Liberal, *endeavouring to excite in their breaſts a ſpirit of Honeſt Emulation, and thus contribute, in ſome degree, towards promoting the cauſe of Virtue and Sound Learning. Should they ſucceed herein, the Author need not ſay it will be matter of ſincere pleaſure to him: Should he fail, the Conſciouſneſs of having acted from no baſe views ſhall temper whatever regret he may feel upon ſeeing his Book ſink into Contempt, or Ridicule, or the more peaceful ſhades of Oblivion.*

If, moreover, he ſhould haply approve his endeavours to the Worthy and Ingenuous part of mankind, he is ready to acknowledge that he is not inſenſible to the approbation of ſuch: Their *approbation affords one of the pureſt pleaſures we are capable of: It confirms a man in his own opinion, and enlarges his ability of doing good:—Yet this is a conſideration (however powerful its influence) which, in compariſon with that already mentioned, has but very little weight with him.*

Apologies are for the moſt part but fooliſh things: And yet it may be neceſſary to urge ſome Apology in behalf of the Author for ſaying ſo much, or indeed for ſaying any thing, on a topic where little that is new or entertaining can poſſibly be ſaid; Education being a ſubject which hath been treated of by a thouſand different pens, and conſidered in a thouſand different points of view. The only proper *Apology he can urge is the infinite magnitude and importance of the ſubject.*

Was it neceſſary to enlarge upon this, he would

would do it chiefly in the words of Dr. Prieſtley; *for he cannot ſay any thing himſelf more fit and applicable: Young Gentlemen (ſays he*[a]*) ſo frequently hear the Learning which is taught in Schools and Univerſities ridiculed, that they often make themſelves eaſy with giving a very ſuperficial attention to it; concluding from the turn of converſation in the company they generally fall into, and which they expect to keep, that a few years will confound all diſtinction of learned and unlearned, and make it impoſſible to be known, whether a man had improved his time at the Univerſity or not.—This evil certainly calls for redreſs; and let a perſon be reckoned a projector, a viſionary, or whatever any body pleaſes, that man is a Friend of his Country who endeavours to re-*

[a] *See his Miſcell. Obſervations on Education, p.* 192.—*The great Induſtry and Abilities of this Writer claim our eſteem and admiration. But it is to be wiſhed he would not be ſo forward to lay before the Public his* Reveries *(for do they deſerve a better name?) on certain parts of our Holy Religion. How can it be conſiſtent with* Chriſtian Charity *to be perpetually perplexing and diſturbing well diſpoſed Minds with metaphyſico-theological and unprofitable Speculations?*

medy

medy it, either by ſupplying any defects reſpecting the Education of Youth, or by encouraging them in the purſuit of what is right and liberal: *A well meaning man may be miſtaken; but a good intention, eſpecially if it be not* wholly *unaccompanied with good ſenſe, ought to be exempted from cenſure.*

So much for the end propoſed by the Author of this Book, and for the motives of making it public.

With regard to the Book itſelf, he need not obſerve that the materials of it are common, and that he has uſed obſervations which he had ſeen before, or heard from others; but ſuch, as far as his memory or his notions of propriety would allow him, he has been careful to attribute to their reſpective Authors — All ſorts of obligations he truſts he will ever acknowledge not without readineſs and gratitude. He confeſſes fairly then that he "has ſerved himſelf all he could by reading." So that, upon the whole, he would not adviſe thoſe who can be pleaſed with nothing but wit and novelty to read or purchaſe

purchaſe this Book: In the matter of it there is nothing witty; nothing new.

Inſtead, however, of treading in the ſteps of thoſe who have travelled the ſame ground before him, he hopes he has followed a Method which has not hitherto been ſo particularly delineated and pointed out. Indeed this very circumſtance may occaſion complaints againſt him for having had one Particular Plan of ſtudy too much in his eye. Be it ſo. He by no means ſcruples to confeſs that the general outline of his Book was drawn from a Plan actually exiſting — And hence he would obſerve (he truſts not impertinently nor yet uncharitably) what little credit is to be given to Writers of a certain caſt and temper, who would repreſent the modes of Education adopted in our Univerſities as barbarous and vain, as inadequate to the end propoſed, and altogether deſtitute of order and conſiſtency: Spleen, diſappointed pride, and ſelf-ſufficiency are bad qualities in an Author — This by the way.

Though he has been guided in the main by a particular

particular Plan of ſtudy, he is totally *unconcerned and unconnected with it: He cannot then (at leaſt with any ſhadow of reaſon) be accuſed of prejudice or partiality. His Correſpondent may have been engaged in this: he himſelf may think it an admirable one: he may wiſh to ſee it more general: and as there ſeemed to be a neceſſity of following ſome regular method, for theſe reaſons he may have adopted this: but he pretends not to ſay any thing deciſive on a point which is ſo very variouſly conſidered and purſued. Let every man think for himſelf. For his own part, he is wont to form his opinion with candour and deliberation; and when he is ſure it is thus formed, there is no man or ſet of men, whoſe favour or diſfavour — nothing, in ſhort, but fair, dipaſſionate, and convincing Reaſon ſhall ever, in any caſe, make him change it: In this there is nothing of obſtinacy, or pride, or arrogance — If he is miſtaken, he is miſtaken.*

It is ſcarce worth while to take notice that in a Publication of this familiar kind, the Author

Author never thought of writing any thing like a finiſhed Compoſition, of inveſtigating his ſubject ſo as to conſider it in every point of view, and that philoſophically: The groundwork was too extenſive: His abilities were too limited: And beſides, he is of opinion it would have been improper to do this — He addreſſes himſelf (it is true) to a young man entering upon a Courſe of Univerſity-Education, but him he knows to be placed under proper Guides and Tutors; and here he would avoid all ſort of interference: not wiſhing to direct *young men or read them Lectures of Philoſophy, but rather (as hath been ſaid already) to inſpire and confirm in them Manly Reſolution and Perſeverance in purſuit after what is* FAIR *and* GOOD.—*For the moſt part therefore he has treated his ſubjects hiſtorically, and after an eaſy, familiar manner; thinking that the moſt amuſing and effectual.*

But, nevertheleſs, ſhould his ſubject at any time lead him ſo far out of the way as to make him incroach ſomewhat on the province

of

of College-Tutors, it is always done with reluctance: For he has no doubt but thoſe, who undertake that Weighty Office, ſtudy to diſcharge it with all integrity, and inculcate ſuch topics as he has juſt touched upon with much greater force and elegance:—Tamen conducere arbitratur, talibus aures juvenum vocibus undique *circumſonare; nec eas, ſi fieri poſſit, quidquam aliud audire.*

A propos—*Need he apologize for inſerting ſo many* Greek *and* Latin *quotations into the body of his Work? He has only this to ſay in his own defence: He is always anxious to ſupport his own opinion by the* beſt *authorities: He could not expreſs the ſame thought half ſo elegant: And his Book is calculated for thoſe only who can read ſuch paſſages with all poſſible eaſe and pleaſure.*

Let it be obſerved farther, that it ſeemed neceſſary to enter now and then upon ſubjects, which to ſome will appear trifling and low, perhaps contemptible.—But in matters of this nature it will never do to be guided by a few individuals.

individuals. With ſuch then this conſideration ſhould have its weight.

The Author would only add, that throughout he has aimed at ſomething like Order and Regularity: But here, and in every other reſpect, he does not challenge his Young Readers (for to Young Readers only *he addreſſes himſelf) to uſe the ſeverity of Criticiſm, but relies entirely upon their Candour: and Candour he hopes they will not refuſe to ſhow towards him; eſpecially when he aſſures them, and that ſolemnly, that he has nothing in this world more at heart than their welfare and advantage.*

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ERRATA.

Page 3. Line 1. *dele* the ` over the *u* in *dulcius*. P. 3. L. 8 and 9. *dele* the , in each line; the Sentence being quite perverted by them. P. 11. L. ult. for ‘ Elments,’ read, *Elements*. P. 17. L. 17. for ‘ proper a ſuperſtructure,’ r. *a proper ſuperſtructure*. P. 22. L. 2. for ‘ Παιδαια’,’ r. Παιδια. P. 25. L. ult. *dele* the words, ‘ like every thing elſe belonging to man.’ P. 121. L. 6. for ‘ forty,’ r. *four*. P. 123. Note b. for ‘ Royamue,’ r. *Royamme*. P. 151. L. 6. for ‘ that it ſuperfluous,’ r. *that is ſuperfluous*. P. 169. L. 18. for ‘ a way,’ r. *away*. P. 176. L. 16. for ‘ This no other,’ r. *This is no other*. P. 183. L. 14. *dele* ‘ the.’ P. 190. L. ult. for ‘ de,’ r. *du*. P. 224. L. 6 from the bottom, *dele* ‘ up.’ P. 249. L. 9. for ‘ honour able,’ r. *honourable*. P. 274. L. antepenult. for ‘ Hence it came paſs,’ r. *Hence it came to paſs*. P. 283. L. 10. for ‘ a regular, and dramatic performance,’ r. *a regular, dramatic performance*. P. 327. L. 1. for ‘ fountion,’ r. *foundation*.

LETTER I.

I AM much pleaſed, *Eugenio*, to hear of your ſafe arrival in College; and to find that the little experience you have had of that way of life has ſuggeſted to you no diſagreeable apprehenſions. For my own part, when I look back on the hours I paſſed within thoſe venerable Walls, I do it with a great deal of pleaſure, and perhaps ſome little regret:—with pleaſure, in recollecting the time and place that gave birth to my beſt and moſt durable comforts, the comforts I mean which attend ſtudy and reflexion; and with regret, in experiencing that the whole of Human Life is not *equally* free from ſolicitude and trouble.

Let me intreat you ever to remember, that your ſucceſs and behaviour in future depends, in a great meaſure, upon the man-

ner you paſs theſe ſeven ſucceeding years. It is entirely in your own power to make them productive of much ſorrow and infelicity: and it is alſo in your power to render them the pleaſanteſt as well as the moſt uſeful period of your life. The indolent and the profligate ſhall have to complain of every thing they do; but the thinking and induſtrious young man feels true pleaſure increaſing daily with his improvement: With no wordly engagements on his hands, and ſpurred on by that which is the *very life and ſoul* of literary purſuits, a *laudable emulation*, he there enjoys ſuch eaſe and tranquillity as are neceſſary for the acquiſition and advancement of ſound Knowledge: And being once fixed in the path which leads to Virtue and honeſt Fame — to every thing deſirable in life—he finds a thouſand reaſons encouraging him to perſeverance, till at length he acquires ſomething of that philoſophical compoſure, which, as it is the effect of much thought and reflexion, lies, in ſome meaſure, beyond the influence of fortune. It is *then*, and *not before*, he can enter into the ſpirit of thoſe well known lines of the *Roman* Poet:

— *Nil*

— Nil dulcius eſt, benè quàm munita tenere
Edita doctrina Sapientum templa ſerena:
Deſpicere unde queas alios, paſſimque videre
Errare, atque viam palanteis quærere vitæ;—
Certare ingenio,—contendere nobilitate;—
Noctеis atque dies niti præſtante labore
Ad ſummas emergere opes, rerumque potiri.[a]

It is needleſs to ſay how ardently I wiſh, my young friend, to be of this turn of mind. Though I have great confidence in your prudence and abilities, yet I will not ſcruple to communicate occaſionally what may ſtand a chance of ſerving as a barrier againſt any irregular deſires, or as an incentive to worthy actions. Having but juſt trodden the ſame path before you, I may poſſibly hit out ſome things which it may be of ſervice for you to know. Think not, however, that I have any notion of interfering with your Tutor's province, had my ſlender attainments enabled me:—Far from it:—I rather wiſh to ſecond his endeavours, by pointing out only ſuch particulars as may be likely to contribute to your *amuſement* more than to your *inſtruction*. The character of a candid,

[a] Lucret. II. 7.

faithful friend is always preferable with me to that of a dictatorial governor: You are therefore to conſider the obſervations I ſhall ſend you not ſo much as precepts for *regulating your conduct*, as hints *ſubmitted to your judgment*; only I muſt beg of you to conſider them well before you reject them, as in general they are the reſult of *experience*—I pretend not indeed to any other advantages.

A Correſpondence of this nature will, I am perſuaded, be *mutually* ſerviceable:—it will inure me to digeſt and methodize my notions of things; for the mind, being fixed on ſome particular object, will be kept from that vacancy, and thoſe vague reveries, which it is otherwiſe ſo apt to fall into. Beſides, we ſhall by this means, I hope, cultivate a *true* and *laſting friendſhip*: And let it be our endeavour, *Eugenio*, to make this ſocial and virtuous principle recover ſomething of its ancient vigour: The endeavour will not be chimerical: The native temper and propenſities of the human heart are, in all ages, much the ſame, and capable of courſe of the ſame improvement: Of theſe propenſities *this* certainly is one of the *nobleſt* and *moſt exalted*. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER II.

WOULD you not conſider me a mere trifler, was I to ſend you any ſtrictures with regard to the furniſhing of your *Rooms?* However, being convinced that many are guilty of very chimerical whims, and abſurdities on this head, I will, at all events, run the hazard. Endeavour then, as ſoon as poſſible, to fix on a comfortable ſett of *Rooms:* To be changing and ſhifting from place to place is attended with many diſagreeable circumſtances. — *Rouſſeau* declaims violently againſt buying Books and Paintings on account of the chagrin that muſt ariſe from the deficiency of all Private Collections of that nature: Though one be not of the ſame mind with this whimſical Philoſopher, yet I would not be deſirous of making of my *Room* a *Picture Shop*, or of my little *Study* a *Public Library*. In the one, if I had any Pictures at all, they ſhould be few and well ſelected; and in the other, no Books but what were neceſſary for the proſecution of my ſtudies. All my furni-

ture ſhould be neat, but plain: nothing glaring, nothing ſuperfluous: Care ſhould be taken,

——— *ne turpe toral, ne ſordida mappa*
Corruget nares, ne non et cantharus et lanx
Oſtendat tibi te.[a]

To have things clean and comfortable about one tranquillizes the mind, and prepares it for ſtudy; but all fooliſh and extravagant ornament tends in my opinion to take off the attention. Beſides, I would endeavour in theſe ſmaller matters, as well as in things of greater importance, to ſhow an elegant and cultivated taſte.

But in order to *exemplify* what I have been juſt ſaying, I will ſend you a ſhort ſketch of the character of a young man whom I never think of without *pleaſure* and *inſtruction*; and be not diſpleaſed if I do it with a view to ſomewhat more than the main ſubject of this letter.

A Contemporary of mine, whom I ſhall call *Cleanthes*, was remarked for having in every thing about him that *neatneſs* and *ſimplicity* which perſons of true taſte have

[a] Hor. Ep. 5. lib. 1.

always

always admired. In his *Room*, above the fire-place, was hung the fine Print of Raphael's repreſenting *Our Saviour's firſt appearance to the Apoſtles after his Reſurrection*; on the oppoſite ſide was an elegant Looking-glaſs, at the top of which there ſtood a ſmall Buſt of TIME; and facing the door a full-length Picture of honeſt *Homer*, ſtanding in proper attitude and holding forth to ſome ancient aſſembly. Over the fire, in a ſnug little *Study*, was the Portrait of a Friend, of whoſe accompliſhments *Cleanthes* would often talk in the warmeſt terms, and whoſe exemplary conduct he profeſſed to imitate: Above that was a fine old Statue of the *Athenian Orator*, in the very act of defending himſelf againſt *his rival* ÆSCHINES. The reſt of the furniture of the *Study*, beſides a few choſen Books and *D'Anville*'s Maps, conſiſted of nothing but a Pair of Globes, and the ingenious Charts of *Dr. Prieſtly*.—In a corner of his bed-chamber was a large and well finiſhed Painting of the *Choice of Hercules*.

Thus did this amiable young man contrive to render every thing *ornamental* conducive to ſome *uſeful* purpoſe;—to warn

him of his errors, or remind him in *Virgil's* words engraved under his buſt of TIME

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile TEMPUS—

—to inſpire him with an *honeſt*, but *well regulated* love of fame;—or to keep freſh in his memory that every thing would yield to *induſtry* and *perſeverance*.

Cleanthes was equally neat with regard to his perſon. As in his *Rooms* one ſhould ſeldom ſee a book lying on the table but what was neceſſary for preſent uſe, ſo in his dreſs there was nothing ſlovenly, nothing coxcomical. He was, in ſhort, what *Horace* would have diſtinguiſhed by his *ſimplex munditiis*, what *Shenſtone* would have called *elegant*,[a] and yet not be able to convey a true idea of what they wiſhed to repreſent.

Theſe things you will probably think *trifling*: But, for my own part, I think that ſuch a turn of mind, when *free from all kind of affectation*, ſets Learning off in its moſt amiable colours; and it is often found connected with a taſte for elegant erudition, and with good morals: Indeed there is a natural *affinity* between them.

[a] *Shenſtone* uſed to think that this epithet conveyed the full meaning of *Horace's* expreſſion.

The

The union of theſe appeared in no one more conſpicuouſly than in *Cleanthes*, for he had a great ſtore of ſound knowledge, together with the ſweeteſt diſpoſition and a truly honeſt heart. Whatever he undertook, he executed in a way that beſpoke the man of *ſcholarſhip*, and *politeneſs*, and *integrity*.

And yet we are not to aſcribe *all* this to Nature. He had, it is true, naturally, very ſtrong abilities, but they had been improved with the greateſt care and diligence. Call to mind the *Lares* that inſpired him, puſhing him on to worthy actions, and teaching him to conſider *nothing* as *inſurmountable*. Few can boaſt of the acquiſitions he had made, and yet moſt young men are *capable* of attaining to them. All the *Graces* looked propitiouſly on this excellent youth, and almoſt every *Muſe* held him in equal favour. ——Think of *Cleanthes*, and fare you well.

PHILANDER.

LETTER III.

THE firſt piece of advice which is uſually given perſons in your ſituation, is, to warn them againſt keeping improper and diſorderly company. Care, however, ſhould be taken, leſt by carrying this caution to an *extreme*, the young and paſſive mind be impreſſed with ideas of *ſuſpicion* and *diſtruſt*: the conſequences of *theſe* are ever to be dreaded. If he has but common faculties, and if thoſe have been properly cultivated, you will readily allow that a young fellow at eighteen muſt have ſufficient penetration to diſtinguiſh between a *manly confidence*, and a *credulity which belongs only to the ſimpleton*. So that the difficulty lies not ſo much in being *able to diſcern* the man of virtue and underſtanding from the mere trifler and debauchee, as to *put on a fixed reſolution to avoid* the one and *win the affection* of the other.

Although I might probably depend upon your own prudence in this particular, yet I will endeavour to explain to you, in a few words, the truth of the well known obſervation,

vation, *That your own life will neceſſarily reſemble that of the company you keep:* My regard for you is too ſincere to ſuffer me to paſs over in ſilence a matter of ſo great importance.

My *Lord Kaims*[a] obſerves, that "virtuous actions are found by induction to lead us to imitation by inſpiring emotions reſembling the paſſions that produce thoſe actions—and hence the advantage of choice books and choice company." He might have ſpoken more generally: For as the mind acquires *ſtrength* and a *right turn* by being converſant with *vigorous* and *regular* underſtandings, ſo likewiſe, for *the very ſame reaſons*, it becomes wonderfully *baſe* and *degenerate* by a continual acquaintance with thoſe of a *vulgar* and *diſtempered* habit: And here we ſee why *Charondas*, the celebrated Legiſlator of *Catana*, puniſhed thoſe as criminals who were *found only in the company* of profligate and wicked people.

This then being the caſe, you are next to obſerve that you are now arrived at that *critical* period, when the impreſſions the mind receives will laſt, it is probable, *during*

[a] Elments of Criticiſm, Vol. 1. p. 179.

life:

life: Now aſſociations of ideas begin to form themſelves; — and upon *this*, Philoſophers will tell us, depends the preſent happineſs or miſery of man:[a] *Now* therefore is the time to *fix on a ſure baſis*, and to *confirm*, thoſe principles of Truth, and Honeſty, and Benevolence, which have been already inſtilled into you. Reaſon may convince you of the excellence of what is right and manly; — the ſtudy of Ethics or Moral Philoſophy will point out the road and encourage you to the practice of it; — and the Examples which you find in Hiſtory, drawn out in juſt and lively colours, will enforce it ſtill more ſucceſsfully; yet all theſe put together will not make ſuch efficacious and permanent impreſſions as the Example and Converſation of your friends: Thoſe made by the *former* are too apt to loſe their influence as ſoon as our thoughts are directed to other matters; whereas the *latter* will make them ſink ſo as time ſhall not be able to obliterate them, nor engagements deſtroy their force.

Conſidering theſe and other obſervations of the like kind, it becomes you to be ex-

[a] This point is treated of in an able manner in *Hutcheſon's Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions*, Sect. 4.

tremely

tremely careful and determined on this head. It is true indeed that, in that venerable Seat of Learning, Virtue ſhines with ſuperior luſtre, yet there are to be found in it too many debauched and worthleſs characters. Now in caſe we frequent their company, we are *naturally* inclined either to *adopt their manner of living*, or to *deſpiſe* them: But a rational man ſhould do neither of theſe things: The beſt way is to have no further connexion with them than what the common forms of civility and good breeding neceſſarily demand. When indeed a perſon has properly formed his mind, he may then with ſafety occaſionally frequent ſuch company from *the beſt of motives*, the motives I mean of ſhowing them the Amiableneſs of TEMPERANCE, and of thus endeavouring to reform them. But before we are *thorough* maſters of ourſelves, it is very dangerous to do it.

And beſides, putting every regard to *literary and moral improvement* out of the queſtion, and excluſive of the havock you make in your own conſtitution, any thing like friendſhip with diſorderly perſons muſt, in the

the end, be a ſource of much greater pain and infelicity than of pleaſure; for the *miſery* of ſuch is much more probable than their *happineſs*;—and it is in our nature to ſympathize with our fellow-creatures, eſpecially thoſe, with whom we have been on intimate terms: By the like reaſoning, intimate acquaintance with perſons of *corrected minds* and *regular conduct* will be attended with effects diametrically oppoſite—

Εςιν καταφυγη πασιν οι χρηςοι φιλοι.[a]

When you ſhall have picked out a few friends of this laſt deſcription, (for they ſhould be *few in number* as well as ſelected with proper care) it would be uſeful were you to ſend me, at a leiſure hour, in a fair and honeſt way, the general outlines of their characters. By thus inuring yourſelf in time to ſcan the humours and diſpoſitions of thoſe you live with, your pen would be exerciſed, and your mental faculties would acquire keenneſs and penetration. And as long as it is done with ſome care, and with modeſty and candour, you will derive no leſs pleaſure than advantage in thus beginning to form your opinion

[a] Men. Frag. Ed. Cler. p. 254.

of

of men and manners: The genuine and ſpontaneous diſcovery of its own notions is ever agreeable to the human mind; and it will retain more forcibly, becauſe it is better ſatisfied with, the remarks it makes of its own accord, than thoſe which it paſſively receives at ſecond hand; — and this too is the only ſure way to make the deepeſt impreſſions on the heart and bring conviction to the underſtanding, which it is found neceſſary to do, before that any principle can become of habitual ſervice.

When, moreover, we ſcrutinize characters, either in a moral or literary view, with candour and deliberation, we ſhall ſoon ſhake off that petulancy and ſelf-conceit we are apt to bring with us from ſchool; acquiring thus, by degrees, a right and liberal way of thinking, and making ourſelves diſpoſed to allow the full value to every virtue and quality in Human Nature.

I have only to beg, that whilſt you are taken up with your College-Friends, you will not forget him, who thus preſumes to adviſe you, and who would have you conſider this and every other Letter, though a

poor,

poor, yet an *honeſt* and *diſintereſted* proof of his affection.

Vive, vale, Eugenio, *noſtro chariſſime cordi;*
Inque tuo vivam pectore, ut ipſe meo!

PHILANDER.

LETTER IV.

HAVING choſen a few companions of Virtue and Good Senſe, you will preſently find that their *Converſation* will be no leſs conducive to *invigorate your underſtanding*, than their *Example* to *keep you from the paths of vice and folly*; both together conſpiring to make you ambitious of attaining the character of the *real Gentleman*; or, in other words, the man of *integrity*, *good breeding*, and *ſound erudition*. But before any ſure and effectual advancement can be made this way, you ſhould think in time of regulating your Mind, and of directing the Paſſions, (which are the organs whereby the Mind exerts itſelf) to right and rational objects—

objects — Virtue and Learning are only the natural *effect* of this.

Experience, as well as Theory, informs us, that the Paſſions are in the end our great motives to action: There cannot then be a fitter employment for Reaſon, than to conduct and balance them properly; — to purge the mind of whatever bad tendencies it may have by nature, and prepare it for thoſe excellent qualifications and endowments which it is ſo capable of receiving. This is the great end of a right education; and hitherto it has been fully kept in view with regard to you. But the authority of Tutors and Parents being now a little relaxed, and as you begin to uſe your thinking powers with a degree of independence, the raiſing of proper a ſuperſtructure on this foundation will principally depend on your own care and exertion. And, believe me, *Eugenio*, the whole of the matter lies in your being able to manage yourſelf —— *Totum in eo eſt, ut tibi imperes.*[a]

As long as man retains any thing that is *decent* and *rational* about him, he can never doubt of the *wiſdom* and *propriety* of being able to regulate his Paſſions: The queſtion

[a] Tuſc. Quæſt. 11. 22.

is, *whether* and *how* this can be effected. That it *can* be effected, there remains not certainly the leaſt ſhadow of doubt: Ill indeed would man have deſerved to be ſo emphatically ſtiled by the Phyſiologiſts a MICROCOSM, if the Paſſions, which make up ſo important a ſhare of his internal ſtructure, contributed nothing to the excellence of his frame, but tended rather to *obliterate the grandeur* and *deſtroy the dignity* of the *nobleſt* part of it. The wonderful contrivance that is obſervable in this divine fabric, is not confined to the rational faculties, or to the contexture of the human ſkeleton, but is ſtrikingly extended over the *whole*. It follows then that the Paſſions, though ſome of them, upon a ſlight view, may appear violent and perverſe, muſt be modelled nevertheleſs, and tempered by Nature, ſo as to tend to the welfare of the Individual and of Society: If ſo, we muſt *neceſſarily* have the power of directing them to *juſt* and *proper* ends: And indulgent Nature has not been leſs careful of giving us this power for the right conduct of life, than of furniſhing us with eyes to ſee and hands to ward off an impending evil.

But

But how to acquire a regular ſway over our Paſſions is not perhaps ſo obvious as the *neceſſity* and *intention* of the thing.

Much has been ſaid reſpecting the imbecillity of Reaſon, and the violence of Paſſion during the ſtate of youth: It is certain, however, (as has been hinted above) that Reaſon, properly ſo called, is ſtrong enough, in every ſtage of life, to keep the reins in her hand: But this will not hold true, unleſs we live ſo as to retain ſomething of that plainneſs and ſimplicity which is conformable to Nature: Every one will readily acknowledge that our general mode of living *at preſent* is by no means according to this ſimplicity, and that therefore it tends no leſs to give preternatural ſtrength to Paſſion than to diminiſh the influence and authority of Reaſon: Hence the human Paſſions become too often the occaſion of much miſchief to the Community, as well as of miſery to thoſe under their ſway: But wiſe Nature is free from blame.—If then we wiſh to obtain a proper command over theſe powerful incentives to action, the firſt and great maxim is, TO LIVE TEMPERATELY: For thus we ſhall ſhut up every avenue

 whereby

whereby any improper force may be conveyed to them. — " And perhaps we ſtand in need of nothing more than *temperance*, an *honeſt mind*, and a *vigorous and conſtant exerciſe of the powers of Reaſon*, to render our nature nearly as amiable in its low ſphere, as ſuperior natures indued with nobler faculties, and influenced only by pure deſires."[a]

I truſt you will not only allow the *propriety*, but endeavour to reap the *advantages* that accrue from the right government of the Paſſions. And let me add, by the way, that the being able to exerciſe this government can never appear with *ſo much* luſtre and applauſe as it does in *youth* — To ſubdue a reſtiff and vigorous enemy reflects honour on the ſkill and integrity of the commander, and fills his ſoul with pleaſure; but it is in *every* man's power to overcome that which is exhauſted or worn out from natural decay and infirmities.

As this is a point of the laſt conſequence, I may perhaps add ſomething more reſpecting it by way of an appendix to this Letter, and ſhall only obſerve here that there is no

[a] See *Hutcheſon's Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions*. Sect. V. and VI.

need

need of waſting time and words in expoſing the *brutiſh* notions of the Diſciples of *Epicurus* on this head, or the *raſh* and *haughty* ones of thoſe of *Zeno* — both the one and the other acting evidently againſt Nature and right Reaſon.

LEANDER.

Leander was the eldeſt ſon of a Gentleman of no inconſiderable fortune. His father, a man of ſound ſenſe and reflexion, was aware that not only his own and his children's happineſs, but alſo that of the Community, in ſome meaſure, depended on their Education; and that their Education depended no leſs on the choice of a perſon to conduct it. Knowing then the *importance* and the *difficulty* of the thing, he took care to fix on a proper Tutor for *Leander* and his brother. He was a man of elegant manners, and a great admirer of the *Ancients*, though not *(as ſome are)* an *Enthuſiaſt* in that reſpect. Had it not been foreign to our purpoſe, I ſhould have been glad to ſend you ſome account of his method of educating his young pupils. I ſhall only juſt obſerve, in a general way, that he always kept in

view what his favourite *Grecians* meant by
E their ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ and ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑ when applied to the buſineſs of Education, and ſeemed to be perfectly acquainted with the great ſecret of making *bodily* and *mental* Exerciſes ſerve reciprocally as a ſpur and relaxation to each other.

Furniſhed with a decent ſhare of elementary Learning, and, what is of ſtill greater importance, beginning to form a taſte for the Sciences and for ſound Knowledge, *Leander* about twelve years ago was admitted a member of the *Univerſity*, to which you belong. His Tutor accompanied him. He was juſt arrived at his eighteenth year,—a period when the paſſions are as turbulent as the bluſtering ſubjects of old *Æolus*, and when it requires great ſkill and reſolution to keep them within due bounds. Thoſe of *Leander* were ſtrong and impetuous; inſomuch indeed that either from the want of true courage, or more probably from a *principle of vanity*, which *commonly* leads ſpirited young men to licentious practices, he gave them for a ſhort time a ſcope that was inconſiſtent with the character of the real Gentleman. Little room indeed had we to expect

expect in him the leaſt deviation from the path of Virtue and true Honour;—but the beſt grounded expectations of man are not on this earth always realized.

His Friend and Tutor—for the *former* ſhould *ever* be involved in the *latter*—was far from being at eaſe upon ſeeing *Leander* following this courſe of life: Though he never winked at his irregularities, yet he did not always din his ears with them: Sometimes he would expoſtulate, but never without temper, and good nature, and good arguments. If, in ſhort, during the firſt half year the *Pupil* yielded to ſome of the paſſions which reigned in the breaſt of young *Alcibiades*, it muſt be confeſſed that the *Tutor* had ſomething of the wiſdom and dexterity of that great Teacher of Youth, the admirable *Socrates*.

It has been often obſerved, "That when a right turn is given to the mind in our early years, and when right notions of Virtue and Religion have been properly impreſſed upon it, though they may be in ſome meaſure effaced for a time by impreſſions of a heteregeneous nature, yet there will be always good hopes of their revival." *Leander*'s Tutor, confiding in the truth of this obſervation,

obſervation, ſtill hoped to bring him back to his right ſenſes. Upon this he was *wholly* bent.

The firſt ſhort *Vacation* he took him up to *London*; and juſt before their return to the *Univerſity* they paſſed the greateſt part of one morning in *Weſtminſter-Abbey*, in ſurveying the monuments of the illuſtrious Worthies of our Iſland: And immediately after, he conducted him, *as it were by chance*, into an *Hoſpital* wherein were lodged thoſe who were in danger of dying martyrs to the impetuoſity of their luſts:* Having for a few minutes contemplated this ſcene of horror, "*Leander*, my friend," ſaid he, being juſt at the door, and taking him affectionately by the hand, "behold theſe emaciated wretches, and call to mind the inhabitants of *Weſtminſter-Abbey*: Was it not by means of the *ſame* inſtruments, *the human paſſions*,—but how *differently* applied!—that *thoſe* arrived at *immortal renown* and *happineſs*, and that *theſe ſad ſpectres* have reduced themſelves to the loweſt ſtate of *infamy* and

* This laſt circumſtance was perhaps ſuggeſted from a paſſage in *Rouſſeau's Philoſophical Dream* about Education. See his *Emilius*, towards the end. It is but juſtice, however, to ſay, that there are many good hints and obſervations interſperſed in this book, which I make no doubt might be put in practice.

deſpair?

deſpair? You are now returning to College — Conſider this matter, my worthy friend, with the attention it deſerves."

The ſcheme had its intended effect. It made him ſeriouſly *conſider*; and this is all that moſt young rakes ſtand in need of (if they are capable of this) to make them return to the path of Virtue. He found it, however, no eaſy taſk to eſtabliſh that admirable mode of living, and that propriety of conduct, for which he became afterwards ſo deſervedly diſtinguiſhed. Believe me, *Eugenio*, there is need of great courage and reſolution to paſs from a life of gaiety to that kind of ſtudy which is neceſſary to the attainment of *valuable* accompliſhments: When Virtue is not altogether an *artificial* thing, but ſtands on the firmeſt foundation and is in a manner made to become *habitual* (as was at firſt the caſe reſpecting this young man), even *then* the Paſſions may ſeize an unguarded moment, and upbraid Reaſon with its frailty: But when once they have got the rein, to call them back to the ſtation for which wiſe Nature deſigned them, becomes far more difficult — *Hic labor — hoc opus eſt* —. Theſe, like every thing elſe belonging to man,

~~man,~~ if they meet with too much indulgence and ſucceſs, are apt to grow reſtiff, and leap over the boundaries preſcribed them from the beginning, continuing intractable and uncontrouled.

But *Leander*, as he was nothing more, ſo was he nothing leſs, than a Man. His thoughts having continued to flow in the channel wherein his excellent Tutor had put them, he was ſoon convinced that it was a *manly* and a *noble* thing to barter the *fleeting* and *unſatisfactory* pleaſures of the *Senſualiſt* for thoſe *ſublime* ones of the *ſober-minded Philoſopher*. He reflected much on the day's adventure in *London*,—he called to mind the virtuous character of young *Scipio*, and the aſtoniſhing inſtances of fortitude and reſolution to be met with in ſeveral others at his age: Theſe and ſimilar reflexions made him pant after "*the Great and the Honourable.*" In two words—He *conſidered:* He *conquered.*

Thus *Leander* preſently found that his taſk was not of an invincible nature. Knowing that the brighteſt parts ſtand in need of diligence and application, he ſoon contracted a habit of ſtudy. And by thus rendering a great

great part of his happineſs independent, he blunted the edge of every violent and leading paſſion: If indeed he found any improper ſolicitation from this quarter, he would immediately divert his attention to other buſineſs and amuſements;—and by thus giving a new turn to his thoughts would prevent them from dwelling on any object which might tend to corrupt them. He had recourſe to ſuch little precautions, becauſe he knew that by means of them great Virtues are eſtabliſhed: Small matters often prevent great improprieties and misfortunes: *And a truly honeſt mind has a variety of little reſources againſt vice, which others either know not or deſpiſe.* Thus he proceeded with *diffidence,* indeed, but with *reſolution,* confirming thoſe notions and tender habits which his Tutor had taught him in the ſhades of a retired life: And habits of Virtue, when once properly confirmed, are more difficult to be ſhaken off than any other whatſoever.

In all this you muſt not ſuppoſe that he affected any kind of ſingularity; or was converted into an auſtere liver, or the unſocial book-worm. Far otherwiſe. He was ſenſible

ſible that good company, rational converſation, and the endearments of true friendſhip, fill the mind with every ſocial pleaſure and give one a right enjoyment of life, and this he conſidered as nearly the *whole* of Philoſophy; he therefore devoted ſome part of every evening to ſociety: The conſcious improvement of his intellectual faculties, the integrity of his life, and the careſſes of every man of true worth made him there ſhow that cheerfulneſs which it is not eaſy to expreſs, and which none but a *Leander* can feel.—He got up early—divided the firſt part of the morning between reading and reflexion, and ſpent about two or three hours every day in ſome manly Exerciſe. He was a great enemy to that fooliſh cuſtom of having breakfaſt-parties, wherein, he uſed to ſay, was planned many a ſcheme ending in vice and folly; and was of opinion that the evening was the fit time for relaxing the mind with the ſweets of converſation.

After this manner did *Leander* wiſely diſtribute his time between *contemplation* and *action*—between *ſolitude* and *ſociety*; the *one* gave him an opportunity to meditate on the works of Nature,—the end of his own exiſtence,

ence, and the character he was to support whilst he enjoyed it on this earth; and from the *other* he derived that elegance of language, that ease and sweetness in behaviour which give an amiable lustre to Virtue and every other valuable accomplishment. It may be observed, that his Companions consisted of a small number of congenial minds.—The polish to be derived from *mixed* society must be acquired elsewhere, not at the *University*: That is not the place; nor is it the time.

In this uniform conduct he resolutely persevered, which became at length, if I may use the expression, *a practical* translation—I never expect to see a *literal* one—of the το καλον κἀγαθον of the *Greeks*: It also furnished a striking proof of the truth of that fine maxim we find in *Plutarch*: Ελȣ ϐιον ἀριστον, ἡδυν δε αὐτον ἡ Συνηθεια ποιησει. And we may justly consider the man, who forms and preserves such a conduct, as an honour not only to his Tutor, or his College, or to any society of men whatsoever, but, as we now find it, an honour to the nature we are of: It was evidently the intention of the Author of this nature that we should preserve its full

full dignity: And it is yet in the power of us all to bring it to a high pitch of perfection: And this ſhould be an argument, though of an inferior degree, with great minds, to encourage us all to the attempt: *Poſſunt quia poſſe videntur* — But theſe reflexions are growing too ſerious. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER V.

NOTHING on earth, *Eugenio*, can be more pleaſing than that pure and ſolid ſatisfaction which ſprings in the heart of an honeſt man from the perſuaſion of his being of eſſential ſervice to thoſe he loves. I feel ſomething like this ſatisfaction, when I find that the friendly hints which I propoſe to you, are neither laughed at nor careleſsly thrown aſide; — when, on the contrary, you tell me "that your inexperienced years ſtand in need of ſuch a monitor; — that the obſervations, though they may not be new and ſtriking,

ſtriking, ſhall loſe none of their influence,—but that what is dictated by ſo diſintereſted a motive, as a real concern for your welfare, ſhall not be lightly regarded or wantonly miſapplied."——This is the language of *friendſhip*, and it is more perſuaſive than that of the *Athenian Orator*. In friendſhip raſhneſs and exceſs is ſometimes pardonable: In other things I ſhould condemn the man who aims at what is above his reach; but when he does it from the honeſt motive of endeavouring to ſerve his friend, even ſuch an attempt is at leaſt *excuſable*. Hence it is that I am not unwilling to liſten to your ſolicitation, and proſecute our plan of Correſpondence with a degree of confidence.

I have now good reaſon to be convinced that you begin to *feel* the influence of *Virtue*, who I truſt will appear to *Eugenio* in the ſame light, and with all the attractive ſweetneſs and ſimplicity ſhe did to young *Hercules*;[a] and that you, like him, will accept her offers, and cheriſh the lovely Nymph in your boſom—It is in her power, and in her power *alone*, to give true cheerfulneſs, and inward peace and tranquillity.

Now unleſs this tranquillity, this ſelf-

[a] See the *Memorabilia*.

complacency

complacency was taking place, the cloſeſt application would anſwer but little purpoſe. It is morally impoſſible that Learning ſhould yield its choiceſt fruit in a ſoil which has not been duly cultured and prepared. To this previous culture and preparation my young friend has already directed his attention, and is exerting himſelf not without ſucceſs. He is fit, therefore, to enter upon a Courſe of ſtudy—ſuch a Courſe I mean as it is neceſſary for every liberally educated perſon to go through, and in which he now promiſes fairly to acquit himſelf like a man. Leſt, however, he ſhould at all deviate from his right path through the boundleſs and beaten plain which is now opening to his view, I am ready, nay ſolicitous, to ſtretch out a friendly hand; not, indeed, that I am under any ſort of apprehenſion on this head, becauſe I am well perſuaded that you are entruſted to a much *abler* guide, of whoſe abilities and integrity I have the higheſt opinion:—But as the moſt trifling aſſiſtance may not be unacceptable at this *momentous* and *deciſive* period, it ſhall be my buſineſs to go on with my *Eugenio* hand in hand, pointing out the adjacent beauties,

and

and endeavouring to amuſe him with ſome *pertinent*, though *trivial* converſation, ſo as to render this important journey leſs tedious and leſs fatiguing. But, if I may continue the metaphor ſtill farther, let me here apprize you, that though it is likely to be at firſt a rugged road, full of ſteeps and difficulties, at which perhaps your youthful mind will be diſmayed, yet fear not but in time it will ſurmount them all: For, like *Virgil's* FAME,

Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo;
Parva metu primò, mox ſeſe attollit in auras;
Ingrediturque ſolo, et caput inter nubila condit.

There is need of nothing but reſolution and perſeverance. A tolerable foundation has been laid: The ſuperſtructure will riſe apace, and it will riſe with ſecurity.

Upon looking over what I have written, I find it to be little more than *metaphor* and *quotation:* But as I cannot diveſt my mind of thoſe lines which ſuggeſted the greateſt part of it, and as, moreover, they will do in every reſpect to preſerve an uniform complexion throughout the whole, I will try your patience a little longer—They

 are

are thoſe beautiful lines quoted by *Xenophon* in his *Memorabilia*—You know them well—They are ſix of the beſt that old *Heſiod* ever wrote—I will therefore tranſcribe them without further apology.

N. B. Under the word ΑΡΕΤΗ is comprehended every qualification that is *good* and *manly*, and *liberal:* Under ΚΑΚΟΤΗΣ, the contrary:

Την μεν γὰρ ΚΑΚΟΤΗΤΑ καὶ ἱλαδον ἐστιν ἑλεσθαι
Ῥηϊδιως· λειη μεν ὁδος, μαλα δ' ἐγγυθι ναιει.
Της δ' ΑΡΕΤΗΣ ἱδρωτα θεοι προπαροιθεν ἐθηκαν
Ἀθανατοι, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὀρθιος οιμος ἐπ' αυτην,
Καὶ τρηχυς το πρωτον· επην δ' εις ακρον ἱκηται,
Ῥηϊδιη δὴ ἑπειτα πελει, χαλεπη περ ἐοῦσα—

Obſerve the ſweetneſs and encouragement contained in the concluſion;

επην δ' εις ακρον ἱκηται,
Ῥηϊδιη δὴ ἑπειτα πελει, χαλεπη περ ἐοῦσα.

Continue to equip yourſelf for the journey, and farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER VI.

MY *Lord Bolingbroke*, in his *Letters on the Study of Hiſtory*, obſerves, "That an application to any ſtudy, which tends neither directly nor indirectly to make us better men and better citizens, is at beſt but a ſpecious and ingenious ſort of idleneſs; and the knowledge we acquire by it is a creditable kind of ignorance, nothing more"—This is no leſs true than elegant. We ſhould therefore be particularly on our guard againſt contracting that vague and deſultory habit of ſtudying, which, having no certain and uſeful object in view, can never be productive of any good effect; and, inſtead of *invigorating* the mental faculties, tends rather to *diſtract* and *enervate* them. Did we but always remember, that the great aim of all our ſtudies ſhould be "to make us better men and better citizens," we ſhould ſeldom deviate from the right road.

Now nothing is more likely to keep us fixed to this point, than to proceed with *humility* and *reſolution*. There has never

been ſo great an obſtacle to the advancement of true Learning, as that *haughty* and *impatient* ſpirit, which, pluming itſelf with its own attainments, however ſlender and puerile, and willing to follow wherever Fancy leads the way, cannot brook the idea of undergoing the labour that is neceſſary to the acquiſition of ſound Knowledge. This is for the moſt part a foible belonging to youth. It too commonly happens, that, during this age of *levity and preſumption*, when the darkneſs in which Nature involves the human mind begins to wear away, we are inclined to ſuppoſe that we *already* know ſufficient to carry us through life with decency and with credit. All of us, unleſs we wink hard indeed, muſt ſee the folly of this; but too few have patience and courage enough to avoid it. Among theſe few I will venture to put down *Eugenio:* For he I truſt is diſpoſing his mind for the reception of wholeſome Literature, and is aware that it cannot be acquired but by *patient induſtry*.

There is likewiſe need of *order* and *regularity*. " We ſhould march all the way, even from the firſt perception of ſenſes (to uſe

uſe *Bacon's* words [a]) by line and level, — ſhould be ſecured and fortified by a certain rule and conſtant method of proceeding." It is only by the obſervance of ſome perſpicuous method, that we can proceed with any degree of certainty, and be able to acquire any ſolid improvement and ſatisfaction: Without it, application and perſeverance lead into greater perplexity; but by obſerving it, the judgment will be gradually formed and regulated, and the memory will be aſſiſted —— Ordo etiam manifeſtò juvat *Memoriam*. [b]

Having then right objects in view, and proceeding with perſeverance and regularity, *it is in the power of every one of us* to make long ſtrides towards that pleaſant place, where (as old *Heſiod* has it) VIRTUE and LEARNING have fixed their ſeats. Neither the *length*, nor the *narrowneſs*, nor yet the *roughneſs* of the road ſhould diſcourage us. And we ſhould not be dejected from a conſciouſneſs of our own weakneſs. It is not indeed poſſible for us to know either the ſtrength or weakneſs of our abilities, unleſs we exert them with reſolution and ſincerity; and ſuch an exertion will never fail of ſuc-

[a] See his Eſſays. [b] Bacon *de Aug. Scien.* 12mo. p. 337.

ceſs. To be *humble-minded* is a neceſſary thing, but to be diſmayed at a little labour indicates a *mean* and an *irreſolute* ſoul, a ſoul which will *never* arrive at excellence in any thing that is fair and manly.

You ſee I do not wiſh to lead you on by any falſe allurements. To ſuppoſe that the road to ſolid Erudition is from beginning to end a road of pleaſure is a fanciful dream,—the dream of a *Sybarite*. But ſtill, pleaſures (and thoſe of the *ſublimeſt* kind) there certainly are, though we cannot come at the full poſſeſſion of them at once. The pleaſures of Learning, like thoſe of Virtue, can be enjoyed only by thoſe who have made ſome proficiency, and who ſincerely wiſh to enjoy them.

I cannot conclude this Letter, long as it is, without congratulating you on having ſo many favourable circumſtances attending your preſent ſituation which tend to *confirm* your reſolution of proſecuting your ſtudies in a proper way. Of this kind particularly are thoſe pleaſant Walks and Gardens, which ſome of the greateſt men of this iſland have been uſed to frequent—" [a] Et tanta vis admo-

[a] Cic. de fin. &c. lib. 5. cap. 1. & 2.—The ſix firſt words are brought a little out of the place they occupy in the original.

nitionis

nitionis ineſt in locis; ut, cùm *ea loca videamus*, in quibus memoriâ dignos viros acceperimus multùm eſſe verſatos, *magis moveamur*, qùam ſiquando eorum ipſorum aut *facta audiamus*, aut *ſcriptum aliquod legamus*— Atque id quidem *infinitum* eſt in *illâ* urbe: quacumque enim ingredimur, in aliquam hiſtoriam veſtigium ponimus." To this ſhould be added the healthfulneſs of the climate, and the opportunity you enjoy of ſpending your leiſure-hours in cheerful and rational converſation with thoſe, who, like yourſelf, are candidates for fame:—Surely, ſuch things as theſe will excite in *every* mind, which has in it the ſmalleſt ſpark of *magnanimity*, an *honeſt* and a *liberal* emulation. And this paſſion, let grave Moraliſts ſay what they will, was no doubt implanted in us for wiſe purpoſes; elſe why ſhould we feel that ſublime and pure delight which ariſes from the reflexion on our having excelled our equals in any thing that is *valuable* and *praiſe-worthy*?

Cheriſh it in your boſom; but remember, at the ſame time, that you *cannot* take *too much* care to *regulate* and *direct it properly*. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER VII.

MANY entertain wrong notions with regard to reading. The generality of young men read *too little:* ſome, *too much*; not apprehending the *uſe* and *intention* of the thing. To ſecure yourſelf from falling into any miſtake, I would adviſe you to conſider the matter coolly and deliberately. And by way of giving you ſome aſſiſtance, I cannot perhaps better employ this rainy afternoon than in throwing together, *juſt as they occur*, a few general obſervations on the ſubject; and after that, we ſhall come to *particulars*: It is here of the higheſt conſequence to ſet out aright, otherwiſe the beſt laid plan, and the moſt vigorous exertion and perſeverance, would be of no avail; for the *abuſe* of reading, inſtead of *advancing*, becomes, on the contrary, an *impediment* to the progreſs of Knowledge.

In peruſing books we are influenced principally by two motives: the one is, to amuſe ourſelves; the other, to improve our reaſoning faculties. If we ſuffer ourſelves to

to be led on by the *former*, any more than what may be juſt neceſſary to relieve the attention, we ſhall be on the high road to dangers and miſtakes. But it would be certainly an important ſtep towards the attainment of Learning, if we could make our pleaſure to conſiſt chiefly in being influenced by the *latter*. I grant, indeed, that thoſe Authors which ſport with the imagination are, to young men, *generally ſpeaking*, by far the moſt agreeable; becauſe (with many other reaſons) the peruſal of theſe requires no exertion of the thinking powers of the Mind. But here you muſt uſe reſolution: A little will do; for if you will boldly oppoſe, at firſt, this propenſity, I can aſſure you of ſucceſs: A Mind, which contains any ſeeds of what is *great* and *liberal*, perceiving the *emptineſs* and *dangerous tendency* of what merely dallies with the fancy and the paſſions, and feeling inwardly a wonderful *deſire* and *capacity* of being poliſhed and enlarged, will ſoon turn with pleaſure to *that mode of reading*, whereby alone it can acquire any degree of *poliſh* and *enlargement*. This being once ſettled into a habit, all is ſecure. If Nature ſhould have given

us a Mind too volatile to undergo at once the labour of nice deductions and inquiries, we ſhould inure it to them *by degrees*; gently exerting its powers nevertheleſs, leſt they become languid and paralitic: But it ill becomes us, if we are friends to ourſelves, to conſider *cowardice*, or *indolence*, or *irreſolution*, as any natural volatility of diſpoſition.

But although we may be right and determined as to the *object* of our reading — the improvement of the Mind, that is; yet we are frequently apt to be miſtaken with regard to the *means* uſed in endeavouring to acquire it. Many there are, who, after the peruſal of ſeveral Volumes, not finding themſelves making the progreſs they expected, conclude too haſtily, that to obtain any portion of true Learning, falls to the ſhare of *only a few favourites of Nature*, from which number they would modeſtly exempt themſelves: The fault originates with themſelves, and poſſibly with thoſe who preſide over their education: Such want order and judgment to direct them: Nature, in the diſtribution of the powers of the human Mind, is, for the moſt part, extremely equal.

Others,

Others, again, are of opinion that if they induſtriouſly collect ſuch curious and valuable books and manuſcripts as are unknown or inacceſſible to the greateſt part of the *Literati*, they are on the direct road to true Learning. Theſe people, all whoſe knowledge lies in their fine *Libraries*, may well be compared to that ſilly *Roman*, who, as *Seneca*[a] informs us, uſed to pay able and ingenious men for being conſtantly about him — For what, think you? — why, in caſe any learned topic was ſtarted (and ſuch no doubt was perpetually hunted after) theſe were to ſupply him, one with an acute ſaying from *Ariſtotle* or *Plato*, — this with a witty one from *Ariſtophanes* — a third with a verſe of *Homer* and ſo on — every one giving him a ſcrap out of his own Author: However, *Claviſcus Sabinus*, for that was the fool's name, thought himſelf a man of very great learning, becauſe it was in the heads of thoſe whom he kept in his ſervice.

Theſe men collect indeed and run over a multitude of books, but never reflect on their contents; never exert the powers of the Mind, nor try to make them capable of

[a] Epiſt. 27.

diſcerning

diſcerning and digeſting that which is uſeful — forgetting altogether, that he

who reads
Inceſſantly, and to his reading brings not
A ſpirit and judgement equal or ſuperior,

Uncertain and unſettled ſtill remains,
Deep vers'd in books and ſhallow in himſelf,
Crude or intoxicate, collecting toys,
And trifles for choice matters — worth a ſponge;
As children gathering pebbles on the ſhore.[a]

When the celebrated Dean of *St. Patrick* ſaid, that all who wiſhed to make themſelves Scholars ought to *read* ſeven or eight hours every day during the firſt part of their life, he meant no doubt that they ſhould ſpend that time in uſing themſelves to think regularly, to canvaſs the opinions of the Authors they peruſed, and to draw from them proper concluſions and information. It is thus we ſhall make a progreſs in acquiring Knowledge: By thus following the track wherein Authors make their obſervations and diſco-

[a] Par. Regained iv, 322.

veries,

veries, we ſhall learn to exert our own powers of invention, and be ſupplied with materials to exert them with advantage: This is the great uſe and intention of books. —" [a]Non *paranda* nobis ſolùm, ſed *fruenda* etiam Sapientia eſt." Let it not be your concern to read *much*, but to read *well*.

It would, I think, facilitate very much what I am anxious that you ſhould attend to, if, upon meeting with any thing extraordinary in any man's life, or any new obſervation recorded in an Author you read, you were to ſhut the book and imagine yourſelf in their circumſtance or ſituation, and conſider the merit or demerit of the action or ſentiment, comparing it with what *you* might have done or ſaid on the ſame occaſion: [b] Or, if, when you meet with a General, who, though he has an opportunity of making a ſpeech to his ſoldiers, yet opens not his mouth, you were to put yourſelf at the head of his army, and compoſe an harangue for him: Or again, when you find a Senator ſitting ſilent, you ſhould make him riſe up, and, having properly conſidered the matter in debate and the character of him

[a] Cic. De Fin. i. 1. [b] De Aug. Scien.

you

you would wiſh to ſpeak, deliver in his ſtead an Oration adapted to the purpoſe; endeavouring to make the matter and words ſuch as he might have been ſuppoſed to uſe—Theſe, and other incidents of the like kind, often occur in the ſpeech-making but admirable Hiſtorians of Antiquity. Numerous are the advantages to be derived from ſuch a practice. Among others, it would tend to make you obſerve the peculiar and hidden excellencies of the Authors you peruſe;—it would exerciſe your faculties in applying properly your own ſentiments, and your pen in imitating their language;—and thus by inuring you to think after their manner, and by poliſhing your ſtyle, it would teach you in time to catch ſomething of their ſpirit and elegance, and make their ſeveral beauties as it were your own.

Take the following account of one who went on in another way:

PHILOPHEMES.

It has been ſaid, that ſince the birth of the Arts and Sciences, reading was never ſo much

much in fashion as in the *present age*; and that men, generally speaking, were never so *ignorant* and *superficial*. However dogmatical this assertion may be, it is nevertheless too true that there are many who read with no *other* view than to *talk* and *shine in company*: This being the summit of their ambition, they suppose that the remembrance of some particular facts, some fine sentences, or humourous anecdotes will make up for every other deficiency. It is, I believe, amongst these glittering bawbles we must rank *Philophemes*. He was sent to the University at about eighteen, possessed of no small share of school-learning: This, however, he did not much increase.

The love of praise, when *moderate* and *well directed*, gives birth, at least it gives *vigour* and *refinement* to several noble qualifications; when *otherwise*, it is the cause of much mischief. This was the ruling passion in the breast of *Philophemes*.

His aim was, to be considered as a man of the most extensive knowledge, as well as of the most elegant and refined taste: The principles of the latter, indeed, had been given him by Nature; but these were rather

vitiated

vitiated than improved by the method he adopted in acquiring the former. Inſtead of reading thoſe models of the *ſublime* and *beautiful* in compoſition with the attention they deſerve, he thought of doing the buſineſs by a much nearer way; for rather than peruſe the great Writers of ancient *Greece* and *Rome*, ſo as to be able to imitate their beauties, and enter into the true ſpirit of their works, *Philophemes* had recourſe to enervated tranſlations and paltry abridgements. His time was therefore principally taken up in running over the more ſhowy but flimſy productions of the day; in learning the ſeveral languages of *France*, *Italy*, *Spain*, *Holland*, *Portugal*, and *Germany*; and in dabbling with the elements of Geometry. In converſation, he would quote, with ſeeming facility, *Voltaire*, or *Taſſo*, or *Camoens*, or any other firſt rate Author in theſe *centum linguis*, the bare *enumeration* of which is enough to perplex and confound one. And as to *Hebrew*, *Perſic*, *Arabic*, *Syriac*, and *Greek* and *Latin*, his knowledge in theſe was not inferior *(ut fama erat)* to that of a *Pocock* or a *Scaliger*. Among readers of the common ſort, like myſelf and others, he

he would talk of *Thucydides* and *Livy* as of his moſt intimate companions. Honeſt *Homer* he was wont to extol with a degree of enthuſiaſm, and would have us believe that he had peruſed all the voluminous commentaries and compilations of the indefatigable Biſhop of *Theſſalonica*. Of ſuch vaſt extent was the capacity of *Philophemes!*

But let us not be carried away with appearances. A diſcerning eye might eaſily perceive that his knowledge went but a very little way beyond the Grammar; or, more properly ſpeaking, (for he had never well digeſted the elementary principles of moſt of the languages he uſed to dabble in) he was juſt able to make a fine quotation, and to paſs a pretty accurate opinion on the principal Authors in them: That was all. This, however, is apt to dazzle a common obſerver. And beſides, "ſuppoſe a Linguiſt (as [a] *Milton* ſtrongly expreſſes it) was to pride himſelf to have all the tongues that *Babel* cleft the world into, yet, if he had not ſtudied the ſolid things in them as well as the words and lexicons, he were nothing ſo much to be eſteemed a learned man, as

[a] In his *Tractate on Education.*

any yeoman or tradeſman competently wiſe in his mother-dialect only." Suppoſe not, however, that I think *lightly* of ſtudying the languages: I only wiſh that all ſtudies, whatever they be, were made ſubſervient to ſome *uſeful* and *rational* end.

Philophemes it is true *read* a great deal, but it may be queſtioned whether he ever really *thought* in his life. His converſation was forced and artificial: His Memory was naturally retentive; to this he was *wholly* indebted: His powers of reaſoning and invention were never exerted: So that whatever his acquiſitions were, he was poſſeſſed of no *real knowledge*; for it cannot be called any real knowledge to know any thing by *rote*—*It is only a bare retention of what has been entruſted to the Memory.*

His method was, whenever he had any previous notice of the company he ſhould meet, to furniſh himſelf with materials for diſcourſe—Apud *alios* loqui videlicet didicerat, non multum ipſe *ſecum*[a]—Being once preſent at a Gentleman's houſe, where two Surgeons, ſenſible men, ſpent the evening; *Philophemes*, as his manner was, introduced

[a] Cic. Tuſcul. Quæſt. v. 36.

Anatomy

Anatomy on the carpet without the leaſt apparent intention. The topic was diſcuſſed with great eloquence. The ſons of *Æſculapius* were now in their element, and on the ſubject of *oſteology* in particular they diſplayed no ſmall ſhare of ſkill and erudition. But *Philophemes* ranſacked over the whole *Ars Medica*; and his ſuperior volubility attracted the eyes of all: "In truth" (ſaid one of the company, after a while, with perhaps more pleaſant *ſarcaſm* than *good-nature*) "my friend *Philophemes* has *Cheſelden* and *Haller* at his finger's end;—to be ſure he was at them till *paſt twelve laſt night*." We ſmiled. He bluſhed.

I need not point out to you more particularly that ſuch a method of going to work, beſides the *futility* of it, will at length be ſure to bring one into very *ridiculous* and *diſagreeable* circumſtances: For all fictions will ſoon fall away, as the bloſſoms do from the trees: there is nothing feigned, any more than violent, that can poſſibly be of long duration: So that the *neareſt* and *moſt ſecure* way to honour and reſpect is, in the end, the ſame as was chalked out and recommended by the excellent *Socrates*, *To*

be, that is, *in reality what one wiſhes to be eſteemed.*[a]

I have juſt this moment called to mind another anecdote, which may perhaps, if there was any kind of neceſſity, ſet this matter in a clearer light—I will therefore mention it.

Philophemes was deſigned for the Church. He was appointed, ſoon after he was ordained Prieſt, to preach at a Viſitation held by the Biſhop of . . . . . —The appointment was highly pleaſing to this young man; for as the audience was likely to be learned and numerous, he looked upon it as a good opportunity for extending the limits of his fame. But where was the Sermon to be had? for the brain of *Philophemes* had never attempted to put together any thing like a regular compoſition of any kind. But no matter how or where:—he was pleaſed with the appointment. The thoughts of making a Sermon himſelf—and to his praiſe be it mentioned—never once entered into his head. He therefore, like another *Claviſcus Sabinus*, had recourſe to a Curate

[a] See *Cicero's Offices*, II. 12. and *Xenophon's Memorabilia*, paſſim.

of

of his—for you muſt know that *Philophemes* was a DIGNITARY in the Church, pampering himſelf at the age of *ſix and twenty* with the revenues of a GOLDEN PREBEND, and a no leſs GOLDEN LIVING!!!—— But this Curate, who he underſtood was eſteemed a liberal and ingenious man, either from want of time, or from ſome neceſſity or other, played his young Rector on this occaſion but a ſcurvy trick. Attend the ſequel. Behold *Philophemes* now in the Pulpit, diſplaying his oratorial talents with no leſs energy than *Mark Tully Cicero*; and now behold him—ſad contraſt!—receiving this anonymous note, juſt as he is going to dine with the Biſhop: "If your vanity ſhould prompt you to *publiſh* the Diſcourſe which we juſt now heard, a friend adviſes you to apprize the world in the title-page, that it is at leaſt *the Second Edition*, for it has *already* appeared in print about ten years ago, when it met with univerſal and deſerved approbation. His Lordſhip, no doubt, and the reſt of the learned audience are much obliged to you for delivering it with ſo much eloquence and ſolemnity."

Are

Are you not moved, *Eugenio*, with ſomething like a mixture of pity and contempt for this frivolous young man?—If you wiſh to be the cauſe of ſuch emotions, imitate *Philophemes*.

Such a character, however, is conſidered by ſome men as a kind of prodigy. For my own part, (and I adopt the words of old *Melibœus* with all ſincerity) "Non equidem *invideo: miror* magis." For, in my opinion of things, the contracted ſpan of human life is too ſhort to be waſted in this deſultory and puerile way; and it ſeems to me to be much wiſer for us, and much more agreeable to the intention of our preſent exiſtence, to proceed in ſome *regular, rational* manner; and to *read*, as well as *act*, not with views to *oſtentation*, but to *acquire true Wiſdom and Virtue*; improving our reaſon with the utmoſt diligence, and making every faculty we have as beneficial as poſſible both to *ourſelves* and to our *fellow-creatures*.

LETTER

LETTER VIII.

I AM glad to hear that your Public Lectures begin with the Mathematics. It is entering on a Courſe of Study in a proper way, and after the ancient manner of proceeding. Every one knows that the old Philoſophers of *Greece* uſed to conſider an acquaintance with Geometry as a key to the underſtanding of the other Sciences: When *Pythagoras* opened his famous School in that part of *Italy*, which was formerly called *Magna Græcia*, his Scholars were always adviſed to begin here as at the fountain head of Literature. And a ſimilar plan was afterwards adopted by *Plato* in the *Groves* of *Academus*, who never admitted to his Lectures in Natural Philoſophy and Metaphyſics thoſe who were unacquainted with the elements of Geometry. To the ſame purpoſe alſo is the ſaying recorded of his Scholar *Xenocrates*, who, having in time ſucceeded *Speuſippus* in his School, and being deſired by one that was ignorant of the Mathema-

tics and the principles of Arithmetic, to admit him to his philoſophical Lectures, replied, *Friend, I would adviſe you to go your way, for you have not the* HANDLES *of Philoſophy*——Πορευου, εφη· ΛΑΒΑΣ γαρ ου εχεις Φιλοσοφιας.[a]

Of the ſame opinion we find all other great men who did not want ſound ſenſe and proper experience in theſe matters. Out of the great liſt of Moderns, I will only mention the celebrated *Bacon*,[b] and the Author of *Paradiſe Loſt*, whoſe capacious mind ſeems to have been no leſs adapted for the ſtudy of Philoſophy in general, than it was for Poetry: "As for the uſual method of teaching Arts and Sciences, ſays he,[c] I deem it to be an old error of *Univerſities* not yet

[a] See the account of him by Diogenes Laertius. We have no word to expreſs λαβη exactly.

[b] He ſpeaks of this in very pointed terms in his Book *De Augmen. Scient.* p. 98, 99.—12mo.

[c] In his *Tractate of Education*. There are a great many valuable remarks in this little piece: But the plan he propoſes is impracticable, in as much as he requires more than the generality of men can compaſs. The Author of *Paradiſe Loſt* ſeems to have thought that all men were poſſeſſed of his mighty genius, to which every thing was feaſible and eaſy—So apt are men to judge of others by themſelves, and ſo liable are they to be miſtaken.

well

well-recovered from the ſcholaſtic groſſneſs of barbarous ages, that inſtead of beginning with Arts moſt *eaſy*, (and thoſe be ſuch as are moſt *obvious to the ſenſe*) they preſent their young unmatriculated novices at firſt coming with the *intellective abſtractions* of *Logic* and *Metaphyſics*," and ſo on. But with you what this great man very juſtly complains of (and what is too often practiſed even at this time of day) ſeems to be entirely removed, and a beginning made juſt as he would wiſh; for nothing can be more *eaſy*, nothing more *obvious to the ſenſe* than the elements of Geometry: Indeed they are ſo much ſo, that ſome have gone ſo far as to ſay, that *everybody* might make himſelf maſter of Mathematics if he would.

I need not quote any more authorities nor aſſign any further reaſons (though there are many more at hand) to aſſure you of the *propriety* of your ſetting out: And hence I have good hope that you are guided by men who ſtudy to diſcharge conſcientiouſly the duties of their high office, and who dare *throw off* the authority of meer *cuſtom* when it *oppoſes* the dictates of more *enlightened Reaſon*, and of *better Experience*—Theſe two

two conſiderations are of the greateſt importance imaginable.

Much leſs need I uſe many words either to *remove the objections* made to this Science, (for objections have been made to the moſt uſeful things in the world) or, on the other hand, to *ſhew* you its *excellence and utility*. The little that has been ſaid againſt it in former times originated in the diſordered heads of the *Sceptics* and *Epicureans*—and who is ignorant that *Pyrrho* and *Epicurus* have had, in all ages, their followers and adherents? But the ridicule of ſuch men will always reflect honour inſtead of contempt, it being an infallible proof of ſome ſuperior worth and excellence in the object of their attack. The readieſt way to anſwer the cavils of prejudiced or little minds on this head is, to oppoſe to them the advantages which accrue from the ſtudy of Geometry: And here we may ſay, and that with the utmoſt truth and impartiality, that they are *more numerous*, and of *more extenſive uſe* than what reſult from *any other human Science* whatſoever—To you, or any young man of reflexion, it would ſufficiently recommend it by ſaying, that this is a

principal

principal clue to whatever we find valuable in the whole compaſs of Literature. For there is not one ſingle Art, whether of the neceſſary or liberal kind, nor one ſingle Science, which is not, in *ſome meaſure*, ultimately indebted to this—There is little need of mentioning particulars. Now ſuppoſing a competent knowledge of theſe might be acquired without underſtanding the Mathematics, yet it muſt be allowed that thoſe who begin with the firſt principles of Science and in a *regular, approved* method, are alone on the right road to proceed with moſt accuracy and ſucceſs.

To enter at large upon this ſubject, and ſhow minutely how the whole of Learning reſts, in a great meaſure, upon this foundation, is a thing foreign to my preſent intention: I leave this to thoſe who are better able, and whom it may more immediately concern: And perhaps, indeed, at this time, it would be a matter of no great conſequence: The conſideration moſt likely to weigh with you now, is, that the Mathematics tend to the immediate improvement and ſtrengthening of your reaſoning faculties.

It is a maxim, that to acquire by gentle degrees

degrees a habit of reaſoning can alone teach us the right and perfect uſe of thoſe rational powers and principles which Nature ſeems to have implanted in us. The peruſal of a *Poem* of HOMER, of an *Oration* of DEMOSTHENES, or of the fineſt *Dialogue* of CICERO, cannot effectually do this. Nor is ſuch a habit to be acquired any where elſe with *ſo much certainty* as in the Schools of the Mathematicians. By being uſed to contemplate that *cloſe* and *elegant chain* of arguing, that wonderful *connexion* and *perſpicuity* which pervades the whole of their *ſublime* Science, you muſt *neceſſarily* catch *ſomething* of their method and acuteneſs. And after having once known the way of forming our notions of things with any accuracy, and of expreſſing them in a perſpicuous and regular manner, it will perhaps be no eaſy matter to make us deviate from it.

With regard to affairs of Literature, we are told by *Ariſtotle*, the great Arbiter in theſe things, that every Compoſition ſhould be *ἑν — one:* And *Horace*, following his maſter in this, as well as in other particulars, has the ſame doctrine:

—— *Sit quodvis ſimplex duntaxat et unum.*

In

In a multitude of other paſſages in his *Art of Poetry*, and indeed in all works of the like kind, we find this precept repeatedly inculcated. Now it is not poſſible to preſerve this *whole*, this *totality*, this *oneneſs*, (call it as you pleaſe) without being firſt able to exert our Reaſon aright, and arrange our thoughts in due order and proportion. If the Mathematics have the leaſt tendency to enable us to do this, (and they moſt evidently have) he who has the noble ambition of being any thing like a Scholar ſhould want no other *ſtimulus* to make him get a competent acquaintance with them.

The ſtudy of Geometry, by thus forming and correcting the faculties of the Mind, will ſoon diveſt it of that *unſteadineſs*, that *pride* and *volatility* which we ſo often find about young perſons—And hence they will be able to proſecute every literary buſineſs in a proper manner, and will learn to fix in time on ſome certain and rational purſuit in life.

Notwithſtanding this, and *all* that *might* be ſaid upon the ſubject, many enter upon this ſtudy with reluctance, and few have reſolution enough to make any tolerable proficiency

ficiency in it; not perhaps that they deny its *uſefulneſs* ſo much as complain of its *inſipidity*. But ſurely this is a very ill-grounded complaint; and can ariſe from no other cauſe than that irkſomeneſs and repugnancy which the human Mind feels at firſt to any ſort of conſiſtency and exertion. For the Mathematics, when properly ſtudied and when but a little progreſs is made, cannot fail of affording the higheſt delight and ſatisfaction: We all know that the firſt principles of every Art and Science are tireſome and unpleaſant, unleſs indeed we may except the Science now before us: For the Elements of *Euclid* will, as I have juſt ſaid, ſoon produce in attentive minds very different emotions—emotions I mean of Pleaſure and Admiration: It is on all hands allowed, that the *inveſtigation*, and eſpecially the *diſcovery* of *Truths*, however *ſpeculative* they may be, naturally affords us the ſublimeſt of all pleaſures. And beſides it is allowed, that *Order*, *Harmony*, and *Proportion* are things amiable in themſelves, and highly delightful to the mind of man:—No *rational* and *thinking* Being can contemplate without wonder, or rather without

out a degree of ecſtacy and rapture, that fine ſymmetry, that curious gradation, that admirable connexion and dependence on each other, that—(I want words to expreſs myſelf)—which we find throughout the works of the Divine Architect of Nature:—Now whatever bears *any ſort of reſemblance* to this, either in the works of *Art* or in matters of *Science*, will always produce *effects* of the *ſame kind*, which indeed ſhall be *proportionable* to their *cauſes*—Let it then be remembered, that there is in Geometry ſuch a beautiful *arrangement* and *connexion* of the ſeveral parts, together with ſo fine a *variety* of *ſubjects* riſing one upon the other and adapted for the exerciſe of the ſublimeſt faculties, as we may look for in vain in the *other* branches of human Learning—But of this enough.

Multaque præterea tibi poſſum commemorando
Argumenta fidem dictis conradere noſtris:
Verùm animo *ſatis hæc veſtigia parva* ſagaci
Sunt, per quæ poſſis cognoſcere cætera tute.[a]

Upon the whole, then, I would have you reſt ſatisfied that you are now entering on

[a] Lucret. 1. 400.

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an *uſeful* and a *pleaſing* Science, and that a competent knowledge of it is a thing *neceſſary* to be acquired by all who wiſh to go through a Courſe of liberal Education in the moſt advantageous way. Suppoſing even you *did not at firſt ſee* its direct uſe and tendency, you ſhould not for *that reaſon* reject it; for believe me, you will perceive, in time, that it has ſo *powerful*, though perhaps *inſenſible*, an influence upon the Mind, as to enable it to proſecute other purſuits with greater *ſtrength* and *advantage*. Remember what I have told you before, that a *haughty*, *impatient* ſpirit is no leſs an impediment to the progreſs of ſound Knowledge, than *indolence* and *timidity*. Be not diſcouraged at the firſt ſetting out, and I will venture to aſſure you of ſucceſs. Let me again remind you, that there is no *Happineſs*, no *Virtue*, no *Literary Attainments* to be arrived at without *manly reſolution* and *perſeverance*.

Nunc animis opus, Eugenio, *nunc pectore firmo*.

As to the *method* of ſtudying this Science, I do not apprehend any difficulty. Commentators will be of no real ſervice to you: At

At this time, however, every thing of that nature ſhould I think be avoided — But here you have a better guide to direct you — *Euclid* has choſen the beſt Problems and Theorems, and has placed them in, perhaps, as clear and elegant a manner as poſſibly can be. Many have attempted to alter his ſelection and arrangement, but their attempts have only ſerved to make his excellence the more conſpicuous. Be ſure to underſtand his Definitions thoroughly — Definition being what all Science is built upon, it is well known that the old Philoſophers of *Greece* have taken uncommon pains to treat this matter with all poſſible accuracy and preciſion: *Ariſtotle*'s care in this reſpect is remarkable: And *Euclid*, generally ſpeaking, is not deficient. Have therefore, in the firſt place, (I ſay it again) a clear and thorough knowledge of his Definitions; after that, attention is all that is neceſſary, and this cannot be diſpenſed with. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER IX.

THE detached tractates of the ancient Hiſtorians and Philoſophers, which you ſay you read at your Private Lectures, will do well to prepare the way for peruſing with greater eaſe and advantage a regular Hiſtory of the *Greek* and *Roman* Polity. No doubt your excellent Tutor will give you proper directions as to the *end* and *manner* of reading them; yet here, as well as in other things, there are perhaps certain *minutiæ*, which, though ſcarce worthy of his notice, ought to be attended to nevertheleſs. It ſhall be the buſineſs of this Letter to glance at ſuch particulars.

There are many who admire the writings of Antiquity for no other reaſon but becauſe all the world admires them: Whilſt a few others, on the contrary, depreciate and undervalue them from the mere affectation of being ſingular — So capricious a thing is the mind of man when not guided by *unprejudiced* and *cultivated* Reaſon! Now theſe perſons are equally in the dark with regard

to

to the beauties of the *Ancient Compoſition*; the one being not *able*, the other not *wiſhing* to underſtand it. In truth there is need of a very correct taſte and judgement, to ſee all its excellencies, and to reliſh that *genuine ſimplicity* in which it is handed down to us: Yet he that is not capable of doing this, cannot poſſibly derive either *pleaſure* or *improvement* from reading the works of the Ancients: But they are highly productive of both; and it ſhould be the great care of every one, devoted to ſupport the character of a Gentleman, to fix upon and adhere reſolutely to that track which leads this way with greateſt certainty; taking care, at the ſame time, to avoid the enthuſiaſtic notions of thoſe who contend, that what is *uſeful* and *elegant* in Literature is to be found *no where elſe but in the productions of Antiquity*.

The great end of ſtudying the *Claſſics* is, it is plain, to make them uſeful and ſubſervient to you in ſupporting the dignity of the ſtation you are to fill in life. To do this effectually, you muſt read them ſo as to be able to ſee their ſeveral beauties, and (yet without being a ſervile copyer or a plagiariſt) to transfuſe into your own ſtyle and compo-

ſition *ſomething* of their *ſpirit* and *method*, *ſomething* of their *majeſty* and *ſimplicity*. Whoever thus ſoberly analyſes theſe great models will, it is true, acquire leſs *general* and *faſhionable* learning, but, which ſhould be the firſt object, he will treaſure up a ſtock of *ſound knowledge*; and having inured himſelf to a habit of reflexion, will always have it in his power to draw out and apply this knowledge with *eaſe* and *propriety*.

Again: In order fully to reap this advantage, we muſt render theſe writers eaſy and agreeable to us, ſo as to be able to enter into the true ſpirit of their works: Here it is ſeen at once that to make oneſelf at leaſt a *tolerable* maſter of the language in which they wrote is altogether a neceſſary thing: And this is not to be done in a little time or with a little trouble: That, however, it is not *inſurmountable*, many a worthy character of our own country and of our own times will both convince us and encourage us to the taſk.

Now as to the means of attaining theſe points, let us look up in particular to the example of the claſſical writers of *Ancient Italy*. In the *philoſophical works* of *Cicero* we ſhall find perhaps not a great deal more than the

the thoughts and opinions of *Pythagoras*, of *Plato*, of *Ariſtotle*, and the other Philoſophers of *Greece*, judiciouſly ſelected and applied after his own way:[a]—The bee, it has been ſaid, though ſhe culls her materials from various and different flowers, works up her honey ſo as to make it have a taſte wholly original and peculiar to itſelf: So perhaps in this reſpect we may ſay of this great man.—*Homer*, *Heſiod*, and *Theocritus* were confeſſedly the luminaries whereby *Virgil* ſteered his courſe. And upon comparing the *Commentaries* of *Julius Cæſar* with the *Anabaſis* of *Xenophon*, we ſhall be inclined, it is probable, to give no leſs praiſe to the *imitative* manner of the *Roman* than to the *original* work of the *accompliſhed* Scholar of *Socrates*.

Theſe and every other ſubſequent writer of credit and correctneſs had ſome model before

[a] So much indeed is repeatedly confeſſed by himſelf—See *de Nat. Deor.* I. 4 and 5.—his *Tuſc. Quæſt.*—his *Academ. Quæſt.* and his *De Fin.* paſſim. We ſhall find him alſo endeavouring to imitate his favourite *Plato* both with regard to his ſubjects and his manner of treating them. "His chief deſign was to give his countrymen, in their own language, a Hiſtory of the Ancient Philoſophy, rather than any ſyſtem of his own, and explain to them what the old Philoſophers had ſaid or written, on thoſe ſubjects that were conſidered moſt important."

them: This indeed they ſtudied to imitate, but they did it with the *hand of a maſter*; borrowing ſome particular graces, according to the nature of their ſubject and the idiom of their language.

Horace acknowledges that *Archilochus* was the pattern he followed in Iambic Poetry, and tells you what uſe he made of him; defending at the ſame time the *merit* and *propriety* of ſuch imitation:

—— numeros animosque *ſecutus*
Archilochi, non res *et agentia* verba *Lycamben.*
Ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus ornes,
Quòd timui mutare modos et carminis artem.[a]

But after what *manner* did they *ſtudy* theſe models? Not, we may be ſure, through the medium of *abridged* or *tranſlated* copies of them. It is true indeed that *Cicero* and others uſed to tranſlate *Greek* Compoſitions in order to form a good ſtyle; but they never dreamt of doing it with any further views, or of facilitating to others the acquiſition of the orginal language. This was the invention of a more indolent period, when man-

[a] Lib. 1. Ep. 19.

kind

kind became too liſtleſs to exert properly their intellectual powers.

However ſerviceable Tranſlations may have been at ſome particular period, or conſidered in ſome particular points of view; yet from the time they have been looked upon as neceſſary aſſiſtants to young learners, I am fully perſuaded, in my own mind, that they have not only retarded the progreſs of ſolid Erudition, but have greatly contributed towards the engendering of that falſe, ſhowy, and mixt ſort of Literature which is now ſo much in faſhion — Indeed the *one* is the *conſequence* of the *other*. If we caſt our eyes but a hundred years back, we ſhall find that the dead languages were much more generally underſtood *then* than what they are at *preſent*. The crudities which we are now daily peſtered with muſt be owing to this decay of ſound Learning. And what cauſe is to be aſſigned for this ſpeedy and manifeſt decay? *Several*, perhaps, co-operate: But the general and wrong uſe that is made of Tranſlations, is not I think to be conſidered as one of the *leaſt efficient*.

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It may be ſaid, that *numerous* and *plauſible* are the arguments which have been advanced in ſupport of a contrary opinion—True—But they are far from being ſtrong or concluſive; and moſt of them are overthrown by this ſingle obſervation, if properly examined and followed through all its conſequences: "*That* way of learning muſt be the beſt and moſt ſecure, which comes *neareſt* to the method of *inveſtigation*, becauſe *here* there is room left for the right *exerciſe* of the intellectual faculties; and it is only by the right exerciſe of theſe, that the knowledge of any *Language*, as well as of any liberal *Art* or *Science*, can *ſurely*, though perhaps *ſlowly*, be acquired." To proceed any other way is to *add to*, inſtead of *removing*, that darkneſs and inability of due exertion, with which our underſtanding is naturally attended.*

When, therefore, perſons run over the writings of the Ancients in a haſty manner,

* The celebrated *Dr. Buſby*, than whom no one, I ſuppoſe, had greater capacity or experience with regard to the inſtruction of young men, ſeems to have been convinced of the bad tendency of tranſlations; for he would never allow, it is ſaid, the uſe of any thing beſides the *bare original*, fairly and correctly printed,

without

without underſtanding either their language or the full excellency of the compoſition, they put one in mind of thoſe *petits maitres* of modern times, who think to preſerve health, and get vigour and activity to their lungs and muſcles by riding out on every occaſion in ſome eaſy vehicle of modern luxury and refinement—It was not *thus* that the *Roman* Youth attained to any eminence in their Literary Exerciſes, or in the Field of *Mars*.

If tranſlations muſt be read, let them be read by way of *amuſement*, and not with a view of underſtanding an ancient writer, or of learning his language. In theſe things they will certainly prove defective. Of the few that I have read ſince I became capable of forming any judgement on things, thoſe of XENOPHON's *Anabaſis*, done by *Spelman*, and of his *Cyropedia*, by *Aſhly*, and that of VIRGIL, by *Warton* and *Pitt*, are the only ones I met with, which ſeemed to preſerve any thing of the *true elegance*, and *majeſty*, and *ſimplicity* of the original. The merit of our famous tranſlation of the *Iliad* and *Odyſſey*, is perhaps juſtly pointed out by *Mr. Blackwell*,

Blackwell,[a] where he ſays, "That *Pope* has taught *Homer* to ſpeak *Engliſh* incomparably better than any language but his own." Theſe tranſlations, and *ſuch as theſe*, together with the annotations ſubjoined to them, may be read, during leiſure-hours, with a degree of pleaſure and improvement.

Dr. Johnſon indeed obſerves, "That the HOMER of *Pope*, as well as the ANACREON of *Cowley*, has admitted the decoration of ſome modern graces, by which he is undoubtedly made more amiable to common readers; and, perhaps, if they would honeſtly declare their own perceptions, to far the greater part of thoſe whom Courteſy and Ignorance are content to ſtile the *Learned*.[b]" This obſervation is, perhaps, rather vague and dogmatical: However, there ſeems to be much truth in it: But this is to be attributed to nothing with more juſtice than to that miſchievous practice of encouraging the uſe of tranſlations, which naturally tends to give the mind an *indolent* and *careleſs* turn, and a *diſtaſte* to the labour neceſſary for the attainment of the original language. And

[a] In his *Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer.*

[b] See his *Life of Cowley.*

beſides,

beſides, it is too generally ſuppoſed, "that modern Erudition hath *ſuperſeded* and *rendered uſeleſs* an acquaintance with ancient Authors." When ſuch a practice and ſuch a ſuppoſition prevail, or are even *countenanced*, where is the wonder that *Pope* ſhould be more eagerly ſought after than *Homer*, or that *Cowley* ſhould be allowed to have tuned the *Lyre of Love* with greater ſkill than *Anacreon*?

I am perſuaded, however, that he who has naturally what may be formed into a correct taſte, will, with a *moderate* knowledge of *Greek* and of *ancient manners*, (for the *one* is as *neceſſary* as the *other*) derive much greater pleaſure from reading the *ſimple*, *energetic* language of *Homer*, than what the *ſmoothly-flowing Engliſh Iliad* is capable of affording even to "a *common* reader:[a]" And the forming of ſuch a taſte ſhould be attended to in time, before the

[a] *Cervantes*, with his uſual humour and good ſenſe, obſerves, That to read an Author in a *tranſlation* is like viewing a piece of *Flemiſh Tapeſtry* on the *wrong* ſide, where, though the figures are diſtinguiſhable, there are ſo many ends and threads, that the *Beauty* and *Exactneſs* of the Work is obſcured, and not ſo advantageouſly diſcerned as on the *right* ſide of the hangings. See *Don Quixote*, Part II. 62.

palate

palate is vitiated with the leſs wholeſome flavour of modern Literature.

Theſe things I ſpeak from my own experience: And I have dwelt the longer on the ſubject, becauſe you are now at full liberty either to uſe Tranſlations or not: If you do, be aſſured that it is not the way to reap ſolid advantages; you may perhaps *read more*, but you will *ſtudy leſs*: If, on the other hand, you reſolutely avoid them, there will be no reaſon to repent: And, furniſhed as you are with the principles of the two languages, and with no inconſiderable ſtock of words, if you ſit down with a mind willing and determined to wade through a few difficulties, having your *Scapula* or *Ainſworth*, and *Potter*'s or *Kennett*'s ANTIQUITIES by your ſide, believe me, neither *Greek* nor *Roman Claſſic* will have any obſtacles to throw in your way; but, ſoftening that harſh viſage which *Cowardice* or *Ignorance* ſuppoſes them to wear, they will ſoon become moſt agreeable companions. And whilſt you *expand* your mind and render it *fit* for *general inveſtigation* by *thus exerting* its powers, you will, at the ſame time, gradually

dually acquire an accurate knowledge of thoſe two claſſical languages which have been the *delight* and *admiration* of ſucceeding ages. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER X.

——QUITE in a reverie this morning:—abſolutely unfit for any thing which requires the leaſt thought or attention—I will, however, try to compoſe myſelf ſo as to give you an account of the manner in which I have been trifling theſe two days laſt paſt: And for doing this, your favourite Author will abundantly excuſe me: You remember how he writes to his beloved *Virgil:*

Miſce ſtultitiam *conſiliis brevem:*
Dulce *eſt* deſipere *in loco.*

Our common friend, the gay and ſprightly *Hilario,* came to ſee me about a week ago.

On

On *Thurſday* laſt he and I ſallied forth a partridge-ſhooting,—a diverſion which we are both fond of. Having ranged the fields for ſome hours, not without much ſport and ſucceſs, we found ourſelves hard by the houſe of the good old *Philoxenus*. Was you but acquainted with this worthy Gentleman, you would perhaps ſuſpect that our game did not *caſually* lead us this way. His greateſt happineſs is to adminiſter comfort and pleaſure to thoſe about him. To a great ſtock of ſound and elegant Learning, he joins all the hoſpitable and benevolent qualities of honeſt *Axylus*—one of the loveliеſt characters, in my mind, THE POET ever delineated; and that he has done in two lines:

Αφνειος βιοτοιο; φιλος δ' ην ανθρωποισι·
Παντας γαρ φιλεεσκεν, ὁδω επι οικια ναιων.

Here we met a neighbouring Gentleman, and the ſenſible *Hortenſia*, who had juſt arrived with her only daughter, the amiable *Clara*. *Philoxenus* was of the happieſt of men. Between walking, and a lively and rational converſation, we paſſed the after-

[a] Iliad Z. 14.

noon

noon in a manner the moſt agreeable: Had the miſanthrope, *Timon*, been there, his heart muſt have again felt ſome of its *natural* emotions.

Soon after tea, "*Philander*, (ſaid *Hortenſia*,) you have juſt ſeen what difficulty I have had to prevail on our hoſpitable neighbour to leave his houſe for but one day, and come to celebrate *Clara*'s birth-day tomorrow: You know I don't mind ſuch things,—only I think it may give riſe to a little harmleſs mirth: And *Philoxenus* and yourſelf have taught me, that it is our greateſt wiſdom to make our abode on this earth as ſmooth and eaſy as poſſible, and that nothing can do this like *Philanthropy*, and *Innocence*, and *Cheerfulneſs*: Now, Sir, having finiſhed my *preface*, (proceeded ſhe, ſmiling) will you be ſo good as to carry this *Card*, which I intended to have ſent from hence, to your mother and our young friend *Catharina*:—And, Gentlemen, if you would be pleaſed to attend them, I cordially give *you* the ſame invitation."—"And we moſt cordially accept it," replied *Hilario*, before I had time to ſpeak, riſing nimbly from his chair and making a profound bow

to

to *Hortenſia*.—" A thought has juſt come into my head"—(continued he, in his rattling way,) " I muſt inform you, Madam, that I have ſome little ſkill in muſical matters — you have perhaps obſerved already how fond I am of ſpeaking of my own accompliſhments — however, be that as it will — what I was thinking of is this: That I ſhould put my German Flute in my pocket, and *Philander* put in his a pretty little *Ode* on this happy occaſion; for this friend of mine makes verſes, and ſhoots partrigdes with equal ſkill and dexterity: *I* will ſet it to muſic; then this lady ſhall ſing it,—this ſhall play the Harpſichord,—this the Guitar,—and I myſelf will play the Flute—and thus, Madam, we ſhall ſpend the day moſt glorioufly:—Ladies, what ſay you to the motion?"—" A better motion, (exclaimed *Philoxenus*) there cannot be:—It requires no amendment, and will be carried without a diviſion:—*Clara*, my girl, thou muſt not object to it—'tis entirely innocent:—Go, *Philander*, and invoke your *Thalia*:—my Carriage ſhall be at your *Villula Tuſculana* by eleven to-morrow morning to fetch

fetch your mother and ſiſter:—you and your friend may come on foot."

See what an aukward ſituation this rattle-pate brought me into. I declare I had not tagged a couplet theſe ten years—an employment fit for mere boys and girls—and what could one ſay on a ſubject ſo *backneyed*, and ſo *barren* of every thing *new*: But here one was obliged to comply; for it was not poſſible to get off without being very rude indeed, and ſpoiling at the ſame time a ſcheme which promiſed ſo much harmleſs amuſement.

To be brief: We met at *Hortenſia*'s: There was a ſplendid company: The birth-day *Ode* was played with much parade and good humour: We dined: We drank tea: We ſang: We danced: In a word; we celebrated the *Eighteenth of October* with as much joy and feſtivity as if we had been celebrating the *Eighteenth of January*, which we always do, *in our humble way*, and always mean to do, as long as our amiable QUEEN remains on this earth.

I am afraid you would accuſe me of ſomething which ſhould not be in a plain, honeſt friend, was I not to ſend you this *illuſtrious*

ode; I will therefore incloſe it. However deſpicable you may conſider it, it coſt me more cudgelling of my brain than you can eaſily imagine:—when accompanied with the ſoft and moving notes of *Hilario*, I aſſure you it had no paltry effect: He diſpatched his part in leſs than an hour;—he excels, you know, in all the *ſuperficial*, but *agreeable* accompliſhments; and his abilities in the muſical way are aſtoniſhing. I was not able to ſend it you as he ſet it, and, naked as it is, you muſt read it with more than your *uſual candour*.—The metre of penſive *Hammond's love-lorn* lays was adopted by the deſire of *Hilario*. Adieu.

VERSES

On the Birth-Day of C. B. R.....s, Oct. 18.

I.

HAD I but Prior's *ſkill to blow the reed,*
With warbling ſtrains I'd uſher in this morn;
I'd celebrate with notes of matchleſs meed
The Day, when Clara, *lovelieſt Maid, was born.*

Tho'

II.

Tho' never warm'd with true poetic fire,
Unfit for ſong, unfit for homelieſt lay,
Yet Cibber-*like, I ſeize th' unwilling lyre*
To greet fair Clara's *happy* NATAL DAY.

III.

For ſo much BEAUTY *with ſuch* SENSE *combin'd*
Make e'en my thoughts in meaſure ſmooth to flow;—
That well proportion'd Shape—that heav'nly Mind,
Would cauſe a Lemnian's frozen breaſt to glow.—

IV.

Tho' SPRING'S FRESH FRAGRANCE *pleaſe us now no more,*
Tho' Nature's gay embroid'ry 'gin to fade;
Tho' SUMMER'S ROSE-AND-LILY *Scenes are o'er,*
And all th' AMBROSIAL COOLNESS *of the ſhade:*

V.

MILD AUTUMN *too, in ſtole of ſweeteſt hue,*
Slides SMILING *on with ſmooth, majeſtic pace;—*
Adieu, blythe SEASONS, unbewail'd *adieu,*
Since Theſe *your charms* ſtill bloom *in* Clara's *face.*

VI.

And, WINTER *hoar—with all thy ſurly train—*
All hail, in mantle clad of watchet dyes!
Lo! all thy arrows dart at thoſe in vain,
Who've ſeen but Clara's BLUSH, *and* Clara's EYES.

LETTER XI.

IT gives me pleaſure to find that you diſcover unexpected beauties in the Elements of *Euclid*. You begin alſo, you ſay, to perceive how the ſtudy of the Claſſics tends no leſs to meliorate the heart, than to correct the judgement and form a good taſte — Theſe are the great ends of ſtudying them; and the conſideration of becoming well acquainted with thoſe fine languages in which they wrote (eſpecially the *Greek*, as being of all others moſt the effect of art and philoſophy) ought to be an additional encouragement to the reading of them.

There is ſcarce need of apprifing you of the excellency of this language: You muſt ſoon ſee it yourſelf: However, there can be no harm in endeavouring to confirm the notion in you: With this view, therefore, I will try to recollect the little that I have read or obſerved reſpecting the nature of the *Greek* Tongue, and ſhall probably throw out a few general hints with regard to the ſtudy

of

of it — Miſtake me not — I by no means pretend to enter on a Philoſophical Inquiry into its ſtructure and original formation, or to point out even any of the numberleſs advantages which ariſe from being accurately acquainted with it — Theſe things I leave to abler hands — To have contributed, in the leaſt, towards making you read it ſo as to be able, at ſome future period, to undertake ſuch an Inquiry *yourſelf* — this I ſhall conſider no unpleaſant circumſtance in my life — and this is my only aim.

Language, then, in general, is the medium whereby we communicate the perceptions of our minds to each other with greateſt ſpeed and accuracy: Like every thing elſe belonging to man, it is in its nature *changeable* and *imperfect*: The ſeveral media for this communication have of courſe their peculiar excellencies and defects: But none have been more *univerſally* and more *juſtly admired* than the languages of the ancient *Greeks* and *Romans*: It has been ſaid indeed that *theſe* are the *only* ones which have in themſelves any real *dignity*, and *rythm*, and *harmony*: Certainly they of all others preſerve the moſt exact meaſure and value on their

their words and ſyllables, and are capable of courſe of the fineſt muſical periods.

But it is allowed, on all hands, that the *Latin* is in *every reſpect* far inferior to the *parent-language*. Of all the languages ever known, it is perhaps in the *Greek only* that we find the *beſt* and moſt *copious* Alphabet — that we meet with *proper* names for every thing without being compelled to the unneceſſary uſe of metaphorical expreſſions — and ſee all its derivatives, and, it is probable, all its roots and primitive words, deduced from no *foreign* ſource, but all contained *within itſelf*: For theſe, with numberleſs other reaſons, the *Greek* Language is to be conſidered as the fulleſt and moſt complete of any that we are acquainted with: *Compare it* with *any other whatſoever*, and the truth of this will appear in the ſtrongeſt point of view.

If, indeed, any human art, or ſcience, or acquirement, have ever arrived at any thing like perfection, may we not in that light conſider the lauguage of ancient *Greece?* Caſting our eye over the extenſive plain of Literature, whatever meets us in the way appears, when deſcribed in this admirable language, in compariſon to any other, with

ſuperior

ſuperior elegance and *preciſion*. In the hands of the Philoſopher, the Poet, the Hiſtorian, the Orator, the Mathematician, the Phyſiologiſt—in a word, in every ſpecies of Learning, it is no leſs aſtoniſhing than curious to obſerve with what wonderful pliableneſs it moulds itſelf, and with what *accuracy* it conveys their *ſeveral* ſentiments.

By this facility indeed with which they joined together and compounded their words, they give in a *ſingle ſentence*, often in a *ſingle word*, a *full* and *lively* deſcription; inſomuch that it has been juſtly doubted whether the mind of the reader is moſt affected by the impreſſion of the thing painted to it, or his ear charmed with the rythm and harmony of the language, and the noble copiouſneſs of its ſound. And thus is THE GREEK TONGUE, (as one,[a] who *thoroughly* underſtood it, obſerves) *from its Propriety and Univerſality, made for all that is* GREAT, *and all that is* BEAUTIFUL, *in every ſubject, and under every form of writing.*

GRAIIS *ingenium*, GRAIIS *dedit ore rotundo*
Muſa loqui—

[a] *Mr. Harris*—in his moſt elegant book, HERMES, III. 5.

Happy

Happy it was for the *Greeks*, who had naturally a fine genius for the Arts and Sciences, that at the ſame time they were furniſhed with a language *copious* and *elegant*, *capable* of *every variety* of *compoſition*, and full of *nerves* and *majeſty*; ſo as to be able to expreſs themſelves in a ſtyle *ſomewhat worthy* of their inward feelings, and obſervations. Did it not contain in itſelf ſomething thus *peculiarly* excellent and noble, it would have been hardly worth one's while, perhaps, to beſtow ſo much time and labour on the acquiſition of a dead language; and, except in *particular* caſes, we ſhould be the leſs inexcuſable for getting at the knowledge it might contain through a medium the moſt *eaſy* and *familiar* to us.

The ſobereſt judges are of opinion that it is ſcarce poſſible to diſcover from what Language the *Greek* derives its origin: Should it be ſaid that it originally ſprang from the *Hebrew* or from ſome other *Oriental* Dialect, yet all muſt allow that it retains not a tittle of the genius and idiom of ſuch a Dialect; but is to be conſidered as a language, in every reſpect, *totally diſtinct*: Indeed one of the correcteſt and moſt elegant Scholars of

our

our time and country obſerves, That it is quite of its own growth; "that it ſeems to acknowledge no parent-ſtock, nor reſemble any model more ancient than itſelf; that it ſeems, in ſhort, as the *Athenians* uſed to ſay arrogantly of themſelves, to be purely *αὐτόχθων*." But the ſuperior excellence of it is to be attributed to the extraordinary diligence and ingenuity of thoſe who formed it: For the *Grecians*, *naturally* a moſt witty people, of a fine ear, and living under a free government, cultivated and refined the mother-tongue, whatever it was—whether they carried the firſt principles of it into *Greece*, or was by them derived from ſome neighbouring Dialect—cultivated, I ſay, and refined it in ſound as well as in expreſſion; whilſt the reſt of mankind were ſatisfied with little more than being barely able to make themſelves *intelligible* to each other.

Yet, nevertheleſs, a long time muſt have elapſed before a Language ſo copious and wonderfully excellent arrived at its perfect ſtate: But there are not many materials whereby to trace its continual and progreſſive improvement: Indeed the INSCRIPTIO SIGEA is, I believe, conſidered as the

only

only Book of the kind; and it is there we are to look for it in its *rudeſt*, and moſt *ancient* form. So that we ſhall find it involved in a good deal of obſcurity before the time of *Homer*; and in his writings it appears with its full ſplendor — in all its perfection. He indeed fixed the ſtandard of the *Greek* Tongue. And though the *particular Dialects* formed themſelves after him, and were perpetually changing and diverſified by reaſon of their wars and commerce, yet as theſe wars, until the time of *Alexander*, were chiefly among one another, the general complexion of the Language continued one and the ſame. So then it did not loſe much of its purity, even as a ſpeaking language, for about the ſpace of a thouſand years: And thoſe who *wrote*, imitating the uncorrupt ſtyle of the old Authors, uſed it with almoſt all its elegance and chaſteneſs for above twice that period; I mean till after *Mahomet* II. took *Conſtantinople*: Except, however, among the learned *Greeks* that were in this city, it had begun (as was juſt hinted) to degenerate a long time before; for we are told that, as early as the reign of *Domitian*, even more than *Thirteen Centuries*

Centuries before the taking of *Conſtantinople*, it ceaſed to be ſpoken with its true accent and pronunciation: As ſoon indeed as the *Roman* Government was eſtabliſhed in *Greece*, this degeneracy immediately took place: For the *Latin* names of offices, terms of Law, &c. over-ran the old *Greek* Language; inſomuch that we have Dictionaries of *barbarous* words in it as voluminous as thoſe of the *true* ones.[a]

But laying aſide enquiries of this nature, let us conſider which is the moſt probable way of getting at the knowledge of it with greateſt *eaſe* and *certainty*.

As no advantages are to be derived from an *Univerſity-Education* without a grammatical knowledge of the learned languages, you muſt have been already tolerably well grounded in the fundamental principles of the *Greek* and *Latin*: And yet what you learnt in School, was learnt as it were by rote, being then ſcarce able to ſee its full *meaning*, or *tendency*, or *application*. I would not therefore think it below my notice to read the Grammar (and that the *compacteſt* I could get) over again, with as much care as

[a] See *Dr. Bentley's* Diſſertation upon *Phalaris*, p. 405.—a Diſſertation which abounds with genuine Wit and Learning, and ſhould be read by every *Greek* Scholar.

poſſible,

poſſible, acquainting myſelf *thoroughly* with the flexions of the Nouns, with the ſigns and formation of the ſeveral Tenſes,[a] the Conjugations of the Verbs, and with the exact meaning and property of the Middle Voice.[b] Unleſs one ſets out in this manner, it is *here* as abſolutely *impoſſible* to make any real improvement, as it is to underſtand the *ſublimer* parts of Geometry without being well acquainted with the *Elements* of *Euclid*. And would it not be adviſeable to lay by one half hour every day for putting in practice the method lately pointed out for learning *Greek* on the plan of *Clarke's Introduction to Latin*?[c] Though it was principally calculated for boys in School, yet, as it is certainly the *ſureſt*, and, upon the whole, the *ſpeedieſt* way to get a perfect knowledge of the language, there is no need, in caſe you have not been already uſed to it, of being aſhamed to adopt it.

In being able to know the *primitive*, together with the *ſecondary* and *metaphorical* mean-

[a] An excellent Philoſophical account of the Tenſes is to be met with in my *Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progreſs of Language*, Vol. II.

[b] *Kuſter de uſu Verbi Medii* may be of ſervice.

[c] By *Mr. Huntingford, of New College, Oxford.*

ing

ing of the *Prepoſitions*[a] lies, it is generally confeſſed, the great difficulty of the *Greek* Tongue. With the hopes of removing this difficulty, in *ſome meaſure* at leaſt, I will ſend you an *Eſſay* written on this ſubject, which, as there were but few Copies of it at firſt printed, is now become very ſcarce—It is, I think, well worth your peruſal. As we evidently ſee throughout the language a very ſtriking *analogy*, the method which this *Eſſay* points out will, perhaps, aſſiſt you in inveſtigating and aſcertaining the preciſe ſignification of the *other* parts of ſpeech as well as the Prepoſitions. No ſmall advantage would be derived, were you to endeavour, juſt by way of amuſing yourſelf, to put in practice what the ingenious Author did not live to accompliſh.

[a] My *Lord Monboddo*, who ſeems to underſtand *Greek* as well as his mother-tongue, ſeems to confeſs as much. There is ſomething begun, ſays he, upon this ſubject, (he means the Eſſay affixed to this Letter) by an Author very eminent for his knowledge of the language; but which I regret is not finiſhed: The uſe of the Prepoſitions in compoſition gives a particular beauty and accuracy of expreſſion to the *Greek* language. They uſe commonly enough two of them, and ſometimes three in compoſition with their Verb, by which they deſcribe ſo minutely the action of the Verb, that it is really a kind of painting. Thus *Homer*, in deſcribing water coming out of the foot of a rock, uſes the word ὑπ-ε-κ-προ-ρεεν, by which is deſcribed, 1. its coming from *below*; 2. its coming *out* or *guſhing*; and laſtly, its running *forward*. See the Or. and Pr. of Language, Vol. II. p. 176.

Nor

Nor let it be ſuppoſed that the *Particles* are unworthy of attention: So far otherwiſe, that without knowing their proper uſe it is not poſſible to ſee all the beauties of the *Greek* Compoſition: *Mr. Wood*[a] obſerves, that they are to Hexameter Verſe, what ſmall ſtones are to a piece of Maſonry, ready at hand to fill up the *breaks* and *interſtices*, and *connect* thoſe of a larger ſize *ſo exactly* as to give a ſmooth *compactneſs* to the whole: But they are by no means condemned to this *expletive* duty: They contribute greatly to the *clearneſs* of a Poet's *meaning*, as well as to the *length* of his *Verſes*: The beſt Proſe-Writers have in this reſpect imitated *Homer*, and we muſt confeſs that they have a great ſhare in the *connexion* and *perſpicuity*, which is remarkable in thoſe early productions.

Devarius and *Hoogeveen* have written on the *Greek* Particles, and with great knowledge of their ſubject.—*Vigerus* on the Idioms, and *Mattaire* on the Dialects contain much information as to theſe points.—In tracing out the *changes*, *variations*, and *gradual progreſs* of the different Dialects conſiſts no unimportant part of the ſtudy of *Greek*:

[a] *In his Eſſay on Homer.*

Although

Although it be difficult to know the exact period and manner of ſuch variations taking place, and all the niceties attending them; yet with care in reading, beſides an accurate knowledge of the characteriſtical diſtinctions of each Dialect, you may form a general notion of the time and place they were in uſe, and alſo of the cauſes which gave them birth.

And with regard to the Quantity of the words, a thing by no means to be neglected, *Morrell*'s learned THESAURUS* is, I believe, the only practical book upon the ſubject. *Hephæſtion* is too difficult for a beginner, and *Terentianus Maurus* too tedious and obſcure.

Theſe, and all other books of the like kind, are uſeful for *referring to occaſionally*, and they may ſerve to give you ſome little

* Had the Quantity of the ſyllables been pointed out by ſome particular marks, as for example, in the *Gradus ad Parnaſſum*, this book would have been more generally uſeful; for in order to reap any advantage from it, as it is, one ſhould be acquainted with the different metres of the *Greek* Poetry, which for the moſt part is the acquiſition of *thoſe only* who have made conſiderable proficiency in the language, and not always of *thoſe*.—Since writing the above, I happened to meet with a ſenſible little Pamphlet by *Mr. Seale*, of *Chriſt College, Cambridge*; entitled, *An Analyſis of the Greek Metres*—which, I truſt, will remove the objections uſually made to thoſe who have written on this ſubject.

aſſiſtance

aſſiſtance towards making you a *Greek* Scholar: But you muſt not forget that *the whole* of the matter depends *chiefly* upon *your own care* and *induſtry*; — And in caſe you properly exert yourſelf, I have no doubt in the world but the ſtudy of the *Greek* will ſoon become as *entertaining* as it is *inſtructive* and *philoſophical*.

Such are the obſervations that have now occurred to me on this topic: Should they ſuggeſt any thing uſeful to you, my wiſhes will be amply gratified.

Χρω τοις ειρομενοις, η ζητει βελτιω τετων.

PHILANDER.

AN

ESSAY

ON THE

PREPOSITIONS

OF THE

GREEK LANGUAGE.[a]

Ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις χάρις.

WHEN I first began to give Lectures on the *Greek* Language, nothing gave me more uneaſineſs than the manner in which I found the Prepoſitions explained; even by thoſe who are very deſervedly celebrated, as the beſt *Greek* Scholars of their times; ſuch as *Budæus* in his Commentaries; *H. Stephens* in his Theſaurus; the Gentlemen of *Port-Royal*, in their Grammar; and *Vigerus*, in his Idioms; who is, in this part, the moſt copious of them all. Their manner, univerſally, is this. In the courſe of their vaſt reading, they remarked the ſeveral *Latin* Prepoſitions by which one and the ſame *Greek* Prepoſition might be neatly tranſlated, at different times; and, in their books

[a] It was written by *James Moor*, LL. D. Profeſſor of *Greek* in the *Univerſity* of *Glaſgow*: and read, as an *Introductory Eſſay*, *to a literary Society in Glaſgow, at their weekly meetings within the College.*

on the Principles of the *Greek* Language, they made a full enumeration of all theſe, which they took to be ſo many ſeveral ſignifications of each *Greek* Prepoſition; and with that they ſeem to have contented themſelves, as a full explication of this part of the language; without pointing out any *one*, as the natural, primary, and radical ſignification of the Prepoſition; or attempting to ſhow any connexion, or analogy, between the ſeveral numerous acceptations which they affix to almoſt every one of the *Greek* Prepoſitions, even when governing the very ſame caſe: Nay more, they have not ſcrupled to aſſign to the ſame Prepoſition, while governing the ſame caſe, ſignifications, ſometimes entirely diſparate, ſometimes very nearly contradictory to each other, ſometimes altogether ſo; without apprehending any imputation from thence to the *Greek* Language, as capricious and barbarous, in that part of it; though in my opinion it would be ſo, in the higheſt degree, were that really the caſe. Thus they tell us that παρα ſometimes ſignifies *contrary to*; as παρα την φυσιν, *contrary to nature*; ſometimes that it ſignifies *compared with*; as ανθρωπος, παρα τα αλλα ζωα, *Men*,

Men, compared with the other animals, βιοτευουσι ὥσπερ θεοι, ſays *Socrates* in *Xenophon*; two ſignifications quite diſparate. In truth the Prepoſition ſignifies neither one nor the other, but really anſwers always exactly to our *Engliſh* Prepoſition *by*, or *near*.

So they ſay that Επι ſometimes ſignifies *over*, and ſometimes *under*; thus Επι Κλαυδιου Καισαρος, *Sub Claudio Cæſare*: — Θεος ὁ Επι παντων, *Deus Supra omnes*. Theſe two ſignifications again are contradictory, the one to the other. The word, however, ſignifies neither *over*, nor *under*; but always *upon* exactly; whereas, *under* is always expreſſed by ὑπο, and *over* by ὑπερ. In fine, which is the moſt ſurpriſing of all, they tell us, all of them, that εις ſometimes ſignifies ἐν, and, vice verſa, ἐν ſometimes ſignifies εις; as ἐβαπτισθη Εις Ιορδανην: He was baptized *In* Jordan: — απεστειλεν ὁπλιτας Εν τη Σικελιᾳ: He ſent ſoldiers *To* Sicily: — That is, that the *Greek* Language is ſo rude, that it conſiders motion *to* a place, and reſt *in* that place, as one and the ſame idea; and expreſſes both by either of the two words, indifferently.

In making theſe remarks, I do not mean, in the leaſt degree, to diſparage the pains

and labours of theſe very learned and communicative men, to whom the world is indebted for the reſtoration of the *Greek* Language to the Republic of Letters. Far from that, I hold their works in the higheſt eſteem, as ſo many Treaſures of their kind. And any one, who attempts to make any further improvements for facilitating the knowledge of *Greek*, will find theſe works to be ſo many large ample ſtore-houſes, copiouſly filled with almoſt all the materials he will have occaſion to uſe; and cannot but be extremely thankful, that the unwearied induſtry of the former Scholars ſaves him the tedious and toilſome labour of digging again for the *ſame* materials, in the original mines. Theſe men began with what is undoubtedly the firſt, grand, and moſt neceſſary ſtep towards the recovery of the knowledge of an ancient language; I mean their copious and ample enumerations of the ſeveral different acceptations of the ſame word. The only matter of regret is, that they reſted there; without exerting themſelves to trace out, and explain the connexions, if there were any, between ſuch different acceptations; and point out the tranſitions, by which the word

word paſſed from one ſignification to another. For a Language, in which there are really no ſuch connexions, nor tranſitions, and in which, to one and the ſame word, there are arbitrarily affixed, a number of oppoſite, or even of different ſignifications, deſerves in my opinion to be accounted a language capricious and barbarous, to the higheſt degree; and the inventors of it, a race of mortals extremely ſavage, and of a very low degree of rationality.

But the world has not that opinion of the *Greeks*, and their language. Far the contrary: They are allowed to have been a moſt ingenious people; and to have cultivated and refined their language to the utmoſt; even ſo far, as to furniſh, with eaſe, elegance, and perfect preciſion, the fulleſt range and compaſs of expreſſion, for the moſt abſtract ideas of the moſt ſubtile Metaphyſics. It was alſo known, that, (whatever might be the caſe with the Prepoſitions) in the other parts of the language at leaſt, there is every where to be met with the moſt elegant, eaſy, natural connexion, and tranſitions from one acceptation of the word to another; ſo that one perceives, with eaſe and pleaſure, how

the ſecondary one took its riſe from the primary. This might have afforded a preſumption, that the *Prepoſitions* were not *ſingular* in this reſpect; though the connexion of their different acceptations was not, at firſt ſight, ſo apparent as in ſome parts of the Language; and the great obſtruction they occaſioned to the compaſſing a ready knowledge of the Language would ſeem to make the experiment of tracing out theſe connexions well worth trying. I reſolved to attempt it at leaſt; and that, with the utmoſt application; and even to perſevere in the attempt, though I ſhould not be very ſucceſsful at firſt; being perfectly perſuaded, that, in a Language ſo exquiſitely fine in other reſpects, the fault would not lie in the Language itſelf, as utterly deſtitute of all analogy in this part of it; but would certainly lie in my own want of ſkill to trace out that analogy; which perhaps might mend.

I was, moreover, excited to make ſuch an inquiry, as I found that I could never teach this part of the Language, with any ſort of pleaſure to myſelf, nor with any hopes of conveying any eaſy, or ſatisfactory knowledge of it to my ſcholars by purſuing the

the method of the Commentators above-mentioned: that is, for example, when, in one ſentence of an Author, there occurs the expreſſion τα επι εμοι; to tell the ſcholars, as a ſufficient explication, that the Prepoſition επι governs three ſeveral caſes, and has many various ſignifications with each caſe: particularly, with the dative it oftimes correſponds to the *Latin* Prepoſition PENES, *in the power of*; as here, τα επι εμοι, *the things in my power*. By and by, the very ſame words may occur again in an Hiſtorian, when one muſt be content to ſay, that, at other times, επι with the dative correſponds often with the *Latin* Prepoſition PONE, *behind*; as here, τα επι εμοις means *the parts* (of the army) *behind me—the battalions in my rear*.

Such a way of explaining any part of a language appears to me to be equally diſagreeable, and uncomfortable to the teacher, and to the ſcholar.

Wiſhing then, of all things, not to be under the neceſſity of having recourſe to ſuch an unpromiſing method, I ſet about this inquiry with all the earneſtneſs I was capable of; and, as I had, in general, a notion, that, in perhaps all languages, each

word had, originally, ſome *one primitive, radical* ſignification; from which its other ſignifications gradually took their riſe, by metaphor, and other natural analogies, ariſing from the various modes of human intercourſe, commerce, war, laws government, &c.: I reſolved to try, firſt of all, whether this, perhaps, might not even be the caſe in the *Greek* Prepoſitions. With this view, I ſtudied them carefully in the pureſt Authors, when occurring in the moſt eaſy, ſimple, and natural expreſſions. By *natural* I mean free, both from metaphor, and from any artificial turn of expreſſion; and alſo free from any abbreviation, or words left to be underſtood. By purſuing this method, I fancied that I had, at length, diſcovered both to each Prepoſition one natural, primary, radical ſignification; and which could, almoſt always, be expreſſed in one *Engliſh* word; and, at the ſame time, that I could perceive the natural reaſon, and foundation, why the ſame Prepoſition governed more Caſes than one.

Having gone thus far with each Prepoſition, not without ſome ſatisfaction and encouragement to proceed, though far from being

being fully aſſured that I was right; I took a careful review of them all, comparing theſe radical ſignifications together. From which ſurvey of the whole, compared alſo with the flexions of Nouns, I imagined, that I did plainly perceive the true uſe and deſign, in the *Greek* Language, of that part of ſpeech called PREPOSITION, viz. that the three chief circumſtances of relation, or connexion, in human life are expreſſed by the flexions of Nouns in the three oblique Caſes; and, that all other circumſtances, of relation or connexion, are expreſſed by the Prepoſitions. By the THREE *chief* circumſtances of relation, or connexion, in human life, I mean POSSESSION, INTERCHANGE, and ACTION. *Poſſeſſion*, or the *relation* between the *Poſſeſſor* and *that which he poſſeſſes*, by the *Genitive Caſe: Interchange*, or, *mutual communication*, whether of words or things, by the *Dative Caſe: Action*, or, the *relation* between the *Agent* and *what he acts upon*, by the *Accuſative Caſe*. All other relations were, I thought, in *Greek* expreſſed by the Prepoſitions. Theſe other relations, all, refer to *Reſt* or *Motion*; *Place* or *Time*; and are what the Schoolmen would call the

Accidentia

Accidentia Motûs et Quietis; Loci et Temporis. According to the mutual connexion between the ideas of *Place* and *Time*, all Prepoſitions expreſs *place* and *time* equally, though, perhaps, *Place* was the primary idea, or ſignification in all of them. With reſpect to *Motion* and *Reſt*; ſome Prepoſitions expreſs only the *one* of theſe; and then they govern only *one* Caſe. Others expreſs *both*; and then they govern *two* Caſes; one, when they expreſs *Motion*; the other, when they expreſs *Reſt*. By *motion* in this Inquiry into the ſignification of the *Greek* Prepoſitions, I always mean *progreſſive motion*; or, in common language, *motion towards*. When a *Greek* Prepoſition expreſſes only motion, the *one* Caſe it governs is ALWAYS the *Accuſative*; or Caſe of the *active* Verb; by a very proper and natural Analogy in Language; as all external action implies *motion towards* that we act upon. If my hand ſtrike the table, it muſt move towards the table. When a Prepoſition expreſſes only *reſt*, or *ſituation*, the *one* Caſe which it governs is NEVER the *Accuſative*; but always one of the other two oblique Caſes, the *Genitive*, or *Dative*. When the ſame Prepoſition

poſition expreſſes BOTH motion and reſt, it governs Two Caſes; when *motion*, *always the Accuſative*, as before; when reſt or ſituation, *always one of the other two*; not *interchangeably* but *invariably*; the ONE or OTHER of the two. Thus the *Greek* επι, which anſwers exactly to the *Engliſh* Prepoſition *upon*, expreſſes both *motion* and *reſt*. We ſay equally, "The Ball is FALLING UPON the ground, or, is LYING UPON the ground: In Greek, ἡ σφαιρα πιπτει επι THN ΓΗΝ; and, ἡ σφαιρα κειται επι ΤΗΣ ΓΗΣ: the difference of Caſe governed, expreſſing diſtinctly the difference of acceptation meant; even ſuppoſe the Verbs were not expreſſed. For, επι την γην, by itſelf, would ſhow that *motion upon*, that is, *progreſſive motion pointing upon*, was meant; and, επι της γης, *reſt upon*, or, *ſituation upon*; but not interchangeably, επι τη γη; if only reſt, or ſituation, was meant to be expreſſed, and nothing further. For when, beſides the *two* Caſes appropriated to expreſs *motion* or *reſt* in general, a *Greek* Prepoſition governs a *third* Caſe, it then expreſſes *ſome one* particular and remarkable *mode* of the general ſignification. Thus επι with the third Caſe, the *Dative*,

expreſſes

expreſſes *cloſe upon*; either in *place*, or in *time*; that is, *next-behind*, or *next-after*. For example; επι εμου, when meant of *place*, ſignifies *next-behind me*; when meant of *time*, *next-after me*.—So ὑπο, anſwering preciſely to our Engliſh Prepoſition UNDER, with the *Accuſative* expreſſes *motion under*; that is, *motion tending under*, or *coming under*; with the *Genitive*, *reſt*, or *ſituation under*.—*The Ball is running under the table*: Η σφαιρα κυλινδειται ὑπο την τραπεζαν.—*The Ball is lying under the table*, ὑπο της τραπεζης. ὑπο likewiſe governs the *Dative*; and then it expreſſes ſuch particular modes of UNDER, as we would expreſs by ſaying, protected *Under*, ſubject *Under*, directed *Under*: as, ὑπο τω ναω, Under the protection of the temple: ὑπο τω βασιλει, ſubject Under the king: ὑπο τη λυρᾳ, Under the direction of the Lyre.

To give one inſtance more—ΕΙΣ and ΠΡΟΣ both ſignify To; but with this difference: Εις ſignifies *motion to*, and that only; therefore governs only the *Accuſative*: Προς, on the contrary, NEVER [a] ſignifies *motion to*; but expreſſes

[a] This is plainly a miſtake; for προς with the *Accuſative* does ſignify *motion to*, and that *not ſeldom*: He alſo forgot to obſerve its ſignification with the *Genitive*. There are ſome other aſſertions

expreſſes any other kind of RELATION *to*; being of the moſt general and extenſive meaning of all the *Greek* Prepoſitions; and anſwering to the *Engliſh* expreſſions, *relating to*; *with relation to*; *with reſpect to*: and it governs the *Accuſative*, in this its principal and primary ſignification; but it governs alſo the *Dative*; and then it ſignifies theſe particular *relations to* which we expreſs in *Engliſh* by the words *cloſe to*, or AT; or, by the words *united to*, *joined to*, *added to*.

Theſe particular, or ſecondary ſignifications I have only mentioned, at preſent, ſo far as they make the Prepoſition govern a different Caſe. The various other ſignifications of that kind will properly come in under another head of this inquiry. To return.

When I had, after a good deal of pains, got thus far in my ſearch into the proper, original meaning and uſe of Prepoſitions in

aſſertions in this ESSAY which are not ſtrictly true, but I leave you to find them out; ſo that you ſhould read it with care and attention — Theſe we are to attribute to the learned Author's dying before he had time to execute his plan, or carefully reviſe the little he had done. — I recommend it to you *chiefly*, becauſe of the method of analyſing the language, which it enforces and points out.

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the *Greek* Language, and began to indulge myſelf in the fancy that I was not miſtaken, having conſulted only the very beſt writers, viz. *Plato*, *Xenophon*, and *Demoſthenes*; yet I wanted ſtill, if poſſible, to put myſelf out of all ſcruple, or, doubt; whether, in theſe ſignifications, which I had affixed to each *Greek* Prepoſition, as its proper, natural, and primary meaning, I might not have ſometimes been deceived, by metaphor, artificial turn of expreſſion, or figure of ſpeech, which had eſcaped my obſervation. To make ſure of this, I reflected, at length, that if they really did ſignify as I had conjectured, I ſhould find them ſo ſignifying, and in ſuch conſtruction, and that perpetually and invariably, clear of all metaphor or figure; in thoſe writings, where the whole ſubject was entirely relating to *Time* and *Place*; *Motion* and *Reſt*; *Situation*, *Poſition*, and *Figure*; that is, in Books of Mechanicks and Geometry. With this view I immediately turned over *Ariſtotle*'s Mechanicks, and *Euclid*'s Elements. There I had the pleaſure to find my conjectures completely verified, to the utmoſt of my expectation. My ſatisfaction was the greater, as my anxiety to conquer this,

this, the moſt difficult, and moſt troubleſome part of the *Greek* Language, had been very great.

Being now perfectly at eaſe as to the primary and natural ſignifications, I applied myſelf more cheerfully to ſtudy the ſecondary and artificial; that is, to deduce *them* from the *original* or *primary*. Succeſs in that ſtudy depends upon a proper attention to the genius of the *Greek* Tongue, in the many beautiful, ſimple, natural, and eaſy ways it takes to abbreviate expreſſion; and to free language from the diſagreeable and unneceſſary cumber of a multitude of words to expreſs ideas, which, though complex, are yet common; and which, without loading the ear with the tedious enumeration of all the ſeveral words expreſſive of all the ſimpler ideas which form the complex idea, can, readily and with perfect preciſion, be apprehended by a proper ſelection of a few words. In caſe I be expreſſing myſelf obſcurely, I ſhall mention one eaſy, remarkable example, from a moſt elegant writer, *Euclid*. You make a full enumeration of all the words, when you ſay, "The parallelogrammal, rectangular ſpace, contained by—

or,

or, in *Greek*, το χωριον παραλληλογραμμον, ὀρθογωνιον περιεχομενον ὑπο. But *Euclid*, as ſoon as he has, by a few expreſſions more complete, made his reader well acquainted with this complex idea, very elegantly, as well as very judiciouſly, abbreviates the language for conveying it, into the moſt ſimple expreſſion of ΤΟ ΥΠΟ; the *firſt* and the *laſt* word; an expreſſion, the fartheſt in the world from *technical*; being, on the contrary, exactly according to the ſpirit and genius of the *Greek* Language.

So, alſo, juſt in the ſame manner, *Euclid* has Η ΥΠΟ, for ἡ γωνια περιεχομενη ὑπο; and ΤΟ ΑΠΟ, for το τετραγωνον ἀναγεγραμμενον ἀπο.

By attending to this part of the genius of the *Greek* Language, I found, in time, that, in every one of the *Greek* Prepoſitions, all the ſeveral metaphorical, or ſecondary ſignifications, in whatever diſparate, or even contradictory ways, they may come to be tranſlated in another language of a different genius; and which, in conveying briefly a complex idea, may often, among its ſeveral ſimpler ideas, ſelect for expreſſing the whole ſome *one*, quite different from *that* one, which the *Greek* ſelects; yet, ſtill, in the

Greek

Greek itſelf, theſe ſecondary ſignifications, may, all of them, be properly deduced from the *primary*, by an analogy, not only plain, ſimple, and natural, but even elegant and beautiful; as might be expected from the fine taſte and genius of the PEOPLE.

I ſhould next go on to exemplify this throughout all the *Greek* Prepoſitions; and indeed, even prior to that, I ſhould firſt *enumerate* their *original* ſignifications; as expreſſing the modes of motion, and of reſt; poſition, or ſituation; which I commonly do, by the familiar practice of ſhooting at butts; conſidering the arrow, firſt, in its motion, or flight towards the mark; as likely to hit, or miſs; and how far, and in what reſpect to miſs; as by going over, under, aſide; coming near, going wide, and ſo forth; then, after it is fixed, or at reſt, its ſituation with reſpect to the mark.

But theſe I ſhall defer to another opportunity, being ſenſible that I muſt have already tired the company ſufficiently with a ſubject ſo dry, and unentertaining, as a mere grammatical diſquiſition is likely to be. My excuſe depends upon the complaiſance of the company; and I hope they will be ſo

good as to remember, that when one is very much intereſted himſelf in any thing, whatever it be, he is very apt to weary other people with it.

In caſe, however, any Gentleman preſent has the leaſt curioſity to have this THEORY (if you will give me leave to dignify a low ſubject with a high name) applied to any particular example, I ſhall juſt now, if it be agreeable to the reſt of the company, endeavour to ſatisfy him.

November 30. 1764.

LETTER XII.

AS you are now engaged, during your Private Lectures, in preparing yourſelf to read over with all poſſible advantage the Hiſtory of the Wars, and Popular Buſineſs of the Ancients, it will not perhaps be unpleaſant to you, to take at this time a *general* and *curſory* view of the revolutions of their Literature.—This will preſent unto

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us a *variegated* ſcene: For in looking back on the events of former times, it is obſervable to every one, that Civil Hiſtory wears a much more *uniform* appearance, at different periods, than that of Learning and Science: The Arts of War and Government are ſomewhat ſimilar in almoſt every nation; and as they have no connexion with refined taſte and ſentiment, they ſtand their ground with more firmneſs and uniformity than even the *uſeful* or *neceſſary* Arts: But thoſe of the *liberal* and *literary* ſort, proceeding from an elegant turn of mind, and of courſe reliſhed by the *Few only*, whoſe *leiſure*, and *fortune*, and *genius* fit them for ſuch amuſements, are frequently of no great *extent* or *vigour*, and are liable to be *varied* by education and example, and are ſometimes indeed *totally obliterated*.

With regard to the country wherein Literature was firſt known and cultivated, in any regular manner, learned men are not *entirely* of the ſame opinion: To *Egypt*, however, we ſeem to ſtand indebted for the invention, and perhaps for the *perfection* of almoſt *all* the *Sciences*, as well as of thoſe Arts, whoſe principal tendency is to furniſh the *neceſſaries*

of life: But we ſee little of the *fine* Arts before the riſe of the Popular Governments of *Greece:* The *Egyptians*, though they were not entire ſtrangers to *Poetry*, *Eloquence*, and *Painting*, yet, it is certain, never cultivated theſe Arts with any great attention; and, of courſe, among them they did not arrive at their full maturity: But *Huſbandry*, *Architecture*, and many other of the *uſeful* Arts were carried to very high perfection in *Egypt*; and their principles, as they advanced towards this perfection, were regularly analyſed and diſcuſſed—*Hence* originate *Geometry*, *Aſtronomy*, and moſt of the other Sciences.[a]

Theſe continued in a very flouriſhing way in *Egypt*, till *Cambyſes*, that unworthy ſucceſſor of the Great *Cyrus*, carried his arms thither: Temples, and Libraries, and all other Monuments of Piety and Wiſdom were every where totally demoliſhed by this Barbarian: This was a moſt ſevere blow given to Learning, and is the firſt we have any account of:[b] It happened about five

[a] See *Strabo* XVII. ſub init.

[b] See an elegant Chapter on this ſubject in *Orig. & Pr. of Language*, Vol. III. near the end.

hundred

hundred and twenty years before the *Chriſtian* Era.

About ten or fifteen years after, *Pythagoras* opened his celebrated School in that part of *Italy* called *Magna Græcia*. Luckily he had been in *Egypt* before the *Perſian* Conqueſt;[a] and, having lived there ſomewhat above twenty years, brought with him, it is probable, the greateſt part of the *Egyptian* Philoſophy: Upon the reduction of *Egypt*, he is ſuppoſed to have been made priſoner and carried over to *Babylon*, where he acquired the knowledge of Muſic, and all the learning of the *Magi*; and in his way from thence travelling over *Greece* and the adjacent iſlands, he ſettled at length near *Croton* in the South-Eaſt of *Italy*: Here, I ſay, under the auſpices of this Great Man, Science again raiſed up her head, and extended her genial influence far and near. Theſe Schools are ſaid to have been demoliſhed by one *Cylon*,[b] a rich, worthleſs ſcoundrel of the neighbourhood, who with his infamous cabal diſperſed the learned men who ſtudied there, and did all they

[a] *Jamblicus de vita Pythagoræ*, cap. 4. & ſeq.

[b] *Jamblicus* (ut ſupra) cap. 35.

could to *exterminate* them from the face of the earth.

From this time Philoſophy continued in an unſettled ſtate, till it broke forth with new luſtre in the celebrated Groves of *Academus*. *Plato*, who had converſed with ſome of the *Pythagoreans* in *Italy*,[a] and having lived himſelf ſome years in *Egypt*, was in every reſpect well calculated for the office he undertook: He had, moreover, reaped ſingular advantage from the uncommon wiſdom of his maſter *Socrates*: And we know that his own natural abilities were wonderful.—Hence the foundation of that aſtoniſhing height which the Liberal Arts and Sciences now attained in *Greece*: This Period was the GOLDEN AGE of Literature:[b] Now we ſee it flouriſhing in all its Majeſty. But as ſoon as *Greece* became ſubject to the ambitious King of *Macedon*, all the branches of this *delicate* Plant began to ſhrink and loſe their beauty: And when the *Romans* again ſubdued it, they faded ſtill more under the rigid Diſcipline of thoſe ſevere Con-

[a] See *Laertius in Plat.*

[b] This Period was from about 450 to 300 years before Chriſt, taking in the Space of about 150 Years.

querors.

querors.—Thus with its LIBERTY *Greece* loſt its literary fame, and, in leſs than a Century after it became a *Roman* Province, it degenerated nearly into a ſtate of *Barbariſm*—*Sic tranſit Gloria mundi!*—This was a blow from which, probably, Learning has been never able to recover.

When the *Romans* had nothing left to conquer, the natural influence of Peace and Riches diſpoſed them, at length, to imitate the noble productions of *Grecian* Ingenuity: And thus again the Sciences and fine Arts changed their ſituation.* In *Italy*, though they aroſe to great eminence, yet they did not appear with their former vigour; nor did they continue for any conſiderable time: Neither the Government nor the native temper of the people were adapted to cheriſh and improve them: As they ſeem to have been at firſt introduced from a principle of *vanity*, and cultivated *merely* from a *deſire* of *emulation*, rather than from *genuine taſte*, ſo it was no hard matter for *deſpotiſm* and a *dreadful profligacy* of manners to undermine them, and check their growth.

* They were introduced into Italy, and began to be cultivated there about 220 years before our Saviour.

Here, however, they *lingered* in a *languid* and *expiring* way till the fouth century, when, by the inundation of the *Goths*, all that was *Great* and *Beautiful* was overwhelmed;—in ſhort, almoſt every *veſtige* of *Learning* and *Civility* was in the weſtern parts of the Empire totally obliterated.

Long, however, before this period, indeed before the Arts had been carried over into *Italy*, and not a Century after the time of *Plato*, ſome ſcattered rays of Science had begun to appear in *Alexandria*, where, under the patronage of *Ptolemy Soter* and his ſucceſſors, they collected ſtrength, and ſhone for many ages with conſiderable ſplendour. Although the *Alexandrian* Libraries partook, in ſome meaſure, of the revolutions which happened in the *Roman* Empire, yet they were generally in a very flouriſhing ſtate, any loſs by war or other caſualties being ſoon retrieved; and that in the *Serapion* ſtood unimpaired, and continued to produce very great men both in Government and Philoſophy till near the middle of the 7th Century:[a] About this time the *Saracens* de-

[a] See *Origin and Progreſs of Language*, as before.

moliſhed

moliſhed it,* when their Calif *Omar* gave orders that the books it contained ſhould be all burnt: The prodigious number of theſe Volumes may be inferred from their having ſupplied with fuel, as it is well atteſted, *forty thouſand* public baths for the ſpace of *ſix months*.

After this follows a long and a gloomy interval: For more than 700 years, we ſcarce perceive one faint glimmer of Literature; and what did appear, during this dark period, was amongſt the very Barbarians, who deſtroyed the *Alexandrian* Libraries: For the *Saracens*, about a Century and a half after their mad behaviour in *Alexandria*, became wonderfully fond of *Grecian* Learning, eſpecially the Philoſophy of *Ariſtotle*; and being ſpurred on and patronized by their celebrated Calif *Almamunis*, they cultivated it with conſiderable ſucceſs. If the Weſt was at all illumined with any ray of Science, during theſe ages of ignorance and horrid darkneſs, it muſt have been derived from the *Arabians*; who, when they had driven the *Goths* out of *Spain* and *Sicily*,

* About A. D. 643.

came

came in large bodies and ſettled in thoſe countries. Their fondneſs for *Ariſtotle* ſtill continued, and aroſe at length to a moſt extravagant pitch; inſomuch that every School was engaged in explaining him, and ſcarcely minded any thing beſides: Hence the origin and appellation of *The Scholaſtic Doctors*—*The Scholaſtic Writers*. After this period, (it has been obſerved,[a]) the *European Chriſtians* profited much by the *Arabian* Learning, and were highly indebted to the *Saracens* for the improvement they made in different parts of Philoſophy.

But ſtill, as their principal Authors, their *Averroes* and *Avicenna*, are known to contain little more than dry and obſcure comments on the Acroatic Works of *Ariſtotle*, it may be ſaid that all human Science and Erudition, properly ſo called, had its abode, as yet, amongſt the *Greeks* in *Conſtantinople*. When this city was taken by the *Turks*,[b] the learned men it contained fled from thoſe Barbarians; and finding refuge in *Rome* and other parts of *Italy*, they propagated throughout the weſtern world the *Greek* Language,

[a] See Moſheim's Eccleſ. Hiſt. 9th and 10th Cent.

[b] This happened, A. D. 1453.

and

and with it a right taſte for the *Grecian* Arts and Sciences —

HINC *priſcæ redeunt Artes—felicibus inde*
Ingeniis aperitur iter, deſpectaque Muſæ
Colla levant ——[a]

They no where met with ſo favourable a reception, as from *Alphonſus* VI.[b] and ſome other *Neapolitan* Princes of the Houſe of *Arragon*;[c] and more particularly in *Florence*, from the celebrated Family of *Medicis*. Hence that ſpot became, in a manner, the center of the fine Arts and Sciences, and the general rendezvous of all candidates for literary repute: *La Toſcane* alors était en *Italie* ce qu' *Athènes* avait été en *Grece*.[d]

Thus Ancient Learning ſpread itſelf with incredible ſwiftneſs all over *Europe*: And the *Art of Printing*,[e] which had been in-

[a] Claud. De Laudibus Stiliconis — Lib. II. ſub init.

[b] *Giannone's Hiſtoire Civile du Royaume de Naples.* Royaume

[c] See *Moſheim's Eccleſ. Hiſt.* XV. *Cent.*

[d] *Voltaire's Lewis* XIV. *p.* 17. 4*to.*

[e] *Laurent Coſter* invented wooden types at *Harlem* about A. D. 1440. *Genfleiſch* and *Guttemberg*, not many years after, carved metallic ones at *Mentz*: Theſe, though an improvement on thoſe of *Coſter*, were yet imperfect, beauſe they were often

vented

vented but a few years before this time, has been the means of diſſeminating it far and wide, and of placing the Treaſures which contain it out of the reach of the rapacious hand of Time, and perhaps of every earthly Power.

After the Period juſt mentioned Ancient Literature met with different reception in different countries, and has been cultivated with various ſucceſs — No where with more ſucceſs than in *England*: But we cannot ſay that it is *now* in a flouriſhing ſtate among us; for, however *enlightened* we may call theſe days, all competent judges of the matter will I believe readily acknowledge that in the laſt Century, and in the beginning of this, there was much more *ſound* and *ſolid* Erudition *then* than we find *at preſent*: — In the room of it there is ſucceeding another ſpecies, ſhowy indeed and ſplendid, but vain, empty, pernicious.

It would be *uſeful* as well as *amuſing* to enter more minutely upon this hiſtory, and

unequal. The invention was afterwards perfected by *Schoeffer* at *Stratſbourg*, who caſt the types in an iron-matrix, engraved with a puncheon. See a Note of *Dr. Maclaine's* (in *Moſheim's Eccleſ. Hiſt.* as above) quoted from *Meerman's Origines Typographicæ*.

to

to inquire into, or rather aſſign more at large (for they are pretty obvious) the *particular cauſes* of theſe ſeveral revolutions: But this ſhort ſketch muſt ſuffice for the preſent: And from this you may obſerve that we are principally indebted to the *Greeks* for the Learning which we now enjoy, that people having been of all others the moſt zealous in the propagation of it, and advancement.

The writings which their firſt-rate Authors have left us contain the beſt rules for juſt Compoſition, and are themſelves the beſt examples. If you wiſh to form a good ſtyle together with a correct taſte and judgement, ſpend as much time as you can in the reading of them. Though the *Latins* had little more to do than to *imitate* theſe, yet they are no plagiariſts, but have an original manner of their own; and ſeem, for the moſt part, to have derived their obſervations from the ſame unexhauſted ſource—from Nature (that is) and the independent exertion of their own Minds. They were guided in the main certainly by thoſe their ingenious predeceſſors — Indeed to have deviated from them, would have been to deviate from Nature,

Nature, and from the ſtandard of all human Perfection.

By being converſant with theſe Writers (if I may thus ſpeak without digreſſing too much from our ſubject) you will find from experience, that the pleaſures of the *underſtanding* have more *force*, more *conſtancy*, more *variety*, and much more *dignity* in them than thoſe of the *ſenſes*: Hence it is of greater importance to cultivate and improve ſuch intellectual connexions than any other whatſoever.

A competent knowledge of theſe frequently prevents the *gay* and *ſocial* mind from degenerating into *dulneſs* or *debauchery*; and beſides teaching us how to *reliſh*, and make a *right uſe* of the gifts of Fortune, this knowledge alone can enable us to fill any *liberal* ſtation in life with *propriety* and *reſpect*: —

His *animum ſuccinge* Bonis; *ſic flumine largo*
Plenus Pierio defundes pectore verba.[a]

[a] Theſe lines are taken out of *Petronius Arbiter*: In this Author we meet with a flower now and then, but they grow in ſuch bogs and ſtenchy quagmires, that they are ſcarcely worth the trouble and danger there is in going after them.

LETTER XIII.

WHEN I ſent you thoſe general ſtrictures on the *Greek* Tongue, together with the *Eſſay* on its Prepoſitions, my principal object (as indeed I told you at the time) was to make you conſider that admirable Language in a proper point of view, and to *confirm* you in the reſolution of acquiring a competent knowledge of it. You ſay I have not been unſucceſsful in this reſpect — 'Tis enough — I am perfectly ſatisfied — And hence I have been encouraged to endeavour to do ſomething in the ſame way with regard to the other claſſical Language — With this I am now going to trouble you.

The *Romans*, it is well known, derived their Learning chiefly from the *Greeks*. But they are more indebted to them for their *Language*, than for the *ſubject-matter* of their Compoſitions. We are told by *Dionyſius* of *Halicarnaſſus*, and by *Quintilian*, that the *Latin* is formed, though not *altogether*, yet *principally*, from the *Doric* and *Æolic* Dialects.

My

My *Lord Monboddo*,[a] (whoſe judgement in *ſuch things* at leaſt I hold in the higheſt eſteem) inſtead of conſidering it as *debaſed* or *corrupted* from the *Greek*, is of opinion that it is a *diſtinct* Dialect itſelf, and the moſt ancient of them all, and was firſt introduced into *Italy* by *Ænotrus*, or *Evander*:[b] The former went there about 160 years before the time of *Homer*; the latter, about a Century after *Ænotrus* — both it is likely before the *Greek* had arrived at its full ſtandard: — And thus this branch of the Language, having been leſs cultivated, has not of courſe all the Numbers, nor all the Voices and Tenſes of the Verb; nor yet that variety of declenſion and modes of application, which we find in the other Dialects of the Mother-Tongue.

Its Etymology ſhows plainly that it is of *Greek* extraction;[c] but we muſt allow, at the

[a] *Origin and Progreſs of Language*, Vol. I and II. paſſim.

[b] *Evander* ſettled on the banks of the *Tiber*, and built *Pallanteum*. See *Virgil*, Æn. VIII. 51.—Coming from *Arcadia*, he and his followers no doubt ſpoke the *Doric* or *Æolic* Dialect — the *former* moſt probably. But is it proper to divide theſe Dialects? For theſe at firſt, like the *Attic* and *Ionic*, were one and the ſame. — Την δι Δωριδα (ſcil. διαλεκτον) τη Αιολιδι —— την αυτην φαμεν. See a ſatisfactory, though it be a conciſe account of this matter in *Strabo* VIII. 1.

[c] See *Varro de Linguâ Latinâ*.

ſame

ſame time, that there is a mixture of ſomething elſe: Now it ſeems not improbable that after *Pythagoras* had been in *Italy*, (and he is ſuppoſed to have come there in ſomewhat leſs than a Century after the time of *Romulus*) the *Latin* formed itſelf on the *Doric* or *Æolic* Dialect of the *Greeks*, —(this being the *only* Dialect uſed in the *Pythagorean* Colleges) — incorporating at the ſame time ſeveral words out of the *Oſcan* or *Teutonic*, or ſome other barbarous Language, during the different periods of its progreſs towards the perfection it at laſt arrived at.

Be this as it may, it is certain that it continued for a long time extremely rude and imperfect. It is, I believe, pretty commonly ſuppoſed that *Cicero* was the firſt who brought it to a juſt ſtandard: But he himſelf diſclaims that honour, and ſeems to attribute it to *L. Craſſus* and *M. Antonius*, who were between 30 and 40 years older than himſelf, and the firſt great Orators that ever appeared in *Rome*. Having particularly mentioned their age, he adds theſe words: "Quod *idcirco* poſui, ut, dicendi Latinè *prima maturitas* in *quâ ætate* exſtitiſſet, poſſet notari; et intelligeretur *jam ad ſummum pœne eſſe perductam*,

ductam, ut *eo nihil ferme quiſquam addere poſſet*, niſi qui à Philoſophia, à Jure Civili, ab Hiſtoriâ fuiſſet inſtructior."[a]—I am aware that he is here ſpeaking of the perfection of *Roman* Eloquence; but that will not in the leaſt affect the matter in queſtion: For if their *Eloquence* was then arrived at its perfect ſtate, the *Language* muſt have *neceſſarily* reached that point *as ſoon*, if not *ſooner*.

Earlier, however, than the period juſt alluded to we cannot *ſafely* date the maturity of the *Latin* Tongue. Being now much ſtudied and refined, it was in a great meaſure diveſted of its former ruſt and barbariſm: For in comparing it with the Parent-Language and by that means improving it, they made it more elegant and harmonious, ſo as to reſemble the *Greek* much more than it did before.[b]

——— *Sic horridus ille*
Defluxit numerus Saturnius, et grave virus
Munditiæ pepulere —

But by this very circumſtance it loſt that

[a] *De Cl. Orat.* 43.

[b] We have high authority to aſſert that the *Latin* from about this period was much more like the *Greek*, than what the old *Latin* was—Indeed the thing ſpeaks for itſelf.

uniform,

uniform, though *harſh* and *ruſtic* appearance which it had ſo long retained.

It continued but a ſhort time pure and uncorrupt. That ſtrict and ancient Diſcipline, which forbad every other Language, even the admired one of the *Grecians*, to be ſpoken within the borders of *Italy*, and which obliged foreigners in their negociations with the Republic to make uſe of an Interpreter;[a] — this Diſcipline, I ſay, tending certainly to preſerve the Language, if not to improve it, was relaxed more and more, and the *Greek* became ſo prevalent as to be conſidered the *faſhionable, acquired language of every polite Roman*. But the great Cauſe of the corruption and decay of this, as it will be of all other languages, was the EXTENT *of* EMPIRE. Before *Duillius*'s time in the Firſt *Punic* War, ſays our admirable Critic,[b] the *Romans* had got nothing beyond *Italy*: But in the following Century they carried their Eagles almoſt all over *Europe*: So that the vaſt confluence of people from all the Provinces, the introducing of foreign artificers and captive ſlaves from every quarter,

[a] See *Valerius Maximus, Lib.* 2. *Cap.* 2.

[b] See the *Diſſertation upon Phalaris*, p. 403.

and the Natives that returned home from the Expeditions, made an innovation of language at *Rome* itſelf. And thus the *Latin*, even among thoſe who compoſed in it and who had perfect models to imitate, began to loſe its purity immediately after the *Auguſtan Age*; *Paterculus* being looked upon as the laſt Author, who wrote in a chaſte, claſſical ſtyle. It lingered, however, in a corrupt and decaying ſtate till the time of the Philoſopher *Boethius*,[a] with whom the *Latin* Tongue, and the laſt Remains of *Roman Dignity*, may be ſaid to have ſunk in the *Weſtern World*. In the beginning of the Seventh Century, we are told it was no longer *ſpoken even* at *Rome*, and was dwindling faſt into what they called the *Roman-Runic*,[b] from whence ſprang the modern *Italian*, *French*, and *Spaniſh* Languages.

[a] He lived about the beginning of the Sixth Century.—See *Hermes* III. 5.

[b] The ſame as what was called the *Romance-Tongue*, a mixture of the language of the *Franc*, and of bad *Latin*.

LETTER XIII. Continued.

BUT it is time to ſay ſomething of the Language itſelf.—The *Latin* has its *defects* as well as *excellencies*. Among the *former* none is more ſtriking than its incapacity of expreſſing philoſophical matters with any degree either of *conciſeneſs* or *preciſion*: Of this *Lucretius* complains not ſeldom:

Here in particular:

Nec me animi fallit, Graiorum obſcura reperta
Difficile inluſtrare Latinis *verſibus eſſe*,
(*Multa novis verbis præſertim quom ſit agendum*)
Propter Egeſtatem *Linguæ*, *et Rerum Novitatem*.[a]

Here too:

Nunc et Anaxagoræ ſcrutemur Homæomerian,
Quam Græci memorant, *nec* Noſtrâ *dicere* Linguâ
Concedit nobis Patrii Sermonis Egeſtas.[b]

[a] Lib. I. 137. [b] Lib. I. 830.

And once more:

Nunc, ea quo pacto inter ſeſe mixta quibuſque
Conta modis vigeant, rationem reddere aventem
Abſtrahit invitum Patrii Sermonis Egeſtas.[a]

This perhaps may be owing, in ſome degree, to there being ſo few in *Italy* who ſtudied the more abſtracted parts of *Grecian* Philoſophy; for the *ſcientific* and *metaphyſical* inveſtigations of the *Greeks*, their *Obſcura Reperta*, (as *Lucretius* calls them) were not much ſought after by the *Romans*. Indeed before the time of *Cicero* they knew little or nothing of them — He is the only one who made any figure this way. And yet we muſt conſider him, if we would conſider him impartially, rather as one who hath *collected* and moſt *elegantly related* the old Philoſophy, than as the inventor of any new or original Syſtem. He too, like the *Epicurean* Poet, complains much of this deficiency of his mother-tongue, and is often obliged to expreſs his meaning by a *Periphraſis*, or *borrow words from the Greek*, or elſe uſe terms of his *own coining*.[b]

[a] Lib. III. 259.

[b] Of this laſt Sort indeed the Author of *Hermes* mentions

But

But the Poverty of the *Latin* in this particular may probably be accounted for from the original ſtructure of the Language: And this it was difficult, or perhaps it was not poſſible, for any but the firſt framers of it, to have altered or amended: Its having but one Tenſe to expreſs *the Aoriſt* and *Præter-Perfect*; its wanting an *Active Participle Paſt*, and *Preſent Participle Paſſive*; and above all, its want of the *Article*, together with the *ſtubborn nature* of the Language *not admitting* of being compounded or joined together, force thoſe who uſe it to the frequent uſe of a *Periphraſis*, and often to leave an *ambiguity in their meaning*. Of theſe, and its other anomalies and defects, if you wiſh to have a *full* and *accurate* knowledge, I would refer you to *Hermes*, and to the *Second and Third Volumes of Origin and Progreſs of Language* — Books theſe, as good and elegant, with regard to Languages and their uſe in Compoſition, as any that have been written either *before* or *after* them.

To glance at its *excellencies* will, I ſhould think, be more agreeable.

only *one*, which was properly new coined by him, namely, *Qualitas*. See B. 2. Ch. 3.

It is commonly obſerved that the *Latin*'s chief perfection lies in its fitneſs for expreſſing things which *relate to War*: This ariſes from that prevalent, but, I think, rather *vague* opinion, that all languages reſemble in their nature the diſpoſition of the people who firſt formed and uſed them: I readily grant that the *Latin*, like the ancient *Romans*, breathes a *martial* and *gallant* ſpirit; but at the ſame time, it ſeems to be *equally* well adapted for topics of a very *different* ſort. To confine ourſelves to the Poets.

As the *philoſophical* parts of *Lucretius* convince us no leſs of the *barrenneſs* of his *Language* in that particular, than of the *abſurdity* of his *Syſtem*, ſo the *fine deſcriptive* paſſages in that elaborate Work may ſerve to ſhow how admirably fit it is for delineating the *calm Scenery* of Nature. *Ovid* and *Catullus*, with the tribe of amorous bardlings, are a ſufficient proof that it is perhaps *too well calculated* for the *Affairs* of *Love*; it being capable of conveying the *groſſeſt* ideas with a degree of cleanlineſs even, and of modeſty. In the *courtly Horace* we ſee with what wonderful *elegance* and *propriety* it can hand down to poſterity both *moral* and *literary*

rary precepts, as well as the effuſions of a *gay, ſocial,* and moſt *friendly* heart. Nor is it leſs evident from *Virgil,* in whoſe hands this Language acquired all the *graceſulneſs* and *majeſty* it is *capable* of, that the ſports and employments of the *Shepherd* and honeſt *Huſbandman* can be as *happily* deſcribed in it as thoſe of the *Stateſman* or the *Warrior.* Hence we conclude that the *Latin* is *equally* elegant and nervous, whether it be applied to things relating to *Peace,* or to *War* and *Popular Buſineſſes:* As long as it has ſomething *corporeal,* ſomething I mean *palpable to Senſe* and common obſervation, and not the *abſtract conceptions* of *Mind* to treat of, it flows with a *ſweetneſs* and *energy* of expreſſion which you muſt forcibly perceive by reading the beſt Authors in it, but of which it is not *poſſible* to give any juſt idea.

I think it quite needleſs to ſay any thing with regard to the ſtudy of this Language: It is leſs difficult, becauſe leſs copious, than the *Greek:* You are ſenſible you ſhould endeavour to be able to compoſe in it with (if poſſible) a degree of *Cæſar*'s elegance and ſimplicity, or elſe that of *Cicero:* Not that I imagine you'll have much occaſion to write

write it any more than what your College Buſineſs may require, but becauſe I am convinced that this is the only ſure way to obtain a *thorough* knowledge of any language: None of the hidden beauties, the delicate touches can be perceived by him who is unable to do this—And for the ſame reaſon it was that I adviſed you to uſe yourſelf to *Greek* Exerciſes.

As you have a turn for *Latin Poetry*, there cannot be a more *liberal* amuſement than to indulge it: It will tend alſo to *correct* and *poliſh* your taſte, and bring you to a *critical* acquaintance with the language: *Virgil*, *Horace*, and *Tibullus* ſhould be your only models.

I admire very much ſome modern productions in this way. The Poem on the *Immortality of the Soul*, and that on the *Judgement of* PARIS have no ſmall ſhare of *Virgil's Purity*, and *Elegance*, and *Majeſty*. In the little Volume, entitled *Carmina Quadrageſimalia*, you'll find a vein of Wit *equal*, though not *ſimilar*, to that of *Martial*, and expreſſed in the *modeſt* and *harmonious* numbers of *Tibullus*. What we have of Biſhop *Lowth* of this kind are admirable. *Smith's Ode on Pocock*,

Pocock, together with thoſe of his friend, the Author of the *Splendid Shilling*, have been deſervedly conſidered as breathing a ſpirit truly *Horatian*.

Others might be pointed out; but as your own good taſte and good ſenſe will prompt you to ſpend a leiſure hour in regaling yourſelf with ſuch flowers as theſe, it would be quite ſuperfluous to ſay more.

I am not ignorant that the modern practice of writing the dead languages, whether in *Proſe* or *Verſe*, has been repeatedly and violently attacked. Theſe attacks, however, have proceeded from perſons totally *unable* to ſee the advantages attending it, or from thoſe *fools* and *innovators* who exert the whole force of their minds to overthrow opinions which are commonly received, and which are known from *Experience* to be productive of *Utility* and *Pleaſure*. Such an affectation for ſingularity, as long as it meddles not with that which is *Pure* and *Holy*, deſerves not any regular or ſober confutation——I would rather *laugh at* and *deſpiſe* it.

Vive, vale!—ſi quid noviſti rectius iſtis,
Candidus imperti: ſi non, his utere mecum.

LETTER

LETTER XIV.

THOUGH I be a warm and zealous Advocate for the conſtant ſtudy of *Greek* and *Latin* Authors, yet I am far from thinking that all Human Knowledge is treaſured up in the productions of thoſe celebrated Geniuſes. This, however, was the prevailing opinion from the Revival of *Letters* till the beginning of the ſeventeenth Century,[a] and ſome even now are inclined to think ſo. — About that time my *Lord Verulam* introduced the method of Inquiry by means of *Experiment*, and thus removed the prejudices of former times, and placed Philoſophy on a *new* and more *extenſive* baſis. Thoſe, who purſued the track which was pointed out to them by this our Great Countryman, have traverſed and inveſtigated the vaſt regions of Nature, opening, as they went, ſcenes for Science and ſerious Contemplation, though little known or attended to before, yet capable of affording the nobleſt kind of Pleaſure, and Inſtruction.

[a] See *Moſheim's Eccleſ. Hiſt.* Vol. IV.

It

It reflects much honour on your Univerſity for having early eſtabliſhed a Profeſſorſhip in this ſublime and uſeful branch of Literature, the duties of which have been always diſcharged by men of the firſt abilities, and with true dignity and propriety; never certainly more ſo, than by the very learned and amiable Man who now ſits in the Chair. By attending his well digeſted Courſe of Lectures in *Experimental Philoſophy*, and in *Aſtronomy*, this part of your ſtudies will be rendered eaſy, as well as agreeable: And having but juſt gone through the Elements of *Euclid* and ſome higher parts of the Mathematics, this no doubt is the propereſt time for you to attend them: Some indeed are perſuaded to it, when they ſcarcely know the very firſt principles of Geometry, and are of courſe unable to reap all thoſe advantages and improvement, with which they are ſo replete—Whatever may be ſaid to the contrary, there is certainly nothing like to one's having a competent and ready ſtock of previous, elementary knowledge.

You can want no motive to recommend theſe ſtudies to you: For theſe, more perhaps

haps than any other, contain ſomething which *neceſſarily awakens* our *curioſity*, and, when they are conducted in a proper manner, ſo as to be moſt ſucceſsful, they tend in an eminent degree to enlarge and elevate the Mind, and promote a right ſpirit of Piety, by exciting our admiration of the Divine Works and Divine Providence: In the proſecution of theſe purſuits, marks of Perfect Wiſdom and Perfect Goodneſs, appear throughout the wonderful arrangement of things, perpetually obtruding themſelves upon us, and tending to inſpire every ingenuous heart with the moſt profound ſentiments of reverence, and love, and confidence: Theſe ſentiments, ſufficiently impreſſed, exalt our nature to the higheſt dignity and happineſs of which it is capable, and diffuſe a pleaſing and uniform ſerenity over every ſcene of life: They diſpoſe a man to behave with propriety and honour *here*, and give the beſt founded hopes of the *continuance* and *increaſe* of this ſolid felicity, through *endleſs* ages, in a *better* and *future* ſtate? [a]

[a] See the whole remark in *Dr. Prieſtley's Obſervations on Education*—It is little more than a paraphraſe on what the *Abbè Fleury* ſays in his ſenſible little Book *Du Choix et de la Conduite*

As

As well as thus *expand* and *improve* the mind in what is *virtuous* and *manly*, they will alſo *inure* it to *habits* of *induſtry*, and *prepare* it for *undertaking other ſtudies* with *better ability* and *ſucceſs*.

I will only add, that you ſhould take care to read with proper attention whatever Books are recommended to you: Without doing this, it will never anſwer one's purpoſe to attend any Public Lectures of what kind ſoever; for it is only by peruſing what has been well written on the ſubject that laſting impreſſions can be made: He who deſpiſes or neglects proceeding in this manner will never, it is certain, make any right progreſs in literary, or any other liberal purſuit; and there are much better hopes of the *heavy*, but *induſtrious plodder*, than of *him*. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

des Etudes, p. 185.—Not that I wiſh to inſinuate Dr. P. took it from thence; (and indeed if he had I ſee no harm) for the ſame Obſervation muſt occur to every man of ſenſe, who properly conſiders the ſubject.

LETTER

LETTER XV.

THE tranſition from Mathematics to Logic is eaſy and natural, and according to the practice of the oldeſt and beſt Inſtructors. The Mind, by a due application to the former of theſe Sciences, having been uſed to reaſon with certainty and preciſion, is now more fit and able to enter upon the "*Intellective Abſtractions*" of Logic. Accordingly we find that as the ancient Philoſophers did not chuſe to admit into their Schools thoſe who were totally unacquainted with mathematical Learning, ſo their firſt buſineſs was to teach them, being admitted, a proper ſkill and knowledge in what is commonly called *The Art of Reaſoning*:—And this they did from a conviction, that the ſtudy of it contributed, in an eminent degree, to the general improvement of the faculties of the Human Mind;—that it was of univerſal application;—and that this part of Literature, in conjunction with Mathematics, is to be conſidered as forming the great

ſource

ſource from whence all the other Arts and Sciences derive their origin:—Hæ *Rationales Scientiæ* reliquarum omnino CLAVES ſunt[a]—Et ANCILLARUM loco erga Phyſicam ponendæ ſunt—And hence, by the way, the neceſſity of ſtudying theſe two Sciences ſo as to *exemplify* and *illuſtrate* each other; for whoever does this properly, "will become not only by Mathematics a more expert *Logician*, and by Logic a more rational *Mathematician*, but a wiſer Philoſopher, and an acuter Reaſoner, in all the poſſible ſubjects either of ſcience or deliberation.[b]"

As to the ſtudy of Logic in particular, if it be at all conducive to thoſe important ends which have been already mentioned, you cannot certainly want motives to undertake it with courage and reſolution: Though there are many arguments ready in hand to make this point as clear as the moſt evident Theorem in *Euclid*, yet I ſhall only throw a *hint* or two on the ſubject, and leave you to the farther inveſtigation of it.

Thoſe who have, with moſt accuracy and penetration, inquired into the Hiſtory of

[a] *Bacon de Augment. Scient.* Lib. 3.—& 5. cap. 1.

[b] See *Hermes*—the Preface.

Letters and of the faculties belonging to us, ſeem to agree that the Principles of Reaſon are by Nature implanted in the Mind of man: Theſe Principles are the ſeeds from whence Learning and all our mental acquiſitions have firſt their origin; and they have always flouriſhed and brought forth fruit in a good ſoil and under a favourable climate: But, like the *other* gifts of Nature, they firſt of all require proper culture and attention, and are capable no doubt of *different* degrees of improvement: Now every tolerable degree of improvement is to be moſt ſurely attained to by following ſome technical method, ſo as to accuſtom them to *frequent* and *regular* exerciſe; for it is by right and regular exerciſe that our *intellectual* as well as *corporeal* endowments can, in general, acquire any ſort of readineſs and activity. Hence we may ſee the neceſſity, I mean if we were to enter at all into the argument, of calling in the aſſiſtance of Art; and the Art employed here is Logic, which, by purging and regulating the Mind itſelf, tends of courſe to ſtrengthen and improve all the powers with which the Mind is indued. *Lord Verulam*, ſpeaking of this Science

Science and Mathematics, has an obſervation very pertinent to our purpoſe, and which I think is finely expreſſed: "Non ſolùm *dirigunt* eam, (ſcil. Mentem) ſed et *roborant*; ſicut ſagittandi *uſus* et *habitus* non tantùm facit, ut melius quis *collimet*, ſed ut *arcum tendat fortiorem*."[a] And *Locke*[b] would recommend them as neceſſary not only to make us *ſcholars*, but even to make us *thinking* and *rational* creatures.

Again: Logic is a Science of *univerſal application*. Perhaps all the other Arts and Sciences have certain boundaries which they cannot paſs: But it is not ſo with this: For tending to ſtrengthen and enlarge the powers of the Human Mind in general, it extends itſelf and is to be applied to whatever thoſe powers can comprehend or inveſtigate. Even in Mathematics, that beautiful regularity and connexion, that uninterrupted chain of reaſoning which pervades them, is to be attributed to Logic: And it is to this ſpeculative and uſeful Science we are ultimately indebted for that pleaſure and advantage, which, in every branch of human Art

[a] De Augment. Scien. V. 1.

[b] See his Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding.

and Literature, is to be derived from due Order, and Perſpicuity, and Proportion.

With regard to the *Greek* Language, it is readily acknowledged that its characteriſtic excellence conſiſts in its *Copiouſneſs* or *Univerſality*:—I ſee no reaſon why it may not be argued, upon the *ſame* principle, that the *Univerſality* of Logic is a plain proof of its *dignity* and *uſe*: And as to its importance in Society, it is by ſo much ſuperior to the *Greek* or any other Tongue whatſoever, as is Sentiment or Perception of Mind, to the Words in which that Sentiment is expreſſed. So then we may ſafely conclude, that all the other parts of Learning, how ſublime ſoever and delightful they may be, unaccompanied with "a ſound and correct Logic, are in fact no better than warbling Trifles."[a] *Galen*,[b] we are told, upon contemplating the many wonderful uſes of the HAND, "upon obſerving the ſuppleneſs and variety

[a] *Hermes*, I. 1.

[b] By conſidering the divine mechaniſm of the *Hand* this celebrated old Phyſician was converted from Polytheiſm to believe in the *One Living God*: And upon his converſion he compoſed a Hymn, conſiſting of little more than of praiſes on this member of the human Body, and an enumeration of its various uſes.

of

of joints in his fingers, their bending all the ſame way, the counterpoiſe which they receive from the thumb, the ſoftneſs and fleſhy parts of the inſide, with all the other circumſtances which render that member ſo fit for numberleſs different uſes," cried out in a kind of exſtacy: Ιδε, Το Οργανον οργανων. Thus, when we conſider all the *various uſes* of Logic, and the *different ways* in which it is to be applied with ſo much ſucceſs and advantage, may we not properly ſay? Ιδε, Η Επιστημη επιστημων. Accordingly this, and Mathematics are ſtiled *Artes artium* by the great Man to whom I ſo frequently refer.[a]

But ſtill farther—Logic is, to ſpeak accurately, the proper ſource from whence all the Sciences and all the Arts derive their origin. Before we can underſtand, and of courſe before we can form a right judgement of any thing, we muſt firſt of all inveſtigate the principles on which it is founded: Now the firſt principles of the Arts and Sciences being naturally implanted in our Minds, it is the buſineſs of Logic to cultivate and im-

[a] De Augmen. Scient. V. 1.—I gueſs he had in view here the anecdote reſpecting *Galen*. See the Context.

prove them, leading them by degrees to their full ſtrength and powers of action.

To prove the ſame thing in a more ſcientific way. It has been obſerved, (and who will deny the truth of it?) that "nothing can be known but by knowing either directly the ſpecies to which it belongs, or by knowing other ſpecieſes, which enable us to form ſome notion of the object unknown: If this be true, there can be no Philoſophy or Science of any kind, without knowing the genuſes or ſpecieſes of things; and, as that cannot be attained without *diſinition* and *diviſion*, it ſhould ſeem that a good ſyſtem of Logic, of which the art of *defining* and *dividing* is a principal part, *is the* FOUNDATION OF ALL SCIENCE.[a]"

It is needleſs to be more particular in enumerating its excellencies and advantages.

And beſides all this, the ſtudy of Logic, when rightly purſued, is not deſtitute of the trueſt and moſt ſublime ſort of *pleaſure*: For the Mind which is in us, feels itſelf wonderfully *pleaſed* and *ſatisfied* in acquiring that *aptneſs*, that *activity* and *enlargement* which we find neceſſary to fill every reſpect-

[a] See *Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progreſs of Language.*

able

able ſtation in life with any kind of dignity and decorum—This, it is true, depends entirely on the method that is purſued. That which you ſay you follow ſeems to be perſpicuous, and an excellent one, and diveſted of every thing that is *ſuperfluous* and *ſcholaſtic*. There can, at leaſt, be *no harm* in uſing *Aldrich*, or *Napleton*, or ſome *ſuch* inferior Compendium, ſo as to get acquainted with a few technical, yet neceſſary, particulars: But by adhering to *Ariſtotle* as your principal Guide, you adopt the old and the beſt method of ſtudying it—a method that will teach you ſomething more *ſolid* and *intereſting* than the ſtupid *jargon* and *rugged babblements* of the Schools: You thus approach to the *fountain-head*:—and better certainly, and more delightful it is, to go to the *pure ſource*, than to drink at a *pitiful ſtream*, eſpecially when that ſtream flows *muddy* and *diſturbed*.

——— *Juvat* integros *accedere fontes*,
Atque haurire. ———

But more perhaps reſpecting this laſt point at ſome future period. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER XVI.

I FORGET whether it was among *La Bruyere's* Apothegms I ſaw it obſerved: "That very few know how to paſs their leiſure-hours"—Whoever made it, I think there is much truth in the obſervation——And by leiſure-hours he means all ſuch as cannot be well devoted either to bodily exerciſe or ſevere ſtudy: Of this kind you have, moſt days, one or two on your hands.

Now to avoid paſſing ſuch intervals in illiberal purſuits or thoſe which are altogether frivolous, one ſhould always have ſome fixed employment for them: Perhaps they cannot, for the moſt part, be more pleaſantly or more wiſely employed, than in reading the beſt *Engliſh* Poets, eſpecially *Milton* and *Shakeſpeare*—in peruſing well written Tours and Voyages, or periodical Papers, or ſome candid and ſenſible Biographer—The Hiſtory of *England*, and other Compoſitions of the ſort, which, to read them properly, require much time and care,

care, had been better deferred till you have finiſhed a regular courſe of ſtudy in Ancient Literature.

But in order to peruſe our firſt-rate Authors with moſt advantage, I would adviſe you to read with care the learned Biſhop *Lowth's* excellent *Engliſh* Grammar: Nor would it be improper, if after it you read *Hermes*, that philoſophical and admirable Production of the late *Mr. Harris*: Theſe two Treatiſes will throw great light on Language in general, and eſpecially that of our own country, of which it would be a ſhame to a polite native of *Britain* not to have a complete and thorough knowledge: And beſides, theſe books (*Hermes* in particular) are intimately connected with your *logical* purſuits.

I ſee no reaſon why one ſhould too ſcrupulouſly abſtain from NOVELS: Thoſe of *Fielding*, and ſome of *Smollett's*, with a few others, will ſerve to *unbend* the mind, and to form an *eaſy*, *familiar* ſtile. The *Vicar of Wakefield*, and the *Adventures* of the brave and "broad-hearted" *Robinſon Cruſoe* I ſhould wiſh to read every year, and I ſhould always read them with increaſing ſatisfaction—Probably

bably there is not a book of the kind capable of affording ſo much pleaſure and improvement. — But as to that heap of *crude* and *unnatural* ſtories, which wrong-headed boys and girls are perpetually piling up, your good ſenſe will teach you to hold them in the contempt they deſerve: " Qui inter *hæc* nutriuntur, (to uſe the words of *Petronius Arbiter*, ſpeaking of the *Rhetoricians* of his time) non magis *ſapere* poſſunt, quàm *bene olere* qui in *culinâ* habitant."[a]

Let me intreat you to give up ſome of theſe hours to the *French* Language: If I am not miſtaken, you can already *read* and *write* it with ſome readineſs and accuracy. You modeſtly aſk my opinion with regard to your learning *Italian*: — If my opinion has any weight, I would by no means adviſe you to it: You have at this time enough on your hands; and you ſhould pay chief attention to thoſe ſtudies, whoſe end is to *ſtrengthen* and *enlarge* the Powers of Reaſon. For my own part, I ſee not the wiſdom of filling one's head with more foreign languages than what may be of uſe for ſome particular occaſion, or conducive to one's real improve-

[a] Satyricon, page 2.

ment.

ment. However, the ſtudy of it, was it only for the ſake of being able to read the *Inferno of* DANTE, the ſo much admired Author of *Chaucer* and *Milton*, and who is reckoned the *Father* of *Modern Poetry*—I ſay, the ſtudying it, was it only for this, may, at ſome future period, be an agreeable amuſement.

If you give but little attention to ſuch hints as theſe, you will be able to paſs every leiſure moment you have ſo as to *unbend* and at the ſame time *poliſh* your mind: And by thus regularly filling each interſtice of your time with ſome *harmleſs* and *liberal* employment, you will not only not be diſpoſed to *complain* of the *tediouſneſs* of life, or *philoſophize* on its *vanity*; but you will, moreover, be better able to keep your paſſions from running aſtray, and to go through your other ſtudies with greater pleaſure and advantage—*Theſe* are conſiderations of no *little* importance.

We are told that Dean *Swift*—in ſuch things particularly well worthy of imitation—*regularly* and moſt *ſcrupulouſly* allotted *certain portions* of the day to *certain purſuits*; the morning to what required moſt thought

and

and attention, and the evening to ſome elegant amuſement; having his Watch generally before him in order to be regulated with regard to his hours of ſtudy and recreation. And we learn from Hiſtory, that the Great *Alfred*, the Honour and Pride of *England*, who fought in perſon fifty-ſix battles by ſea and land, was enabled, during a life of no extraordinary length, by an *exact* and *regular* diſtribution of his time, to *acquire more knowledge* and even to *compoſe more books* than what many ſtudious men of equal abilities, though poſſeſſed of the greateſt leiſure and of every opportunity, have, in more fortunate ages, been able to compaſs or attain.[a]—Let theſe, and other examples of the kind, be always conſidered as having *that weight* and *influence*, which naturally belongs to them.

There is no need of adding more. Farewell.

[a] See *Hume's Hiſtory of England.*

LETTER

LETTER XVII.

TO finiſh at this time what I meant to ſay reſpecting Logic. Though the Principles of reaſoning are born with us, and are the ſame in all ages, yet Logic (as is generally allowed) was not cultivated as a *Science* before the time of *Zeno Eleates*, about 500 years (that is) before the *Chriſtian* Era;[a] and being by him firſt applied to the conducting of Dialogues and convivial Converſation, it was ſtiled *Dialectica*, or *Ars Dialecticæ*.

To the attention with which it was now ſtudied may we not attribute, in a great

[a] *Strabo* indeed obſerves (XVII. in the beginning) that the *Phenicians*, on account of their commerce, invented Logic and Arithmetic — As, ſays he, Geometry was invented by the *Egyptians*, ὡς την Λογιστικην, και Αριθμητικην (συνηναι φασιν) παρα Φοινικων, δια τας εμπορίας — But theſe were never conſidered as SCIENCES in *Phenicia* — We can conclude no more from this paſſage than that with regard to commercial matters the *Phenicians* were juſt able to *diſpute* and *calculate*.

meaſure,

meaſure, the cauſe of LETTERS arriving at ſo wonderful a pitch of perfection in *Athens* during this and the following Century?

Immediately after *Zeno*, we find *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Xenocrates*, *Speuſippus*, *Antiſthenes* with many others, making a conſpicuous figure in the liſt of the ancient Philoſophers. Moſt of theſe did not pretend to add any thing to what *Zeno* had left, and the improvements of the reſt were of little or no importance: So that it remained in a very imperfect ſtate (ſcarcely indeed formed into a regular Science) before the time of *Ariſtotle*. He was born at *Stagira* in *Macedon*, ſomewhat more than half a Century after the death of *Zeno*; and coming to *Athens* about the age of eighteen, he ſtudied under *Plato* for near twenty years. He it was who reduced Logic from a rude ſketch into that form which has been never ſince improved: *Hence* ſucceeding writers on the ſubject have derived all their knowledge. And this, among other things, is a ſtriking proof of his great abilities.

Conſidering the diſcoveries and the improvement which he made in this and other branches of Literature, his maſter *Plato* may

may be excuſed for paying him thoſe high compliments — ὁ ΝΟΥΣ. And again: ὁ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΗΣ. ' Notwithſtanding ſuch honourable teſtimonies of *ſuperior* excellence from ſo *able* a Judge, it has been the faſhion with ſome *Moderns* to treat *Ariſtotle* contemptuouſly, and to tax him with being inſipid and affectedly abſtruſe. This, and all complaints of the kind, may probably be accounted for, without tracing them to that general want of correct Taſte in ancient Erudition, and that deſpicable effeminacy of manners and purſuits which we find ſo prevalent and extenſive. It will be worth while to give this a moment's conſideration.

To any one that glances over the Hiſtory of Logic after the days of *Ariſtotle* and his Succeſſors, it will appear obvious that, in proceſs of time, it was ſhamefully corrupted and abuſed. This abuſe and corruption made its *firſt* appearance among the idle Sophiſts and Rhetoricians of *Greece* and *Rome*. But after that the *Greek* and *Roman* Empires were no more, and when Ignorance and Barbarity reigned at large, we hear little of the Arts and Sciences before the beginning of the Ninth Century: They now began to appear among

among the *Arabians*; for this people, being ſpurred on and encouraged by their Caliph *Almamunis*, (who is alſo called *Abu Gaafar Abdallah*) were at length diverted from purſuits of War to thoſe of the *liberal* and *literary* kind. He erected and eſtabliſhed Seminaries of Learning in ſeveral places, eſpecially at *Bagdad*, *Cufa*, and *Baſora*: In ſhort he ſeems to have ſpared neither pains nor expence to inſtil into the minds of his ſubjects a taſte for *Grecian* Literature.

Nor did his exertions prove altogether unſucceſsful. The fury of their religious Warfare was by this time partly ſubſided: Peace and Tranquillity were in ſome meaſure enjoyed amongſt them: And beſides, the nature of their Language, which was brought to a high degree of perfection about two Centuries before,[a] and which (we are told[b])

[a] This was effected by a ſort of poetical Academy, that uſed to aſſemble at ſtated times, in a place called *Ocadh*, where every Poet produced his beſt Compoſition, and was ſure to meet with the applauſe that it deſerved; the moſt excellent of theſe Poems were tranſcribed in characters of gold upon *Egyptian* Paper, and hung up in the Temple of *Mecca*. See the ingenious *Sir W. Jones's Eſſay on the Poetry of the Eaſtern Nations.*

[b] See *Aldrich's Logic* — the Preface.

is

is no leſs adapted for *philoſophical*, than *poetical* Compoſitions, was a circumſtance favourable to the deſign of this celebrated Caliph: — So that during his reign many *Greek* Productions were tranſlated into *Arabick* with much ſucceſs, and were held in very high eſtimation — But none ſo much ſo, as the Works of *Ariſtotle*. Theſe they ſtudied with laudable emulation, and propagated the knowledge of them not only in *Syria* and *Africa*, but alſo in ſome parts of *Italy*, and in *Spain*, where, having now ſubdued this country, many of the moſt learned of them came over, and eſtabliſhed Schools of Learning. Hence the *Saracens* have been looked upon as the firſt Reſtorers of Literature in *Europe*. — The *Stagirite* was the great object of their purſuit; and the ardor with which they ſtudied him ſeems at length to have dwindled into the mereſt abſurdity and enthuſiaſm.*

With the ſame frenzy we find the *European Chriſtians* were ſoon infected: For hence it was that during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, (though indeed ſome

* See the ſubſtance of theſe remarks reſpecting the *Saracens* in *Moſheim's* Eccleſ. Hiſt. Vol. II. and III. paſſim.

of them appeared much earlier) ſprang up that ſwarm of miſguided Zealots who are commonly called *The Scholaſtic Writers*, &c. Theſe men, inſtead of conſidering Logic as intended to *explain* the *principles* of true Learning and the rules of good Criticiſm, conſidered it — miſtaking thus the *means* for the *end* — as the Perfection of all Wiſdom, and as a Science entirely *independent on*, and *unconnected with*, any other whatſoever — Like thoſe miſerable Wretches in common life, who, acquiring a paſſion for money, *merely becauſe it is money*, never once think of the uſeful purpoſes it is deſigned to ſerve.

Whoever was well verſed in logical and metaphyſical knowledge, was now looked upon as ſufficiently learned, and was ſuppoſed to ſtand in no need of being acquainted with any other Art or Science: To learn *Ariſtotle* by heart was every thing: And we are told that ſome religious Sects learned his *Categories* even inſtead of the *Catechiſm*, and at Church a ſection of his Ethics was ſometimes read inſtead of a Chapter in the Bible. *O Tempora! O Mores!*

But Enthuſiaſm of every kind is always accompanied with Error. Thus it was that theſe Schoolmen were not ſo much animated by

by the glorious Love of Truth, as by a rage of angry diſputation; and this made them ſoon perplex and deform the pure doctrines of Reaſon with a multitude of idle ſubtleties and ridiculous diſtinctions. They loaded the memories of their indefatigable Scholars with a quantity of barbarous terms and ſcholaſtic precepts, delivered in the moſt uncouth ſtyle and manner imaginable, and all ſuch as could repeat this jargon with readineſs and rapidity were conſidered *Prodigies* of Eloquence and Erudition. Every ſoul of them had the name of *Ariſtotle* in his mouth, while very few underſtood his Philoſophy, and not one was capable of applying it with any ſort of advantage, or propriety.

Hence appears the Evil of admiring only ſome *one particular* Science: "And thus we ſee the uſe, nay the *neceſſity* of *enlarging* our literary views, leſt even *Knowledge itſelf* ſhould obſtruct its own growth, and perform in ſome meaſure the part of Ignorance and Barbarity."[a]

But abſurd and intemperate as theſe men were in their notions, yet they maintained their empire in the Schools till near the beginning of the Seventeenth Century; and

[a] See *Hermes* — the Preface.

indeed a great deal of their nonſenſe continued longer, and even at this time of day there are perhaps *ſome veſtiges* of it ſtill remaining.

However, when a more enlightened age reſtored to men the right uſe of their Reaſon, the dry interpretations of theſe *Lunatics* (it is ſcarcely too harſh a term) met with general diſapprobation; and their huge Volumes of Commentaries on this ſpeculative ſubject, (which by the way had been at firſt ſtated in as clear a manner as it will admit of,) are now ſunk into that contempt and oblivion which they ſeemed deſtined for. But, as is commonly the caſe when matters are handled with *ſo much paſſion* and *ſo little judgement*, they did an irreparable injury to the cauſe they wiſhed to eſpouſe: For men were ſoon diguſted with their quibbling ſtuff and nonſenſe, and began to entertain a very indifferent opinion of the uſe and importance of the *Science itſelf*, and of Him who had brought it to ſo high a pitch of perfection.

It was thus that *Ariſtotle* fell into diſrepute; and the complaints and declamations which have been made againſt him ever ſince are to be traced to no other ſource—HINC ILLAE LACHRYMAE.

But

But it is not to be denied, (for why ſhould not one conſider things with all *poſſible impartiality?*) that this Philoſopher is *ſometimes* obſcure and abſtruſe. Inſtead, however, of raiſing cavils againſt him for being ſo in a *few* inſtances, we ſhould admire him rather for being *generally* clear and intelligible. Who but *Ariſtotle* could have handled ſo *intricate* and *ſpeculative* a ſubject—a ſubject not *ſuſceptible* of any *ornament* or *embelliſhment*—who but he could have handled it ſo much *according to Science*, and with ſo much *order*, and *perſpicuity*, and *propriety?*

And beſides we allow, that in this and his other Acroamatic Works, he is perhaps frequently *deficient* in point of *compoſition*; for it is very probable, as my *Lord Monboddo* obſerves,[a] that theſe are to be conſidered as *minute-books*, which he occaſionally uſed in delivering his Lectures, and which it is every reader's buſineſs to *ſcrutinize*, and *enlarge* upon. Indeed all his Works require to be read with *all poſſible care* and *attention*.

Of every prejudice againſt him on this head, therefore, I would have you totally diveſt yourſelf: If, by chance, you ever find

[a] See *Origin and Progreſs of Language*, *Vol.* II.

him

him *obſcure* or *inelegant*, remember that it is in the *very nature of his ſubject*: He is, however, in both theſe reſpects to be conſidered ſuperior to his Interpreters: You will every where find him a *perfect* and *thorough* maſter of the ſubject in hand, explaining all its fundamental Principles in a juſt and moſt beautiful Analyſis, and in general not difficult to be underſtood.

I ſhall only add that you will do well firſt of all, to ſtudy the Categories or Predicaments; which, as their doctrine is eſteemed to be the foundation of all Philoſophy and of Logic itſelf, are very properly placed at the head of his *Organon*.

Poſſeſſed of a competent knowledge of theſe, you will be able to proſecute your preſent ſtudies with greater advantage and ſucceſs: Being conciſe and contained in a few pages, they perhaps may ſtand in need of ſome illuſtration: Here then a good and ſenſible Commentator might be of ſervice; and there is one which univerſally bears that character, I mean *Ammonius Hermeias.—Vive. Vale. Vince.*

LETTER

LETTER XVIII.

ACCUSE me not of being inconſiſtent with myſelf, if I adviſe you to be on your guard againſt indulging too much what I have been ſo anxious to have you acquire, I mean your habits of induſtry and application. For even in our ſearch after Knowledge, we ſhould proceed with temper and judgement, often *varying* our ideas and relieving the mind by means of *exerciſe* and *amuſements*. Though the life of moſt liberal-minded men would have many dull and tedious intervals without the aſſiſtance of books, yet, rather than contract ſuch a fondneſs for them as to impair one's Health and Good Humour, two of the moſt valuable bleſſings we now enjoy, it would be far better to quit them *altogether*, and paſs our days under the ſhades of *Ignorance* and *Obſcurity*; nothing *on earth* being *equivalent* to ſo great a loſs.

A few remarks on this ſubject you will not perhaps conſider as impertinent or entirely

tirely uſeleſs; at leaſt it will be better than to waſte time and paper about the common news of the day.

Agricola uſed to ſay: That in the prime of youth he was ſo paſſionately fond of the ſtudy of Philoſophy, that he would have carried it to an extreme, had not the prudence of his mother checked his impetuous diſpoſition: "Scilicet, as it is added by his ſententious Biographer, ſublime et erectum ingenium pulchritudinem ac ſpeciem excelſæ magnæque gloriæ *vehementiùs*, quàm cautè, appetebat: Mox mitigavit Ratio et Ætas; retinuitque, *quod eſt difficillimum*, ex ſapientiâ *modum*."[a] It is the ſame with many a young man; who, having once imbibed a reliſh for true Knowledge, and perpetually thirſting after a larger draught of it, is apt, like the brave *Roman*, not to be aware that *too intenſe* an application leads to conſequences of a very *fatal* nature: But thoſe—who, to avoid theſe conſequences, give up their *whole* time and attention to the care and enjoyment of the *body*, we have nothing to do with *this ſort of Philoſophers*:—'Tis from the other quarter we apprehend dan-

[a] See *Tacitus in his Life of Agricola*—the beginning.

ger;

ger; and the remedy is to be applied accordingly.

To preſerve the ſound Conſtitution, which Nature has given you, as little impaired as poſſible, nothing ſeems ſo conducive as *Early Riſing*, *Temperance*, and *Exerciſe*: Theſe ingredients, properly mixt together, make the beſt *Recipe* for the Preſervation of Health — To ſay a word on each particular *ſeparately*, and *in order*.

Seven, if not ſix hours-ſleep is certainly ſufficient for one of your *age* and *healthy temper* of body: Any greater indulgence, inſtead of *refreſhing*, will, on the contrary, only *blunt* the *mental* faculties, and too much *relax* the *corporeal* ones: And this ſhould be done, if in your power, at a ſtretch; — one nap and a-way. As the *Phyſician* will inform you that the morning-air *braces* the *nerves*, and *diſtends* and *purifies the lungs*, giving to the whole body freſh vigour and activity; ſo will the *Moraliſt* argue, with equal truth on his ſide, that the mind is at this time of the day moſt *fit* and *diſpoſed* for *virtuous* and *manly* ſentiments: Not having as yet entered on its daily occupations, it is naturally inclined, and, as it were,

were, compelled to contemplate the various parts of the Creation with reverence, and cheerful gratitude. It is *now* that every thinking young man conſiders how to lay out properly the remainder of the day, congratulating himſelf, at the ſame time, on his *ſteady progreſs* in Virtue and Knowledge.—We are told that Chief Juſtice *Hale* uſed to attribute to his having conſtantly made a right uſe of this part of the day not only the *good old age* he lived to, but alſo the *extenſive Learning* of which he was maſter.

Temperance, as well as Early Hours, is not only a grand *preſervative* of Health, but it is principally by means of it that a ſound conſtitution and every virtuous endowment of the Mind is firſt acquired, or at leaſt fixed on a ſure baſis: For it is this great Cardinal Virtue which renders a man *fit* and *diſpoſed* to diſcharge with *propriety* the ſeveral duties of life, which, as a free and rational creature, he owes to God,—to himſelf,—his friends,—and mankind in general.

Intemperance of all kind is evidently bad and pernicious—Inaſmuch as it tends to heat

heat the blood, it quickens its motion, and thus makes it ſtrike with too violent a momentum againſt the delicate texture of the brain, the operations of which are thereby deranged, and the Powers of Thought conſequently diſturbed, or perhaps totally deſtroyed.

——— *Know whate'er*
Beyond its natural fervour hurries on
The ſanguine tide,—whether the frequent bowl,
High-ſeaſoned fare, or exerciſe to toil
Protracted,—ſpurs to its laſt ſtage tir'd life,
And ſows the temples with untimely ſnow.[a]

So that even if we have no regard for our Conſtitution, the decline of which we may not perhaps *immediately* perceive, we ſhould cultivate Temperance as being the only means of enjoying the right and full uſe of that Faculty whereby Man is ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed.

Without this *Nurſing-Mother* of all that is *Great* and *Liberal*, GOOD HUMOUR, *properly ſo called*, cannot long ſubſiſt: And deſtitute of this amiable and enlivening quality

[a] Art of Preſerving Health, ii. 501.

Learning,

Learning, and *Virtue*, and *Religion even*, loſe all their grace — all their attractive excellence. True Cheerfulneſs and Serenity is not only a ſure ſign of an *honeſt* and *well-regulated* Mind, but it is the beſt preſervative againſt *Enthuſiaſm* and *Infidelity*. The tenets of *Calviniſm* — are they not enough to make one's blood chill with horror? — In ſhort — *all Enthuſiaſm* contains ſomething gloomy and dark, and which does violence to the common feelings of our Nature — Was there but more Benevolence and Charity in the world, we ſhould ſee leſs of the diſmal effects of that horrible Peſt of Society. — And if there be ſuch Mortal, (for it hath been juſtly called in queſtion) as a *thinking Atheiſt*, muſt he not be at bottom an uncharitable, ſuſpicious, moroſe, malevolent ſort of an animal? —— Good Humour then is the very balm of life; and to the ſtudious mind it is a moſt wholeſome and neceſſary cordial: Have it therefore always at command, and fly from every thing that is *ſurly*, or *grim*, or *diſdainful*.

But I am loſing ſight of my ſubject — So much for the two firſt heads of it.

LETTER

LETTER XVIII. Continued.

ONE word with reſpect to Exerciſe.

The *Greeks* and *Romans*, it is well known, uſed to conſider the exerciſing of the body as an eſſential part of a Complete Education: Indeed *Plato*, who was himſelf well-ſkilled in moſt of the manly and athletic Exerciſes, ſeems to have looked upon this as more deſerving of attention than almoſt any thing beſides; becauſe that by means of it the Soul is able to exert moſt ſucceſsfully its higher Powers, "the Powers I mean of Reaſon and Intellect:" The Life of Man has its Eſſence in *Motion*— Objects from without *firſt move* our faculties, and thence we move *of ourſelves* either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*:[a] Nor, in general, are we fit for doing the *latter* to any good purpoſe or effect, any more than the *former*, unleſs the corporeal faculties, "which are in fact the firſt inſtruments of our Intelligence," be in an active and vigorous ſtate: Accordingly we find it to be a common

[a] See *Hermes*, III. 4.

obſervation,

obſervation, and confirmed by Experience, that great ſtrength of Mind ſeldom or never attends a very *ſedentary* life: But the proper end of all Good-Learning is to *add to*, and not *impair* the vigour of our mental Powers. Since then they ſtand in certain danger of being hurt and contracted by too intenſe an application, we ſhould enliven and dilate them by frequently diverting them to objects of a lighter and more trifling ſort —

Luſus Animo debent aliquando dari,
Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat ſibi.[a]

To enter a little into particulars. The firſt leiſure hour every morning cannot perhaps be better employed than in walking: This is a *natural* and an *innocent* recreation, and therefore it cannot but be *wholeſome*. What time you ſhould think proper to devote over and above to exerciſe, would, I think, be well beſtowed on *Fencing*, *Muſic*, or *Riding*.

The learning how to make a proper uſe of your weapon would, as *Milton* words it,[b] not only keep you healthy, nimble, and well in breath, but it is alſo the likelieſt means

[a] *Phædrus* III. 14. [b] See his *Tractate on Education.*

to

to make you arrive at your full growth and ſtature, and to inſpire you with a gallant and fearleſs Courage; which, being tempered with ſeaſonable Lectures, and Precepts of true Fortitude and Patience, will turn into a native and heroic Valour, and will make you ſcorn the cowardice of being guilty of any wrong action or inſolent behaviour.

I mentioned Muſic becauſe I know you have a natural turn that way, and have made no inconſiderable proficiency in this agreeable Art: Had not this been the caſe, it would not be adviſeable to think of learning it now, for it would be time idly and fooliſhly thrown away. Though one be not of the ſame opinion with the *Egyptians* of old, who, as ſome ſay, from a ſuppoſition that it tends to enervate the Mind, forbad *men* to cultivate or practiſe Muſic; yet you ſhould avoid all *effeminacy* in your exerciſes of this kind, as well as in other things. But the "*ſolemn* and *divine* Harmonies of Muſic, heard or learnt, *recreate* and *compoſe* the ſpirits, and, if wiſe Men and Prophets be not extremely out, have a great power over

over diſpoſitions and manners, to ſmooth and make them gentle from ruſtic harſhneſs and diſtempered paſſions: And this would not be unexpedient after meat to aſſiſt and cheriſh Nature in her firſt concoction, and ſend the Mind back to ſtudy in good tune ſatisfaction."[a]—This puts me in mind of a young man, noted no leſs for *Rational Oeconomy*, than for his induſtry and ſtrong natural abilities, who, whilſt Undergraduate, in order to avoid the expence as well as the danger attending drinking-parties, uſed to retire every day after dinner into his own *Rooms*, and there paſs a couple of hours over two or three glaſſes of wine, in playing on his Harpſichord, and reading *Virgil*: This is no other than whom I mentioned in the beginning of our Correſpondence under the name of *Cleanthes*, and who promiſes to be in time one of the firſt characters in Great *Britain*—But not to digreſs.

Muſic then is an elegant recreation, and wonderfully congenial to the minds of men, tending to *compoſe* thoſe of a *volatile* caſt, and to *rouſe* the more *melancholy* and *languid*; ſubduing the violence of rough and impetuous

[a] See *Milton, as above.*

Paſſions

Paſſions by fixing the attention on objects of an innocent nature; — and therefore to be conſidered no weak advocate on the ſide of Reaſon.

Over and above the advantages to be derived from other Exerciſes, ſome plauſibly alledge, that Riding is attended with one peculiar to itſelf, the opportunity I mean of enjoying a more freſh, and purer air; and thoſe who are at all acquainted with the Oeconomy of the Human Body will readily allow that this is a moſt important conſideration: Hence it is that the *Dumb-Bell*, and Σκιομαχια, or the *Fighting with your own ſhadow*, are extremely deficient.

Plato and *Pliny* the Younger recommend Riding as a thing wholeſome for the joints and ſtomach. But there is no need of multiplying authorities.

I would not, however, tie you down to any particular method of proceeding; for here, (as has been obſerved with regard to other matters) the proper uſe to be made of minute rules and directions is neither to be too exact, nor altogether negligent of them, and they operate beſt when once formed into a habit. I only wiſh to *appriſe* you that

ſome ſuch Exerciſes as theſe, taken *ſeaſonably*, according to *leiſure* and *convenience*, and not to *exceſs*, are *abſolutely* neceſſary for preſerving a ſound Conſtitution, and alſo for forming a proper judgement of it: *Socrates*, whoſe memory we all revere, uſed to adviſe thoſe about him to make their *Health* their *chief* ſtudy, and to ſay to them: "That it was a hard thing if a man of ſenſe, who took care of his Exercciſes and Diet, did not better know than any Phyſician, what was good or bad for him."—And at the ſame time that proper Exerciſes keep us in good Health and contribute to an external gracefulneſs of mien and deportment, forming, in ſhort, that ΕΥΕΞΙΑ which the Ancients ſo much valued, and which in good truth is ſo infinitely valuable;—beſides this, I ſay, they tend to form a manly and cheerful turn of mind: So that hence we have an effectual antidote againſt complaining of the *tediouſneſs of life* to which ſedentary perſons are ſo liable—It is a fooliſh, a villainous, a dangerous complaint. *Vale.*

PHILANDER.

LETTER XIX.

FURNISHED with a competent knowledge of the *Greek* and *Latin* tongues from having peruſed a few ſhort Treatiſes in them, you will be now more capable of undertaking and going through with propriety the Hiſtories of thoſe celebrated People. Although this ſtudy requires a good deal of care and attention, yet it will be an agreeable *relaxation*, compared to your purſuits of the *abſtract* and *more philoſophical* kind—And I would have you conſider it in that light.

If we read Hiſtory in a proper manner we ſhall find it to be the very "*Anatomy of Philoſophy*:" Here the Paſſions and all the Faculties of the Human Mind are continually engaged in action and exhibited to view. To obſerve the playing of all theſe, and the various motives which call forth their exertions, will afford abundant matter of inſtruction and delight, and it is a ſpeculation not

unworthy of the Philoſopher even. With room for indulging it, Hiſtory will largely ſupply perſons of almoſt all ranks and ſituations. — Nec vero ſum inſcius eſſe utilitatem in hiſtoria, non modo voluptatem.[a]

Now its great, general object ſeems to be to form good and uſeful and intelligent Citizens; or, in other words, to improve us in Virtue and Knowledge; and that in a way which, with the bulk of mankind, is far the moſt effectual — by the Examples I mean and the Experience of others.

What! ſuppoſing we find in Hiſtory (as has been ſaid) little more than a detail of the *Vices* and *Follies* of our fellow-creatures — ſhould that be any reaſon for our not reading it? Quite the reverſe. For we generally find that the bad and reſtleſs Paſſions of Men, however ſucceſsful they may be for a time, lead them by *certain*, though perhaps *ſlow* and *gentle*, ſteps to misfortune and contempt; and, if ſtill indulged, are ſure to end in their miſery and deſtruction. But thoſe, on the contrary, who act upon good and upright principles, in what diſtreſs ſoever they may happen to be involved, yet

[a] Cic. De Fin. &c. V. 19.

at

at laſt we *often* ſee them diſperſe the dark cloud, and obtain their proper reward;—are *always* able to derive comfort from within themſelves,—and appear *amiable* and *reſpectable* even in the eyes of the *moſt abandoned.*

——— *abaſh'd* the Devil *ſtood,*
And felt how awful Goodneſs is, and ſaw
VIRTUE *in her ſhape how lovely*——*ſaw,*
and pin'd
His loſs[a]———

So that the temporary ſucceſs of Vice and Folly, and the depreſſion of real Merit, ſhould equally teach us reſignation to God's Providence, and make us form right opinions of whatever we meet with on this *motley*, and frequently *diſtreſsful* ſtage of Human Life.

Phyſicians tell us that, in the Oeconomy of the Human Body, it is the conſtant buſineſs of the *Inteſtinal Tube* or *Canal* to ſeparate from the excrementitious and hurtful the nutritive part of our aliment—to *retain* the one, and *eject* the other:—Exactly ſuch, with regard to the Oeconomy of the

[a] P. Loſt IV. 847.

Mind,

Mind, ſhould be the office of our *Judgement:* And *here* in particular we ſhall have continual occaſion to employ it: If we do this, we may derive no leſs advantages from the *wicked*, than from the *virtuous* Examples we meet with in our Hiſtorical Purſuits, as well as in the affairs of common Life.

Nonne vides, Albî ut male vivat filius? utque
Barrus inops?—magnum documentum, *ne*
Patriam Rem
Perdere quis velit.[a]

Thus then in order hereby to become *better* men, we ſhould accuſtom ourſelves to ſift and weigh thoroughly every action and event, ſo as to be able to make pertinent reflections upon them, and draw from them juſt and proper concluſions—And thus we ſhall ſoon acquire a habit of thinking and acting for ourſelves.

But again.——As the ſtudy of Hiſtory contributes to *improve us in Virtue*, (which ſhould be its firſt and great aim) ſo does it in no leſs degree furniſh us with *elegant* and *uſeful Knowledge*.

In ſtudying it with a view to this point,

[a] Lib. 1. Sat. IV. 109.

we

we ſhould give chief notice to the progreſſive expanſion and improvement of Human Intellect, and the gradual civilization of Society; tracing, with care and judgement, the *Riſe*, the *Progreſs*, the *Decline*, and again the *Revival* of the Sciences, and of the liberal and neceſſary Arts. We ſhould alſo conſider in every view how the "changes that have happened in the Laws and Opinions of Mankind correſpond with their improvement in the Art of governing," and be leſs anxious to know *where*, or *when*, or *how many*, were the battles fought by the ~~the~~ *Greeks* and *Romans*, than acquaint ourſelves with their *manners*, and the *means* whereby the *former* repelled the attacks of the *Perſians*, and the *latter* ſubdued the World; and how *they* again in their turn were deſtroyed and annihilated.—Thus by diligently obſerving the *connexion* between *Cauſe* and *Effect*, and deducing the one from the other, we ſhall not only furniſh ourſelves, in the ſafeſt way, with a great variety of important Knowledge, but ſhall alſo *improve* and *confirm habits* of *reaſoning* with *accuracy* and *correctneſs*—expanding thus our Mind and ſtrengthening its faculties.—Here there

is

is laid open before us a large field for Inquiry and Contemplation.

But to come nearer to your preſent reading this way—I find I conſider the ſubject in too *general* a view.

It is not from any blind ſubmiſſion to the authority of our Anceſtors, nor yet from the idle notion of magnifying the Wiſdom and Virtue of *remote* times in order to declaim againſt the *preſent*, that we are directed, during our younger years, to go through a regular Courſe of Ancient Hiſtory: But Reaſon and Experience tell us, that this is by far the beſt, and perhaps indeed the *only ſure* way of laying a good foundation for a ſtore of practical and uſeful Knowledge. There can be nothing more plain than that the Mind, when ſtrengthened and expanded by having been uſed to contemplate the Civil Conſtitutions and Popular Buſineſs of *Greece* and *Rome*, comes with ſingular advantage to the ſtudy of thoſe of our own Country, and of other modern Nations: And as it is of greater conſequence to remember whatever relates to theſe laſt, and to form a right judgement of them, we ſhall be now more capable

capable of doing ſo: The many particular arguments in ſupport of this notion are too obvious to be mentioned. At the ſame time we ſhall imbibe *ſomething* of the ſpirit, — of the reſolute, though often irregular and miſtaken Virtue of that brave People, who would rather have exchanged *life*, for what they in a great meaſure thought *utter annihilation*, than their own Laws for thoſe of their *Perſian* or *Carthaginian* Invaders.— The reading of them makes one's blood *glow* within one.—Would to God it would ever tend to inſpire us all with a true love for our Country, and a veneration for our Well-founded Conſtitution! That it would make us quit the paths of *Luxury* and *Licentiouſneſs*, and ſtand *unmoved* in the cauſe of *Liberty!* Fair LIBERTY! what glorious deeds have been performed by thy *real* votaries!

Add to all this, that unleſs we are tolerably well verſed in their Hiſtory, we can ſee but few of the hidden beauties and nice touches and alluſions to be found throughout their Poems, their Orations, and even in their Philoſophical Compoſitions. — Hence this branch

branch of Learning tends greatly to the illuſtration of ſeveral others.

Hiſtory then thus conſidered is a moſt excellent ſtudy, full of what is *animated*, and *inſtructive*, and *agreeable*, —a ſort of Philoſophy, in ſhort, " which teaches by Examples how we ought to conduct ourſelves in *all public* and *private* ſituations." But ſhould you look upon it merely as an exerciſe calculated for the Memory, and regard *nothing but circumſtances* relating to *Place* and *Time*, you muſt loſe all the *Uſeful*, and the *Pleaſant*, which is ſo happily blended in every good Hiſtorian; and you might as well read a bare Chronicle, as the maſterly account of the *Peloponneſian* War.

But ſtill an attention to *dates* and the *ſituation* of *places* is *by no means* to be *diſpenſed with:* So that Chronology and Geography are particularly uſeful: Theſe, indeed, as ſomebody obſerves, are *the two Eyes* of Hiſtory; and without them, it would certainly be full of darkneſs and confuſion. It would be adviſeable therefore to have always by your ſide, when engaged in theſe ſorts of

" *Bolingbroke's Letters on the Study of Hiſtory.* L. III.

ſtudy,

ſtudy, either *Helvicus*, or ſome ſuch compendious Chronologiſt, together with *D'Anville's* Maps, which I believe are reckoned as good as any.

I ſhall only add that in the mean time you would do well to read *Plutarch* and *Cornelius Nepos*: For, after having gone through a *particular detail* of ſome public tranſaction, by running over the *Lives* of the principal men concerned in it, you will be able to recollect the whole, and to treaſure up whatever may be moſt worthy of remembrance. In theſe agreeable Biographers, eſpecially the *latter*, we find an aſtoniſhing fund of information compriſed within a very narrow compaſs, and related in the moſt elegant and correct ſtyle; free from every thing that looks like prejudice, or moroſeneſs, or affectation.

A great deal more might be ſaid on this copious ſubject: To point out how *particularly* neceſſary it is to perſons in *particular* lines of life — in ſhort, to treat it in a manner ſuitable to its dignity and extent, would require a Volume: But I am perſuaded you will want nothing to induce you

to

to make yourſelf competently acquainted with the *Grecian* and *Roman* Hiſtory, and with that of thoſe nations *neceſſarily* with which the other may interfere: It would be needleſs therefore to ſpeak minutely of its more particular uſes and advantages, eſpecially when your ingenious Tutor is always at hand: —

—— *Sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu*
Sit, melius cauſas reddet tibi:—mî *ſatis eſt, ſi*
Traditum ab antiquis morem ſervare, tuamque
(Dum cuſtodis eges) vitam famamque tueri
Incolumem poſſim: Simulac duraverit ætas
Membra Animumque tuum, nabis ſine cortice.[a]—

[a] Horace — as before.

LETTER

LETTER XX.

IT gives me much pleaſure to hear that you have gone through the *Organon* in a regular manner: As you ſeem ſenſible of the excellence and right tendency of the Doctrine it contains, I am under no ſort of apprehenſion of your applying it to ſophiſtry, or idle and diſputatious wrangling.

Of all the branches of Literature this Science, though perhaps it may be the moſt tedious, and productive at firſt of but little ſatisfaction, yet certainly it is the moſt uſeful and extenſive of them all. There will be always need of calling forth your logical acquiſitions, this being the great clue whereby we can attain to an accurate knowledge of the other parts of Learning. And eſpecially with regard to what you are now going to take in hand, you could not have done better than acquaint yourſelf previouſly with the principles and proper uſe of Logic: Indeed it is altogether neceſſary to have a juſt notion of the uſe and nature of the Syllogiſm, before

we

we can undertake the ſtudy of Rhetoric with any great advantage or propriety: Accordingly we find it to be the opinion of all competent judges in the matter, that "thoſe who would addreſs men with all the efficacy of Perſuaſion ſhould cultivate Rhetoric along with Logic:" As the latter conſiſts in the forming and improvement of Right Reaſon, the former ſuppoſes this already done, it being its buſineſs to give to arguments elegance, and weight, and dignity. 'Tis obvious then in what order they ſhould be ſtudied.

There is a mutual connexion and dependence between the ſeveral Arts and Sciences: Than that ſuch prevails between Logic and Rhetoric, nothing can be more evident; and it ſeems not unlike to what we find between the Fifth and Sixth Books of *Euclid:* In the one you are taught a doctrine of *univerſal* application, which in the other is exemplified in the demonſtration of certain Theorems and Propoſitions. In the ſame manner, we have ſeen that Logic may be applied without any kind of limitation; whereas

[a] See *Mr. Harris's Philological Inquiries* — See alſo the *Abbé Fleury du choix, &c. des Etudes. p.* 121.

Rhetoric

Rhetoric is under a little reſtraint, being chiefly confined to things of a public nature, and uſing only digreſſive arguments: The ſame thing *Zeno the Stoic* uſed to illuſtrate more elegantly by a Simile taken from the Hand: He compared the *cloſe* power of Logic to the Fiſt or Hand compreſt, and the *diffuſe* power of Rhetoric to the Palm or Hand open — "Cum compreſſerat digitos, pugnumque fecerat, *Dialecticam* aiebat ejuſmodi eſſe: Cum autem diduxerat, et manum dilataverat, palmæ illius ſimilem *Eloquentiam* eſſe dicebat. Atque etiam ante hunc *Ariſtoles* principio Artis Rhetoricæ dicit, illam artem quaſi ex altera parte reſpondere Dialecticæ: ut hoc videlicet differant inter ſe, quod hæc ratio dicendi latior ſit, illa loquendi contractior."[a]

Notwithſtanding this near alliance between Rhetoric and the moſt generally uſeful of all the Sciences, yet it has been conſidered by ſome as a deceitful and pernicious Art, as a mere engine which (they ſay) was invented only to manage and work upon the diſorderly Populace, and inſinuate wrong no-

[a] See Cic. Orator 32.

tions

tions of things, moving the paſſions, and thereby miſleading the judgement, and is never to be applied but as Phyſic for unhealthy ſtates. But what is all this to the purpoſe? Is it not ſpeaking againſt the uſe of the Art merely from the abuſe of it? "'Tis indeed much the ſame thing as to declaim againſt Fencing, becauſe a ſkill in that exerciſe may enable us to wield the ſword well, to fight a duel, and run one's antagoniſt through with greater dexterity and eaſe."

The ſame kind of reaſoning (if it can be called reaſoning) will hold quite as well againſt the moſt uſeful thing on earth. There is no Virtue or Science of any ſort which is not capable of miſapplication and abuſe: And who will deny that whatever is moſt perfect in its kind is, when abuſed, productive often of the greateſt miſchief and diſorder? — Hence no weak argument might be drawn in favour of Rhetoric and Eloquence.

True Eloquence, in fact, is nothing more than the Perfection of ſpeaking, and can have no ſure foundation but in good Morals; And its right aim is to root out of the Mind every thing contrary to what is *Fair* and *Good*,

Good, to defend Juſtice and Truth, and prevent them from being trampled under foot by the wicked artifices of thoſe who conſult merely their own intereſt and the indulgence of unbridled paſſions. — Malus Homo eſſe non poſſit bonus Orator.

Eloquence is not ſo properly employed in diſcuſſing ſpeculative matters, as in explaining and enforcing the practical ends of Human Life and Moral Action: * Then it aſſumes its proper dignity and character: Nor is there here any neceſſary connexion between moving the paſſions, and miſleading the judgement: For the ends of Truth and Perſuaſion are then eſſentially different when the Orator holds out to the Imagination falſe and fictitious images: In this caſe Falſehood becomes apparent Truth, and Eloquence the inſtrument of deceit; but here it is no hard matter to guard againſt all deception and impoſture: — Yet theſe ends are one and the ſame, when ſuch impreſſions are made on the Imagination and Paſſions, as conſiſt and agree with the dictates of Right Reaſon: In this caſe Eloquence comes in to the aid of Argument,

* See the Eſſays on the Characteriſtics. — See alſo Quint. viii. 3.

and impreſſes the Truth, which Logic teaches, in a warmer and more effectual manner: It paints Good and Evil in true and glowing colours, and thus inſpires us with double ardor to embrace the one, and reject the other.

But ſo far is Eloquence from being the inſtrument of deceit, that, on the contrary, the *moral* is much more *natural* and *therefore* likely to be *more ſucceſsful* than the *immoral* application of it: Becauſe, ere the *diſhoneſt* application can take place, circumſtances muſt be *wreſted*, and miſrepreſentations impoſed on the fancy, in oppoſition to Truth and Reaſon: Whereas in the *proper* application, nothing further is neceſſary, than to draw out and impreſs thoſe images and analogies of things, which *really exiſt* in Nature.[a]

We conclude then, that the proper and natural Buſineſs of Eloquence is to be ſubſervient to the cauſe of Truth and Virtue, delineating and recommending only what is good, and manly, and liberal.

But it is foreign to my purpoſe to go about anſwering all, or any of the objections

[a] See the Eſſays mentioned above.

that

that might be made to this Art: And there is little need of expatiating on its excellence and utility, or of inſiſting on its being *particularly* neceſſary to thoſe who are to fill any high or public ſtation in Life; where they ſhall have frequent occaſion to addreſs mankind, and point out to them how the true Happineſs of the *Individual* and that of the *Community* at large are *inviolably connected*; — it being their buſineſs to enforce Doctrines, and eſtabliſh Laws which ſhall conduce to the well being of the *Whole*. *Ariſtotle*, in the beginning of his Treatiſe on this ſubject, has juſt touched upon ſuch its principal uſes and advantages; but what he hath ſaid is, as uſual, full of inſtruction— To him therefore I would refer you.

And this I do the more willingly, becauſe you ſay you are to follow him *here* as well as in Logic: With regard to theſe things you cannot be led by ſo ſafe and intelligent a guide. It is obvious at once that the RHETORIC of *Ariſtotle* is the ſource from whence all ſucceeding Writers on the ſubject have derived their materials. The Books of *Cicero* indeed, as one might well expect

from ſo fine a genius, are written with great elegance and propriety, and are certainly to be recommended for ſeveral reaſons; but yet whatever ſcientific knowledge of the ſubject they diſcover, we find it all in this little Tractate of the *Stagirite*, and here it is expreſſed in a more accurate and compact manner, and more according to ſcience. *Cicero* was himſelf an Orator: *Ariſtotle* a Philoſopher.

Quintilian again is very far from being an indifferent Writer; but as a *Critic* he is to be compared to *Ariſtotle* (this is an obſervation of ſome of the ableſt Judges) juſt as much as the *Philippics* of *Cicero* are to be compared to thoſe of *Demoſthenes*. It has indeed been alledged, in *praiſe* of *Quintilian*, that "no Author ever adorned a ſcientifical Treatiſe with ſo many beautiful metaphors as he has done:" Is not this the very circumſtance which is moſt faulty in this, and a tribe of other Critics? Are matters of Philoſophy and abſtruſe Science to be diſcuſſed in a ſtyle belonging to the Poet, or the Orator? Surely not.

Next to *Quintilian* we may very properly mention *Longinus*: His ſtyle, like that of the

the former, is blameable, being too florid and ſhowy: This they both learned, it is probable, in the Schools of Declamation which were ſo frequent in their time. He ſpeaks of *Homer*, of *Demoſthenes*, and of *Cicero*, in a moſt figurative and pompous way, as if wiſhing to rival thoſe great men in their own diſtinct Arts. "It is plain, that his imagination was lively and vigorous, and the opinions he delivers are penetrating and juſt, but he has not ſhown a capacity for that rational and ſober Inquiry which is eſſential to all PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM."[a]

Notwithſtanding the *comparative* inferiority of theſe ingenious Writers, they may be read with great pleaſure and advantage: The matter is always good and valuable: Only care ſhould be taken, leſt by amuſing the Fancy they tend to form an unjuſt Taſte, and give a wrong turn to the diſcriminating Powers of the Mind. Now the reverſe of this is ſure to take place in reading *Ariſtotle*: It is his peculiar excellence, at the ſame time that he improves the Judgement, to

[a] See *Philological Inquiries*, p. 10, &c.

correct and regulate the Imagination.—This conſideration is of no ſmall importance.

Ariſtotle is likewiſe remarkable for that clear arrangement and comprehenſive brevity which we ſeek for in vain in other Authors. If we read him with thought and attention (and it will be of no avail to read him otherwiſe) we ſhall always find him meaning a great deal more than what he ſays, and well aequainted with the nature and powers of Human Intellect; each Chapter, eſpecially thoſe in the beginning of his Second Book on the ſubject now under conſideration, diſcovering very deep penetration into the receſſes of the heart, and a thorough knowledge of life and manners; and exhibiting, at the ſame time, admirable examples in the ſound analytical way of reaſoning. You muſt not, however, look for any thing more in him, than the genuine and elementary Principles of the Art, founded in Nature, and analyſed with perſpicuity and good ſenſe: The application of them is (as it ought to be) left entirely to your own judgement: And if you wiſh to be able to apply them with any ſort of ſucceſs,

ceſs, look up to the great examples of *Demoſthenes* and *Cicero*:—imbibe ſomething of their ſpirit, ſomething of their manner of compoſing; but this can never be done, even in any degree, without their almoſt incredible induſtry and reſolution.

But I abſtain from ſaying any thing more. The mind, we know, is pleaſed with making its own remarks, and retains ſuch with greater care and ſafety. I will therefore only obſerve, that in this Treatiſe he is not ſo deficient in point of Compoſition, as in that upon Logic, the ſubject being different: His periods are rather ſmooth and well turned, and his ſtyle always correct, and not ſeldom elegant even, and ſomewhat ornamental. Farewell.

LETTER

LETTER XXI.

HAVING already hinted at the true nature and proper buſineſs of Eloquence, and having withal endeavoured to confirm your opinion reſpecting the Author who has beſt explained its firſt Principles, it may be worth our while to conſider in few words (though without pretending to treat the matter philoſophically) at what *period*, and in what *ſoil* and *climate*, theſe Principles were *moſt* cultivated and applied with *greateſt* ſucceſs.

Eloquence, or the Power of Perſuading, is eſſential to, and therefore coeval with, Society. For ſome rays of Eloquence, however faint and obſcure, muſt have appeared, as ſoon as men began to mix and converſe with each other.* But it is not to be ſuppoſed that they gave any ſort of attention to it, or improved it in the leaſt, before they found themſelves free from violence and furniſhed with the neceſſaries of life.

* See *Cic. de Oratore*, i. 8.—See alſo *Quintil.* iii. 2.

Of

Of what nature Eloquence was originally it is no hard matter to conjecture: Every kind of Compoſition was, at firſt, highly poetical: Thus *Strabo*[a] informs us, that the moſt ancient Writing approached, all of it, very near to the ſtyle of Poetry—We muſt neceſſarily conclude, that the firſt ſpecies of Eloquence was alſo of this complexion—But thoſe, who afterwards cultivated the ſpeaking and writing Arts, diſſolved indeed the meaſure, but preſerved at the ſame time whatever elſe was poetical——Such were *Cadmus the Mileſian*, and *Pherecydes*, and *Hecataeus*, and their Scholars[b]: Εἶτα οἱ ὕστερον, ἀφαιροῦντες ἀεί τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἰς τὸ νῦν εἶδος κατηγαγον, ὡς ἂν ἀπὸ ὕψους τινος.

But when Eloquence in the earlieſt times was decked in the ſplendid language of Poetry, we are by no means to conſider it as then regularly formed into an Art. It is ſaid to have made its *firſt* appearance under

[a] Lib. I. towards the beginning.—*Caſaubon* obſerves upon the place: Ergo, ex ſententia *Strabonis*, antiquiſſimi quique ſcriptores proximè ad ſtylum Poetarum accedunt: Quod profecto verum eſt.—Ac mihi quidem perſæpe *Herodotum* cum lego, *Homerum* aliquem videor legere; quem tamen *M. Tullius* (Orat. 12. & 55.) ait ſolutum omnibus legibus fluere—Sed de his non eſt hîc agendi locus.

[b] See *Strabo* as before.—Theſe are ſuppoſed to have lived near 600 years before *Chriſt*.

this

this ſhape among the *Sicilians*, who, as *Cicero* quotes from *Ariſtotle*,[a] being naturally a keen and litigious people, and upon an expulſion of their tyrants ſtanding in need of eloquent pleading in order to recover their private property, thus became the firſt Inventors of an *Art* and *Rules* for ſpeaking. And this Invention is attributed to (one knows not whom) two perſons named *Tiſias* and *Corax*: Theſe were ſoon ſucceeded by *Gorgias Leontinus*,[b] to whom indeed ſome give the honour of having *invented* the Art of Rhetoric—But he is generally conſidered little more than a vain and diſputing Sophiſt.

In *Sicily*, however, it does not ſeem to have arrived at any degree of Perfection: Here, it is true, Rhetoric was firſt taught and invented, and men were made converſant in diſputation; but among the *Sicilians* we hear nothing of the GREAT and SUBLIME in Eloquence: Nor are we to look for this in any other place than the *Grecian*

[a] See *Cic.* Brutus, 12.—And *Ariſt.* De Rhetor. in the beginning. See alſo *Cic.* De Orat. I. 20. with other Parts of his Works—And, if you pleaſe, *Quintil.* iii. 1.

[b] He was born about 500 Years before the Chriſtian Æra, and lived 109 years.

Republics:

Republics: "Hoc autem ſtudium non erat *commune Græciæ*, ſed *proprium* ATHENARUM." For who would expect to find it under the rigid Diſcipline eſtabliſhed at *Lacedæmon*, or who under the Ariſtocracy of *Corinth*? But in *Athens*, "*the Mother of Arts and Eloquence*," the ſoil was adapted to its nature and favourable to its growth. Though this celebrated City, "*the Eye of Greece*," was the common place of reſort, where Philoſophers and great men met from all quarters to paſs *ſome part* at leaſt of their lives in the cultivation of the *Fair* and *Good*, and where their mutual aſſiſtances and emulation muſt have wonderfully contributed to the rapid advancement of all the branches of Literature, yet this Art even *here* would not, I am perſuaded, have reached ſo high a pitch of perfection, had not the form of Government been *Democratical*: Hence Eloquence became the great inſtrument whereby to arrive at the firſt Dignities in the State—And hence all the Powers of the Soul were awakened and rouſed to action.

Many of the other Sciences and fine Arts have flouriſhed under different forms of Go-

[a] See *Cic.* Brutus, 13.

vernment;

vernment; but Eloquence, like the Senſitive Plant, contracts itſelf and ceaſes to diſplay its beauties on the ſlighteſt touch from the hand of Oppreſſion, or deſpotic Power. Nor can we indeed find it, I mean that *ſublime* ſort which *glows* through the pages of *Demoſthenes* and *Cicero*, ſhowing itſelf in any limited Monarchy, or the beſt eſtabliſhed Oligarchy: So that "Public Freedom itſelf can give it no conſiderable play, where that Freedom has any other baſis, than what is founded on a Democracy." It is upon this principle therefore, and not (as *Mr. Hume*[a] alledges) from a *neglect* of the Art, that we are chiefly to account for the difference between modern Eloquence and that which prevailed during the free ſtate of *Athens* and of *Rome*. Then the Orators gave their labours gratis to the People, and the People repaid them with the Honours and Preferments, which they had the power to beſtow: This was a wiſe and happy Conſtitution, where by a neceſſary connexion between Virtue and Honour, they ſerved mutually to produce and perpe-

[a] See his Eſſay on Eloquence.

tuate

tuate each other; where the reward of Honours excited Merit, and Merit never failed to procure Honours —— the only Policy which can make a Nation great and proſperous.[a]

As the kind of Oratory practiſed by the *Greeks* and *Romans*, cannot ſubſiſt or even take root but under a *free, democratic* Government; ſo it has ariſen to higheſt Perfection in times of *war* and *diſturbance*. Had not *Attica* and its fair Metropolis been invaded, and in danger of being deſtroyed by *Xerxes*, the *Spartans*, and the one-eyed King of *Macedonia*, we ſhould not, it is probable, have heard *ſo much* of the fame of *Themiſtocles*, and *Pericles*, and *Demoſthenes*—

Thoſe Ancient! whoſe reſiſtleſs Eloquence
Wielded at will that fierce Democracy;—
Shook th' Arſenal,—and fulmin'd over Greece
To Macedon *and* Artaxerxes' *Throne.*[b]

Rhodes too was a place where Oratory was in great repute and cultivated not without

[a] See *Middleton's Life of Cicero*, Vol. I. Sect. 2.

[b] Par. Reg. IV. 265.

ſucceſs,

ſucceſs, having of all the neighbouring Iſlands leaſt of the redundancy of the *Aſiatic* manner, and approaching neareſt to the purity of the *Athenian*—" *Rhodii* ſaniores, et *Atticorum* ſimiliores :"* But the Civil Conſtitution here was purely democratical, and the Public Affairs were often in as tempeſtuous and fluctuating a ſtate as the Sea which ſurrounded it.—If, again, we come down to *Rome*, we ſhall find that the moſt ſpirited Orations of *Cicero* were delivered during the troubles occaſioned by the bloody deſigns of *Catiline*, and the fraud and rapacity of *Verres*. " It is only great occaſions that give room for great exertions, and call forth great abilities."

But to ſupport this opinion, which ſome indeed have endeavoured to controvert, it is not neceſſary to adduce any arguments: Fact and Experience have more force than any argument whatſoever; and theſe prove the matter beyond a doubt.

Having ſaid ſo much, though in a general way, of the *riſe* and *progreſs* of Eloquence, you may perhaps expect that I ſhould take ſome notice of its *decline*: But there is not

* See *Cic.* Brutus, 13.

room

room here to enter on a ſubject ſo extenſive: Adviſing you therefore to inveſtigate this matter yourſelf, and referring you for information to that admirable DIALOGUE, affixed to the Works of *Tacitus*, "De Cauſis Corruptæ Eloquentiæ," I would only obſerve that the three *principal* cauſes ſeem to have been:—I. That enervated, though ſweet and pleaſant ſort of Eloquence firſt introduced into *Athens* by the learned *Demetrius Phalereus*,* and which was afterwards much imitated there. II. The Schools of Declamation. III. The Changes which took place in their Government, and which were immediately followed by a *diminution*, and at length by a *total loſs* of LIBERTY.

* See *Cic.* Brutus, 9.—See alſo *Dionyſius* of *Halicarnaſſus*, *De Oratoribus Antiquis*,—the beginning.

LETTER

LETTER XXI. Continued.

TO paſs over to thoſe who made the moſt conſiderable figure in this Art; and to take a curſory review of them.

Here it will be neceſſary to look back, even as far as the old Sophiſt *Gorgias Leontinus*. When he firſt introduced the Art of Rhetoric into *Athens*, his antitheſes and other artificial forms of ſpeech were then held in high eſtimation. Some improvement was made on *Gorgias* by his Contemporary *Antiphon*, who, as well as a Rhetorician, is alſo reckoned one of the Ten Orators of *Athens*;[a] and becauſe of his mild and elegant way of expreſſing himſelf, he had the ſurname of *Neſtor* given him: Indeed his talent in this reſpect was ſo great, that he profeſſed to cure perſons of grief and melancholy merely by his manner of ſpeaking to them: But not likely to make his fortune in this way, he applied himſelf to Rhetoric and left behind him a Treatiſe on the different forms

[a] See *Plutarch's Account of the Ten Orators.*

of

of ſpeech, and containing rules and precepts about the rhetorical Art: This was the firſt thing of the kind, and was held in no little repute.

Much about the ſame time lived *Andocides:* He too is placed among the Ten Orators, and was remarkable for a plain, unornamented way of ſpeaking.

Theſe, however, had a great deal more of the Sophiſt and Rhetorician than of the Orator: And as they are to be conſidered *ſomewhat* behind *Themiſtocles* in point of *time*, ſo are they *very much ſo* in point of *merit*—*He* is the firſt Orator of whom we read any thing extraordinary: He lived in times of confuſion and of danger; and was no leſs eminent for his oratorial powers, than his great ſkill and abilities in directing the affairs of War and all kind of State-Buſineſs.

Pericles, who comes next in ſucceſſion, was the firſt who joined the ſtudy of Philoſophy to that of Eloquence,[a] and he was alſo the firſt Orator in *Athens* that delivered *premeditated* and *written* Speeches, thoſe before

[a] See Cic. Brutus 11.

him using to speak off hand — ὅστις πρωτος γραπτον λογον εν δικαστηριω ειπε, των προ αυτω σχεδιαζοντων.[a] A plain proof of the superior excellence of this way, provided it be done with proper address; for hardly any one's Eloquence is said to have been more powerful than that of *Pericles*: The Poets are loud in his praises: *Eupolis* says of him — That PERSUASION perched on his lips, and that he alone of all the Orators left behind a sting in those who heard him:[b] — And *Aristophanes* — That he lightened — thundered — put all *Greece* in confusion:[c] — "Hujus suavitate maximè hilaratæ sunt *Athenæ*; hujus ubertatem et copiam admiratæ, ejusdem vim dicendi terroremque timuerunt: *Hæc* igitur ætas *prima Athenis* Oratorem *prope perfectum* tulit:[d]" And this superiority *Socrates* attributes (and so does *Cicero* after him) to his having studied under the Philosopher *Anaxagoras*, and

[a] See *Suidas*, *under Pericles*.

[b] ——— προς δε γ' αυ τουτω ταχ' ἡ
ΠΕΙΘΩ τις επεκαθετο τοισι χειλεσιν,
Οὕτως εκηλει, και μονος των ῥητόρων
Το κεντρον εγκατελιπε τοις ακροωμενοις.

[c] Ηςραπτ' — εβροντα — ξυνεκυκα την Ελλαδα.

[d] See Cic. Brutus 11.

his

his being able thereby to derive aſſiſtance from different parts of Literature.[a] There ſeem to have been ſome of his Orations extant in *Cicero*'s time;[b] but unfortunately they are now no more.

Contemporary with him was the eloquent Hiſtorian *Thucydides*. It ſtill remains a doubt whether he is to be reckoned among the Orators: *Cicero* is decidedly againſt it: *Thucydides* res geſtas et bella narrat et prælia, graviter ſane, et probe: Sed nihil ab eo transferri poteſt ad forenſem uſum, et publicum. Ipſæ illæ Conciones *ita multas habent obſcuras abditaſque ſententias, vix ut intelligantur*; quod eſt in Oratione civili vitium *vel maximum*. Quæ eſt autem in hominibus tanta perverſitas, ut, inventis frugibus, glande veſcantur? An victus hominum, *Athenienſium* beneficio excoli potuit, oratio non potuit? Quis porro unquam *Græcorum* Rhetorum a *Thucydide* quidquam duxit? At laudatus eſt ab omnibus: Fateor:—ſed ita ut rerum explicator prudens, ſeverus, gravis; non ut in judiciis verſaret cauſas, ſed ut in hiſtoriis

[a] See *Plato's Phædrus, and Cicero's Orator.*

[b] See Cic. De Oratore II. 22.—See alſo *Brutus* 7.

bella narraret. Itaque *nunquam eſt numeratus Orator.*[a]—But *Suidas* obſerves: That as *Thucydides* excelled others in moſt things relating to State-Affairs both as a Counſellor and a General, ſo alſo καλλει λογων.[b] Many Moderns are of the ſame opinion. For my own part I agree entirely with *Cicero*—But read him over carefully yourſelf, and form your own judgement upon him.

About thirty or forty years after[c] flouriſhed thoſe famous Teachers of Rhetoric, *Lyſias* and *Iſocrates*: Nor yet were they contemptible Orators, though little converſant in Public Buſineſs: Their Orations were chiefly made for others to deliver, or to ſerve as models for the uſe and inſtruction of their Scholars—En *Græciæ* quidem Oratorum *partus* atque *fontes* vides, ad noſtrorum annalium rationem veteres; ad ipſorum, ſane recentes.[d] *Lyſias* is ſaid to have delivered but one Speech in Public, and that at the *Olympic* Games.[e] And *Iſocrates*, it is thought, never

[a] See Cic. Orator 9. [b] See *Suidas*, under *Thucydides*.

[c] That is—about 400 years before Chriſt.

[d] See Cic. Brutus 8—12—and 13.

[e] See *Plutarch*'s Account of the Ten Orators.

ſpoke

ſpoke oftener.—[a] "Huic *Hyperides* proximus, et *Æſchines* fuit, et *Iſæus*, et *Lycurgus*, et *Dinarchus*, et is, cujus nulla extant ſcripta, [b]*Demades, aliique plures:* Hæc enim ætas effudit *hanc copiam*; et, ut opinio mea fert, *ſuccus ille* et *ſanguis incorruptus* uſque ad hanc ætatem oratorum fuit, in quâ *naturalis* ineſſet, non *fucatus nitor*."

But in *Eloquence* the Palm was not *at once* obtained, as it was in *Poetry* by *Homer*: "Nam plane quidem *perfectum, et cui nihil admodum deſit, Demoſthenem* facile dixeris: Nihil acute inveniri potuit in eis cauſis, quas ſcripſit, nihil (ut ita dicam) ſubdole, nihil verſute, quod ille non viderit; nihil ſubtiliter dici, nihil preſſe, nihil enucleate, quo fieri poſſit aliquid limatius: Nihil contra grande, nihil incitatum, nihil ornatum vel

[a] See Cic. Brutus 9. Underſtand *proximus* here with reſpect to *time*, and not as it is to be underſtood in the place quoted, with reſpect to *rank*, or *merit*—And yet they are not here placed in the exacteſt order—However, they all lived in the ſame Century.

[b] The Works of three of the others, as well as thoſe of *Demades*, are now *entirely* loſt: Thoſe of *Hyperides* were extant as late as the Ninth Century; for *Photius*, Patriarch of *Conſtantinople*, kept a journal of the Authors he peruſed, amongſt which was *Hyperides* the *Athenian* Orator. See Philological Inquiries, p. iii. ch. iv.

verborum gravitate vel ſententiarum, quæ quidquam eſſet elatius."[a] Thus then, in the opinion of the beſt judges, this great man excelled all that had been before him, and, we may add, all that came after: Indeed *Cicero* ſeems to be the only one that can in any reſpect deſerve to be compared with him: But *Cicero* when placed by his ſide will ever appear to diſadvantage. *Homer* was not greater in the Poetical Art, than *Demoſthenes* in that of the Orator: His Compoſitions are a ſtanding proof of the wonderful capacity of the Human Mind, when diligently improved and when rouſed with honeſt emulation and the glorious love of Liberty: Thoſe who are beſt able to judge of them, readily acknowledge that of all human productions theſe approach neareſt to perfection.[b] *Æſchines* did not heſitate to attribute his own ruin and diſgrace, leſs to the method with which his adverſary knit together and wound up his Oration, than to the manner in which *the wild beaſt roared*

[a] See Cic. as before.

[b] See *Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progreſs of Language—on the Compoſition of Demoſthenes.*

it

it out.[a] Now here one ſhould think *Æſchines* was an able and impartial judge.

Permit me to take my leave of you at preſent with a ſhort digreſſion. I am ſenſible that *general* Criticiſm is not ſo ſatisfactory as to enter into *particulars.* But I have, as much as poſſible, purpoſely abſtained from ſaying any thing on the *particular* merits of this or that Author, wiſhing only to make you exert your own faculties. Nor would I have you by any means conſult ſuch books as profeſs to make this their buſineſs: Many there are of the kind; and though moſt of them are written without taſte and without correctneſs, yet they may tend to bias your judgement. *Read the Ancients themſelves, but read them with care:* And as you go through each, having deliberately made up your mind upon the ſubject, ſuppoſe you draw a ſhort delineation of his literary character——This would at leaſt

[a] *Æſchines*, on his being baniſhed from *Athens*, retired to *Rhodes*, where he opened a School of Oratory; and having read aloud his antagoniſt's Oration on the famous conteſt between them, *De Coronâ*, aſked his Scholars what they thought of it: They replied it was great—it was admirable: Whereupon *Æſchines* is ſaid to have added: Τι δε, ει αυτȣ̃ τȣ̃ θηριȣ τα αυτȣ̃ ρηματα βοωντος ακηκοειτε;—See *Pliny's Epiſtles.*

teach

teach you to read with due attention: It will alſo accuſtom you to reflect and think for yourſelf, and to form a ſtyle for conveying thoſe reflexions. "Juſtneſs of thought, as well as refinement in language, and manners, and good breeding of every kind can, it is well known, be only the effect of proper culture, and *repeated trial* and *experience*."—Communicate your ſentiments to ſome friend. Were I thought worthy of that honour, I ſhould not at firſt expect any thing *finiſhed* or *unexceptionable: Uſe* and *Habit* is almoſt every thing. And ſhould I happen to ſee matters in a *different* light, I would readily give you my opinion, *ſuch as it is*, with candour and with freedom. Perhaps you would find me, as *Boileau* expreſſes it well:

Cenſeur un peu facheux, mais ſouvent neceſſaire;
Plus enclin à blâmer, que ſçavant à bienfaire.

LETTER

LETTER XXI. Continued.

TO come back to our ſubject.—In the elegant Treatiſe quoted ſo often, I mean *Cicero's De Claris Oratoribus*, which is commonly called *Brutus*, you will find a fuller, though perhaps not the moſt *regular* and *compact* account, of the point under conſideration; together with a minuter liſt of thoſe among the *Greeks* who had any claim to be ſtiled Orators: With regard to the Eloquence of his own Country and thoſe who excelled in it, I refer you there altogether: Except what he himſelf has left us, we ſhould have had little to enable us to form an opinion in this particular: And indeed it is chiefly owing to him that the very names of the *Roman* Orators are at all known to us.—Let what has been ſaid excite you to acquire an *accurate* knowledge of this matter.

But

But to conceive any notion of Ancient Eloquence itſelf, you muſt read in the original the Orations of *Demoſthenes:* Nor can you ſurely want motives to read thoſe Compoſitions which the ingenious *Greeks* ran from all quarters to liſten to: His rival *Cicero* ſays, with equal truth and generoſity, "non modò ita memoriæ proditum eſſe, ſed ita *neceſſe* fuiſſe, cùm *Demoſthenes* dicturus eſſet, ut concurſus, audiendi cauſa, ex *totâ Græcia* fierent:*" Neither can you read them at a more *ſeaſonable* time; for it was theſe *Ariſtotle* had before him in drawing up his RHETORIC: They are therefore the beſt Commentary upon that Treatiſe of his, and the moſt agreeable in the world: And his Treatiſe again will enable you to ſee their excellence and ſtructure with greater nicety and with better judgement, —— Many of *Cicero*'s alſo are truly great and ſublime.

Beſides the pleaſure, and the improvement with regard to forming a good ſtyle and the being uſed to practical modes of reaſoning, with the other advantages to be derived from

* See *Brutus*, 84.

a judi-

a judicious peruſal of the Ancient Orators, we find in them many anecdotes and hiſtorical facts, which perhaps have no where elſe been recorded — at leaſt no where with ſo much *elegance* and *exactneſs*: Nor is there any danger of ſeeing them miſrepreſented; being ſuch, for the moſt part, as relate to the acts and characters of perſons then living, and ſpoken before an audience, that was generally as well acquainted with them as the Orator himſelf, and therefore not to be impoſed upon: Accordingly our great Countryman obſerves: "Orationes ſane virorum prudentium, de negotiis et cauſis gravibus habitæ, tum ad *rerum ipſarum notitiam*, tum ad *eloquentiam* multum valent."[a]

But to ſtep à little aſide once more, and to conclude this Letter. — Whatever relates to Sacred Scripture I hold in high veneration, and never wiſh to ſpeak of it but with all the reverence it deſerves: Now though they contain paſſages of the *moſt beautiful, and ſublimeſt kind*, yet we ſhould always remember that theſe Writings, having a far

[a] De Augmen. Scient. Lib. II.

nobler

nobler end in view, never meddle in the leaſt degree with the affairs of human Literature: And, moreover, all thoſe who know what the unbiaſſed Principles of Reaſon are, and who have inveſtigated the ſubject, and the Nature of man with *fairneſs*, and *diligence*, and *ability*, muſt, I think, be neceſſarily convinced, that the Writings in queſtion contain a Revelation of the Will of the Author of that Nature, and are propoſed in a manner admirably well adapted to it conſidered under a *general* view: It would be therefore a very *fooliſh*, if not an *impious* thing, to judge or ſpeak of them according to the *fluctuating precepts* and *vague ſpeculations* of a *few mere literary* men:—In this place, nevertheleſs, I cannot help taking notice of *Paul* of *Tarſus*, whom *Longinus* reckons among the famous Orators:[a] And is it not with juſtice? Nay—as a Logician too, he may be ſafely compared with the moſt ſubtle reaſoner of Antiquity—And to a man of thought and obſervation it would be needleſs to point out the apparent Wiſdom of ſelecting this Apoſ-

[a] See *a Fragment of Longinus.*

tle

tle at that particular criſis of the wonderful ſcheme of Chriſtianity—To teſtify the truth of what has been juſt ſaid, we might adduce the whole of his writings and his conduct; but witneſs, more particularly, his Epiſtle to the *Romans*, and that pathetic and perſuaſive one to his friend *Philemon*: In the *former* we ſee all the *cloſeneſs* and *ſubtlety* of *Ariſtotle*: in the *latter* all the *pathos* of *Demoſthenes*, or, rather perhaps I ſhould have ſaid, all the *unſtudied, unaffected* Eloquence of the admirable *Socrates*:* Read over this little Epiſtle with attention; conſider the circumſtances relating to it: obſerve the ſimplicity, the ſtrength, which the

* Among the principal Orators of *Athens* ſhould have been reckoned the admirable *Socrates*: He did not indeed make uſe of any rhetorical and artificial embelliſhments: Of ſuch borrowed ornaments he did not want the aſſiſtance: His Eloquence was like his Life, both totally free from Art: His Addreſs to thoſe baſe men, his Judges, as it is recorded by *Plato* and *Xenophon*, is plain and affecting, and ſublime, highly characteriſtic of the man, and in my mind more perſuaſive than a *Philippic* of *Demoſthenes*: Perhaps, indeed, it would be eaſier to learn to ſpeak like *Demoſthenes*, than like *Socrates*—Is, qui omnium eruditorum teſtimonio, totiuſque judicio *Græciæ*, cum prudentia, & acumine, & venuſtate, & ſubtilitate, tum vero eloquentia, varietate, copia, quam ſe cunque in partem dediſſet, *omnium fuit facile princeps*. Cic. De Orat. III. 16.

argument

argument carries along with it: in ſhort, judge of the whole, if you pleaſe, by any *ſober* Laws of Criticiſm, and I will maintain that you never read a finer, or a more perfect piece of Oratory. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER XXII.

I AM wonderfully pleaſed with your laſt Letter, as it informs me of your intending to paſs this ſhort Vacation at my little *Villa*. Being convinced that in making me this viſit you act (as you always do) on a noble and exalted principle, the principle of True Friendſhip, I am under no apprehenſion that my frugal plan of living will be at all diſagreeable to you. However, to form ſome notion how you are likely to ſpend the enſuing month, ſee a full account of the manner in which I

paſs

paſs my days: Should you think it tedious and abounding with *Egotiſm*, remember (though we never gain by it) how naturally fond we all are of talking of ourſelves —— What we are all then ſo liable to ſhould be conſidered with great candour.

The little Village where I am Curate, often puts me in mind of the flouriſhing ſtate of *Goldſmith*'s AUBURN, which he has celebrated in one of the beſt Deſcriptive Poems in our language. The Houſe I live in is not large, but neat and convenient; the neighbourhood ſocial, genteel, and ſenſible; and my ſalary, though ſmall, yet ſufficient to exiſt upon — *Importuna tamen Pauperies abeſt*. You are not ignorant that my mother and ſiſter live along with me: They are what I may call *Liberal Oeconomiſts*.

Thus retired, I endeavour to diſcharge the duties of my Profeſſion with all poſſible fidelity. Religion (we are told) is too generally conſidered as matter of little moment, and is greatly refined in this our age: — It therefore gives me much comfort to ſee that my little Flock, allowing for the unimproved ſtate of the underſtanding of moſt

of

of them, have a good notion of the aim, and nature, and importance of Chriſtianity, and endeavour to live according to its precepts. I contrive to make each family, how poor and obſcure ſoever, a ſhort viſit once a week: And in theſe viſits, though I take care that my behaviour ſhall be ſuch as to command the reſpect due to their Paſtor, it is beſt to put off all unneceſſary forms, and endeavour in the way of converſation to bring in ſomething pertinent and uſeful. This I conſider as part of my duty, and for that reaſon I feel no ſmall ſatisfaction in diſcharging it:—beſides, the good people love and revere me—and to a reaſonable man is not this alone ſatisfaction enough?

This takes up but a little portion of my time: The reſt is employed between reading, bodily exerciſe, and the ſociety of a few friends.

The little Learning I gleaned up, when in College, I now find of the greateſt conſequence, as it enables me to proſecute my ſtudies with pleaſure and improvement. A well written Book is a moſt precious article in one's *Viaticum* through life; and ſhould

we

we not pity the man, whatever honours or riches he may have, who has not the convenience or the capacity of enjoying it?—Indeed to a young perſon, who in the Univerſity has acquired little more than habits of idleneſs and intemperance, the being thus ſecluded as it were from the world muſt certainly be one of the moſt irkſome things on earth. The ſports of the field, without a mixture of that *pure* and *ſolid* pleaſure which ariſes from properly exerting the faculties of the Intellect, will ſoon loſe all their zeſt—all their novelty. The correct *Boileau* has the ſame truth with more elegance—Take it in his words:

—Je ne trouve point de fatigue ſi rude,
Que l'ennuyeux loiſir d'un mortel ſans etude.

Three or four hours therefore in the morning, and from ten to eleven at night, are ſpent in ſome ſerious and regular courſe of ſtudy, in arming myſelf with ſtrength of mind and reflexion ſufficient to regulate my life, and ſupport me in every ſituation of it. And the evenings I divide for the moſt part (unleſs when I write a long Letter to

Eugenio) between reading ſome agreeable Moraliſt or Hiſtorian to my little Family, and contending at our favourite games of Piquet, or Backgammon, or the nobler one of Cheſs—How ſweet "to rock the cradle of repoſing age!"

"But a too ſtudious and ſedentary life is productive of lowſpiritedneſs, and tends of courſe to impair one's Health and Good Humour:" True:—Hence then one is induced to take one's gun or fiſhing-rod, and attended by truſty *Ranger* paſs away an hour now and then among the fields in refreſhing the mind and exerciſing the body; thus avoiding thoſe many inconveniences which a dull and torpid inactivity brings along with it: And in theſe excurſions I am generally fortunate enough to meet with ſomething to make a ſmall diſh for my table; for a Perch, or a Partridge, with a good joint of meat, is almoſt all the dinner you are to expect.——

Form'd on the Samian *Schools or thoſe of* Ind,
There are who think theſe paſtimes ſcarce humane;
Yet in my mind (and not relentleſs *I)*
His life is pure that wears no fouler ſtains.[*]

[*] Art of Preſerving Health.

I would

I would not have you miſtake me in this matter. He indeed, eſpecially in my line of life, that minds little more than ſhooting, or hunting, or dancing, or any other ſuch trifling occupation, is deſervedly neglected and deſpiſed — There is a very wide difference between uſing a thing by way of amuſement and making it the principal object of one's purſuit —— the wideſt imaginable.

What alſo furniſhes me Exerciſe is the care and cultivation of my little Garden: This I take entirely upon myſelf. I cannot afford, nor perhaps would I chuſe, to employ a man on purpoſe. And here I make a point to endeavour to excel my neighbours in the neatneſs of laying out my ground and in the delicacy of my fruit — Is it not laudable, *Eugenio*, even in ſuch trifles, and eſpecially in things of higher moment, whilſt we act perfectly conſiſtent with Virtue, underſtood in its moſt extenſive ſenſe, to attend to that well known line of the noble *Grecian*?

Αιεν αριζευειν, και υπειροχον εμμεναι αλλων.[a]

'Tis thus I *exerciſe* and *amuſe* myſelf.

[a] Il. ζ. 208.

But there is no living without Society, and ſenſible Converſation: This alone can teach us how to apply properly the knowledge we acquire in ſolitude, poliſhes our manners and enlivens the ſcenes of a retired life: An opportunity of enjoying theſe pleaſures and advantages is afforded me at our excellent neighbour's, *Philoxenus*. Here one is always ſure to meet with genteel and rational company. Having been formerly engaged in a public and honourable capacity, his connexions are numerous, and among perſons of Diſtinction, as well as of Senſe and Merit. I long to introduce you to this worthy man. He loves and encourages whatever is great and amiable in Human Nature. — He is a *ſincere* Chriſtian, and a *profound* and *elegant* Scholar — and what can a man be more? I never read the character, which *Pliny* * draws of his friend *Titus Ariſto*, without thinking of *Philoxenus*: The latter indeed is in ſome reſpects (and I ſpeak with all impartiality) ſuperior to the brave *Roman*; but that ſuperiority he derives altogether from his Religion. He

* See *Pliny's Epiſtles*, I. 22.

is,

is, in ſhort, among many others, a living proof that *True Chriſtianity* and *True Philoſophy* may meet in one and the ſame perſon; ſo that they are by no means, as ſome bold men have ſuggeſted, inconſiſtent things — Far otherwiſe.

A few other friends I have of conſiderable value. Though but a Poor Curate, I take care to behave with proper reſerve towards coxcombs, and all narrow-hearted people; and can, thank God, look down both on their ſmiles and ſupercilious airs with all poſſible indifference. — I hate and deteſt the leveling-principle, as unnatural and abſurd — But be *thoſe* alſo far from me who can pride themſelves *merely* on being of this or that order of men, of this or that ſituation in life. Than aſſociate with ſuch, give me rather the friendſhip of one like *Philoxenus*, and let me enjoy it far from the haunts of theſe men. Their Wiſdom, be it what it will, has not made them truly wiſe. Their thoughts and notions, however ſpecious, are illiberal all of them, and ſhallow, and vain. *Mere* birth, *mere* money, *mere* any thing, except VIRTUE and

LEARNING, can give no man living any *real dignity*.

When we meet together, we do all we can to promote innocent mirth and cheerfulneſs. Some indeed ſuppoſe that this is not compatible with true Religion. Theſe men have their opinion: We have our's: But as that is totally different, we exclude every thing of the *ſurly* kind, and admit nothing but *Good Humour*, and *Temperance*, and *Candour*, and *Univerſal Benevolence*, and *manly Politeneſs*.

——— *Purâ ſed libertate loquendi*
Seria quiſque jocis nullâ formidine miſcet.[a]

Thus we find Converſation a moſt agreeable and inſtructive exerciſe, tending to give eaſe to the whole conduct, and to our language elegance and propriety.

Should any of my *rich* neighbours, as the country people call them, come and dine with me, I never make much alteration in my dinner: They know my income, and did I live beyond it, they would *deſpiſe* and *avoid* me. They come, like yourſelf, from

[a] Claudian De Laudibus Stiliconis, Lib. II.

motives

motives of *Friendſhip*; and not in that ſtarched, formal, and moſt inſipid way which is ſo common in modern times.—They live, it is true, in a different manner: I too, had I the means, would probably on ſuch occaſions enlarge my plan, but ſtill ſo as to conduct things with *Oeconomy*, *Simplicity*, *Temperance*; without which it is not to live—But the means are wanting: Neque tamen ego invideo aliis bonum, quo ipſe careo; ſed contra, ſenſum quendam voluptatemque percipio, ſi ea, quæ mihi denegantur, amicis video ſupereſſe.[a]

I am ſenſible that Philoſophers will tell you, that he who enjoys Health and a bare ſubſiſtance, enjoys enough; that ſuch gewgaws, as riches, conduce not to the real Happineſs of man; and ſo forth. Conſidered merely as riches, no man on earth can admit their aſſertion in a more extenſive ſenſe than myſelf; but conſidered as the means of doing good, of living with comfort and ſatisfaction, it muſt be allowed, on the other hand, that they then become

[a] See *Pliny's Epiſtles*, L. 10. He had no buſineſs to ſay—Neque enim ego, ut *multi*, invideo—*Pliny* had a good deal of pride and vanity in him.

no

no improper object of desire even to a *Philosopher*.

Hæc perinde sunt, ut illius animus, qui ea possidet:

Qui uti scit, ei bona; illi, qui non utitur rectè, mala.[a]

But by no means do I say that the man, who has inward Peace of mind, who has universal Benevolence in his heart, and can think with pleasure on his life and death, is in any situation an object of pity, or contempt. Quite the reverse — *He* and *he alone* is the truly happy — the truly great man. — How sweetly does your favourite and most correct Author express my notion!

FORTUNA, *sævo læta negotio, et*
Ludum insolentem ludere pertinax,
Transmutat incertos honores,
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna: —
Laudo manentem; — si celeres quatit
Pennas, resigno quæ dedit, et mea
Virtute me involvo, probamque
Pauperiem sine dote quæro.[b]

[a] Ter. Heauton. A. I. Sc. 2. [b] Lib. III. 29.

But

But to return.

It is thus, my friend, I live. If you can reliſh this ſort of life, haſten to our humble dwelling. We anticipate the pleaſure of endeavouring to make things agreeable to you. Between the Harpſichord, rural diverſions, viſiting our worthy neighbours, engaging in friendly Converſation, or in the *ſcientific* game of Cheſs, we ſhall, I hope, prevent the hours from appearing very dull and inſipid. *Plays*, or *Balls*, or *Operas*, or any other public entertainment, here we have none——

At ſecura quies, et neſcia fallere vita,
Dives opum variarum;—at latis otia fundis,
Speluncæ, vivique lacus;—at frigida Tempe,
Mugituſque boum, molleſque ſub arbore ſomni,—
NON ABSUNT—

LETTER XXIII.

YOU may be ſure I was no inattentive obſerver of your manners and conduct whilſt you were among us. Should I now ſit down and inform you of whatever appeared to me a little aukward in them, I know you would readily forgive me, and conſider it rather as a proof of my ſincerity. Conſcious indeed of many weakneſſes and failings in myſelf, I ſhould not probably be ſo ready to *commend* where I did not meet with *ſomething* to *blame*; nor, on the other hand, ever take notice of little blemiſhes, was I not convinced that your praiſe-worthy qualifications are by far more numerous—I wiſh to have you arrive as near *perfection* as poſſible—And this, perhaps, made me obſerve you with leſs than common candour, and (according to the vulgar phraſe) make a mountain of a mole-hill.

Nothing is more certain, and no obſervation has been more frequently made, than that

that Learning, and even Virtue itſelf, unaccompanied with true manly Politeneſs, loſe much of the dignity and amiableneſs naturally belonging to them. The mere bookworm can, I allow, derive much pleaſure from his extenſive reading; and the Heart of the truly good man is an Aſylum whereunto he can always retreat and find comfort. But as Good Breeding is by no means inconſiſtent with Virtue and Knowledge, and tends to excite in others a deſire of practiſing and attaining theſe valuable acquiſitions, it therefore becomes highly worthy of our attention: And he who is poſſeſſed of it, together with Wiſdom and Integrity of Mind, is the man that can be ſaid to *enjoy* life; being at eaſe with himſelf, and giving eaſe and ſatisfaction to all around him.

But this Politeneſs does not, as I apprehend, conſiſt in being able to make fine ſpeeches or a faſhionable bow—in knowing how to wear a pleaſing ſmile—or in any other of thoſe *apiſh geſticulations* and *deceitful diſtortions* which the World is apt to conſider as the *Paragon* of Good Manners. The Politeneſs I mean is of *another* ſort. It is

nothing

nothing more nor leſs than a *deſire of pleaſing, refined* and *improved* by *Education* and *Converſe* in the *World*, but *proceeding* from *Benevolence* and *Uprightneſs of heart*. The Principles of it are given us by Nature, or acquired by Philoſophy: Theſe I know you have in a high degree; but to give them all the poliſh and luſtre, of which they are capable, you are not now in the proper School: This is to be done only by a free intercourſe with genteel, ſenſible, and mixt Company.

It is to your being excluded from this I attribute your exceſſive unwillingneſs to give your opinion upon any ſubject before you were previouſly acquainted with that of other perſons. No doubt all of us ſhould be cautious and reſerved in this reſpect, and young men more eſpecially — modeſty and diffidence being our greateſt ornaments: And it ſhould be our care rather, to take hints from the Converſation of others, adding thus to our ſtock of knowledge, than be forward to diſplay the little we may have acquired.

All this is certainly true: But at the ſame time there is a wide difference between a becoming

becoming aſſurance and a childiſh baſhfulneſs: It is only "free communication and debate that opens and enlarges the mind, and improves the underſtanding—without this there is a dull ſtagnation of the intellectual faculties."

For the ſake then of their own improvement not only with regard to what is polite and decent, but alſo with a view of acquiring ready habits of reaſoning and inveſtigation, young men, particularly when aſked, ſhould frankly deliver their own genuine ſentiments; free however from all kind of affectation, and that ridiculous deſire of mimicking *the Great* and *the Wiſe*, to which Youth is ſo liable, as well as from the ſilly ambition of appearing otherwiſe than they really are. But when engaged in debate, one ſhould be diffident and conciſe as to the arguments we uſe, and ſhould learn to "acquieſce and ſubmit to Truth as ſoon as we are convinced of it, whether by our Antagoniſt's reaſoning, or upon a better conſideration of our own." This is always a ſure proof of a great mind.—I have no notion, ſaid a moſt amiable and learned man, of differing

fering from worthy perſons, living or dead, for the ſake of *ſingularity* or of *contradiction*, in which I can diſcern no charms, and neither pleaſure nor profit.[a] Well would it be, did we all but ſtrive to imitate his example.

Some perſons, with reſpect to theſe matters, have a happy knack at aſking a few pertinent queſtions, ſo as to induce people to ſpeak on thoſe topics with which they have reaſon to think them beſt acquainted: Of ſuch topics, however, they themſelves ſhould not be entirely ignorant. And thus they poliſh their own minds by rubbing them, as it were, upon thoſe of others — To the ſame purpoſe *Bacon* ſays elegantly: "Prudens Interrogatio eſt quaſi dimidium Scientiæ. Rectè ſiquidem *Plato*:[b] Qui aliquid quærit, id ipſum, quod quærit, generali quadam notione comprehendit; aliter, quî fieri poteſt, ut illud, cùm fuerit inventum, agnoſcat?[c]" But beware of thoſe who are influenced only by motives of idle curioſity, or of ſeeing your temper and the

[a] *Dr. Jortin*—See *his Remarks on Eccleſ. Hiſt.* II. 2.

[b] *In Menone.*

[c] *De Augment. Scient.* V. 3.

depth

depth of your knowledge—All ſuch are infallibly either tale-bearers, or troubled with a dark, invidious ſpirit.

I ſhall take notice of but one thing more; and that is the uneaſineſs and perplexity which to a keen eye was ſometimes obſervable in your mode of addreſs. Where this is glaring, the greateſt abilities become an object of indifference and neglect, ſometimes of contempt. However odd the aſſertion may appear to cool Reaſon, yet Experience every day ſhows the truth of it: "That he who is able to accommodate himſelf to the innocent pleaſures and humours of mankind, and is accompliſhed in all the graces of behaviour, will, with ſuperficial talents, prove generally more ſucceſsful in life, than the man, who, without theſe ſecondary qualifications, has the genius and learning of *Dante*, or of *Bentley*, or even of the immortal Author of *Hudibras*." So true is *Boileau*'s obſervation:

C'eſt peu d'etre agreable et charmant dans un livre;
Il faut ſçavoir encore et converſer et vivre.

The

The Ladies particularly, in whoſe opinion eaſy, agreeable fellows are the only great men, the only Philoſophers, will not readily overlook this defect. But ſenſible as we are that every Lady has not the learning of *Madame Dacier*, nor yet the wit and poignancy of *Ninon de l'Enclos*, there is only need of little ſpirit and confidence, and this aukwardneſs would ſoon diſappear. It originates, for the moſt part, from timidity. Perhaps the only good end of frequenting female company, is to acquire a becoming and liberal addreſs, to refine the manners, to ſweeten the diſpoſition, diverting the mind from the cares, the buſineſs, and the vexations of life, and to unbend it with cheerfulneſs and vivacity: Now this cannot be obtained without entering into a *free* and *eaſy* Converſation, of which decent unconſtraint is the very *life* and *grace*.

I ſay no more. Nor do I ſend you theſe hints with any other view than juſt to remind you, that, trifling as ſuch things may appear, it is neceſſary, nevertheleſs, to give ſome attention to them; and then every little foible of this ſort will gradually wear away of itſelf.

Having

Having in your preſent tranquil and ſtudious retirement laid in a ſtock of ſound Knowledge, you will be able to appear in the world with ſingular advantage; and I have no kind of doubt but you will ſoon diſcover in Converſation that delicacy and diſcernment which ariſe from an acquaintance with Polite Letters, and in your dealings with mankind, that dignity, and probity, and punctuality, which are the natural reſult of Sound Philoſophy.

I ſhall addreſs this to you in College, where I hope it will find you ſafe arrived, and buſy in digeſting and applying the Principles of Rhetoric, which undoubtedly demand more ſtudy and attention than thoſe of Politeneſs.—The *Muſes* are to be firſt of all attended to: The *Graces* follow after: They are moſt agreeable companions: *United*, they form the *inſtructive*, *humane*, *genteel* friend, whoſe *Erudition* ever *improves* one, whoſe *Politeneſs* is ever *pleaſing*:—*Separated*, they may communicate a *temporary*, but no *laſting* or *general* ſatisfaction——But I have done. Farewell.

LETTER XXIV.

IN whatever light we conſider each others characters, it will be always more pleaſing to a heart of common honeſty to point out what is amiable and praiſe-worthy, than ſuch things as are of a different nature: I am therefore quite impatient to ſend you a few more remarks which bear ſome relation to the ſubject of my laſt.—Do you aſk why I did not communicate theſe things by word of mouth?—I anſwer, that as you have promiſed to keep theſe Letters by you, you may perhaps, when you have nothing elſe to do, occaſionally read them over. I only wiſh they might furniſh you with ſome uſeful hints. Of this, however, I am certain, that they will never do you harm.—And beſides, ſomebody has obſerved—That to praiſe people to their face, as it is nothing leſs than to tax them with Vanity, ſo likewiſe a man muſt have patient ears to hear himſelf cenſured in the ſame open manner:—

ner:—But by communicating one's thoughts on paper, there is time to reflect that the perſon who hazards to offend another, not with views to his own, but that other's advantage, gives the ſureſt proof of Love, and Eſteem, and Friendſhip.——But of this enough.

The defect or two (if they can be called ſuch) which I have already pointed out to you, had no other origin than the want of a decent ſhare of confidence. It was with great pleaſure I diſcovered in you nothing of that *Falſe* Modeſty which leads aſtray and corrupts many a youthful Mind. Obſerve all thoſe of licentious lives among you, (for even that Seminary of Virtue and Learning is not without its Libertines) and you will perceive that in general they are chiefly actuated by this weak and vicious principle. "It is not ſo much the Paſſions that firſt ſeduce us, as a bad Example," and the want of that reſpect and reverence which every one of us owes to himſelf. Where this reverence is not found, nothing is more certain than that *there* the tranſition to vice, folly, low-breeding, and infamy of every kind, is always extremely eaſy.

The hard thing is, to be able to acquire that conduct which ſhall preſerve dignity and decorum, without any mixture of haughtineſs, or blameable compliance: If we deviate on the one hand, we are ſure to be contemned and ridiculed for our pride, or inſolence, or ſingularity;—if on the other, to be deſpiſed for want of a manly ſpirit, and the poor opinion we entertain of our own worth and character. The line therefore which runs between theſe two Extremes ſhould be our clue. But perhaps it is not ſo eaſy to point it out, as to diſtinguiſh it by your own obſervation. What gives me pleaſure is to find that you *have* diſcovered it, and that by adhering to it you are becoming wiſe without oſtentation, and without incurring either the hatred or the envy of men of ſenſe—on the contrary, all *ſuch* will reſpect and encourage you.

The mere Fop indeed, or the Libertine, would have you ſuppoſe that he conſiders you as an object of contempt, and thinks himſelf a much ſuperior man. As long as he keeps within the bounds of Good Breeding, let him enjoy his fanciful and ſhort-

lived

lived pleaſure, unenvied and undiſturbed. But believe me he acts the hypocrite; for Virtue and Manly Senſe will never ceaſe to be univerſally revered——It is what the greateſt Fool will admire, though he has not the ſpirit to attain to it:

Knaves fain would laugh at it; ſome great ones dare;
But at his heart, the moſt undaunted ſon
Of Fortune dreads its name and awful charms.[a]

To this then I attribute that Sweetneſs of Diſpoſition, and that general Decency of conduct which were ſo diſtinguiſhable in you—And hence too proceed your correct notions reſpecting Morality and Religion.

Be not aſtoniſhed that the importance of this ſubject never induced me to ſpeak of it before: I purpoſely avoided it: I am ſenſible that the advice of parents or guardians, on ſuch ſubjects particularly, is for the moſt part attributed to the peeviſhneſs or garrulity of age, and for *that very reaſon* is but ſeldom regarded: And, though expoſtulations properly timed and conveyed are uſeful and

[a] The Art of Preſerving Health.

neceſſary, yet here it is much the ſame when a friend expoſtulates. But let a man, when he knows how to think, conſider this matter and his own nature fairly and honeſtly, and with diligence and deliberation—That is the only way—True and Genuine Virtue, like Genuine Knowledge, is not to be learnt as a thing by rote, not "to be poured into the Mind, like water into a ciſtern, that paſſively waits to receive all that comes;"—nor yet is it to be acquired from contemplating its lovelineſs in the animated deſcriptions of Poets, or Moraliſts, or Philoſophers; but there muſt be an *exertion* of the *intellectual faculties*, and an immediate perception of its worth and excellence.

There is not certainly a vice which is more ſhocking in itſelf, or forebodes worſe conſequences, than that faſhionable levity and contemptuous irreverence in which Religion is ſo generally conſidered. This in truth is the natural conſequence of that effeminate and falſe kind of pleaſure, which originates from a fooliſh and unmanly compliance with weak, thoughtleſs, unprincipled Examples. Cheerfulneſs is always pleaſing: Even

Even the levity and innocent ſallies of Youth have, *when properly timed*, ſomething amiable in them: But when ſuch a Religion, as that recorded by the Four Evangeliſts, becomes the object of ridicule or neglect, here Candour itſelf cannot furniſh the mereſt ſhadow of an excuſe. A little reflexion ſurely would make every man conſider this weak and illiberal practice with juſt abhorrence—"But reflexion is not the characteriſtic of Youth"—True—Yet, at the ſame time, is not a *total* want of it the characteriſtic of a brute, an ideot, or the mere ſottiſh and worthleſs debauchee? Let me here ſubjoin the pointed words of a great man: "A beaſt without Reaſon (ſays he) is a much more honourable Creature than a beaſt with Reaſon."

"Singularity, as has been well obſerved by the *Adventurer*, is in its own nature diſpleaſing: But yet there are occaſions on which it is noble to dare to ſtand alone: To be pious among Infidels, to be diſintereſted in a time of general venality, to lead a life of Virtue and Reaſon in the midſt of Senſualiſts, is a proof of a Mind intent on nobler things than the praiſe or blame of men,

men, of a ſoul fixt in the contemplation of the higheſt Good, and ſuperior to the tyranny of cuſtom and example."

But in writing to you, ſhould I not aſk pardon for dwelling ſo long on this ſubject? For I have good reaſon to hope that you will not only ſteer wide of all folly in this reſpect, but that your general conduct will be of eſſential ſervice to the cauſe of Virtue, making it appear that neither levity nor moroſeneſs, nor auſterity, nor merely exhauſted paſſions are the proper companions of Virtue and True Religion: And this no doubt is of much higher conſequence than to be barely a Scholar, or a man of Science of any kind; inaſmuch as to *act* well is of infinitely higher moment than the ability of *writing* or *ſpeaking* well—" Hanc ampliſſimam omnium Artium, bene vivendi Diſciplinam, vitâ magis, quàm litteris perſequere."[a]

Obſerve then the ſum of the whole: Virtue with the True Religion for its proper baſis, and Learning, and Politeneſs are abſolutely neceſſary to form the character of the Compleat Gentleman: That theſe valu-

[a] See *Cic. Tuſcul. Quæſt.* IV. 3.

able

able accompliſhments are uniting themſelves in you I have little room to doubt: It is an union which ſoftens all the anxieties of life: It gives reliſh to all preſent enjoyments: It diſcloſes future ones to view. Who then would not undergo ſome pains, and aſſume ſome courage to make ſuch an acquiſition? My dear *Eugenio*, perſevere to tread in this honour-able, this upright, this liberal path— Depend upon it, it will conduct you to real Happineſs and Glory: But in the mean while forget not to pay as frequent a viſit as you can to him who loves you with all the affection of a brother———

Tecum etenim longos memini conſumere ſoles,
Et tecum primas epulis decerpere noctes:
Unum opus, et requiem pariter diſponimus ambo,
Atque verecundâ laxamus ſeria menſâ:
Non equidem hoc dubites, amborum fœdere certo
Conſentire dies, et ab uno ſidere duci.[a]

[a] Perſius. V. 41.

LETTER

LETTER XXV.

THE other day my valuable neighbour *Philoxenus* related to me the following Story: It happened within his memory and under his own immediate obſervation: He alſo adviſed me to write it down for your peruſal; adding, with a benevolent ſmile;—"Trifling as it ſeems, I know our young friend will apply it to his own advantage: And it may ſerve to temper thoſe grave Lectures in Philoſophy which, I am perſuaded, he daily ſtudies"—Take it then, in ſubſtance, juſt as I had it from his own mouth.

Antonio was the only ſon of a worthy Clergyman. In perſon he was elegant and well made. And from his countenance, which was now beginning to glow with ſentimental life and expreſſion, you might ſoon diſcover that his mind was the ſeat of Innocence and Contentment—*Antonio* was the Picture of Happineſs.

In

In his Eighteenth Year, the age alluded to, he was ſent to the Univerſity; being well prepared for the reception of Knowledge, and juſt able to perceive its end and importance. During the firſt year he purſued his ſtudies with ſuch ſteadineſs and regularity, as made his friends have good reaſon to hope that in time he would be an honour to the Profeſſion he was intended for, and a comfort to all around him. But, when placed in *man*, what are our hopes — our beſt expectations?

When a twelvemonth had almoſt expired, he was invited to paſs the Long Vacation with his father's brother. His Uncle lived in a village near Town, univerſally beloved for his Virtues, and univerſally reſpected for his Erudition. In the ſame neighbourhood lived a Gentleman, whoſe Eſtate, though large, was yet inadequate to his expences: He lived in a gay ſtyle, and excelled in almoſt all the genteel but ſuperficial accompliſhments of the times —— His children had imbibed his notions, and imitated his example.

Of this Gentleman the fair *Louiſa* was the ſecond daughter. Though born of unexceptionable

exceptionable parentage, and poſſeſſed of many both of the perſonal and mental excellencies of *Fielding*'s SOPHIA; yet all this did not procure her many ſuitors: — for *Louiſa* had lofty notions, but no fortune.

You have already concluded that the paſſionate and inexperienced heart of *Antonio* was ſoon affected by being near the influence of charms ſo powerful. The affection was mutual. Nothing however could be more unfortunate to each, or leſs promiſing of comfort and felicity. But inſtead of oppoſing the firſt attack of the "*Belle Paſſion*," and breaking its force by dividing it into deſires of different kinds, he ſuffered himſelf to be captivated thereby, and was ſoon *totally* reduced to its mercy.

Meanwhile he is obliged to go back to College; having no doubt vowed eternal conſtancy and fixed on a plan of correſpondence. This he took care not to neglect. How indeed could he have neglected it, for it became the only thing which engroſſed his attention? He was now altogether unfit for that ſort of application and that active exertion

exertion of the intellectual faculties, whereby alone ſound Knowledge is to be acquired.

Of courſe thoſe Monuments of Ancient Wiſdom and Magnanimity, (the *Greek* and *Latin* Claſſics I mean) which a few months before he had begun to inveſtigate with ſo much eagerneſs and reſolution, were now permitted to lie in his *Study* unmoleſted and unexplored —

—The Mind
Diſſolv'd in female tenderneſs, forgets
Each manly Virtue, and grows dead to Fame.

In ſhort, he became remiſs and heedleſs about every ſerious purſuit, ſo as to neglect the neceſſary Exerciſes of the College, and conſequently incur frequent Impoſitions: One of which happened to ſuit his preſent turn of mind: Idleneſs was his theſis: The Compoſition to be either in Proſe or Verſe. As it is ſhort, and there being ſomething pretty and ingenious in it, I will here inſert it.

An

An ODE to IDLENESS.

GODDESS *of* EASE! *leave* Lethe's *brink,*
Obſequious to my Muſe, and me:
For once endure the pain to think,
O ſweet Inſenſibility!
Parent of Eaſe and Indolence!
Bring Muſe, bring numbers ſoft and ſlow,—
Elaborately void of ſenſe;—
Then ſweetly thoughtleſs let them flow.

II.

Near to ſome cowſlip-painted mead,
O let me doſe away dull hours!
And under me let Flora *ſpread*
A ſopha of her ſweeteſt flow'rs.
And, Philomel, *thy notes O breathe!*
Forth from behind the neighb'ring pine;
Where murmurs from the ſtream beneath
Shall flow in uniſon with thine.

* See this Ode ſet to Muſic by *Dr. Boyce.*

For

III.

For Thee, O IDLENESS! *the woes*
Of Life we patiently endure:
Thou art the ſource whence Labour flows;—
We ſhun thee but to make thee ſure:
For who'd endure War's toil or waſte?
Or who th' hoarſe thund'ring of the Sea?
But to be idle at the laſt,
And find a pleaſing end in Thee.

After having trifled away two whole years in building caſtles in the air and forming imaginary ſchemes of Happineſs, all his chimerical expectations were daſhed at once. *Louiſa*—the fair and fickle *Louiſa*—is ſuddenly married to another! One, as much inferior to *Antonio* in the endowments belonging to the Head and Heart, as he was his ſuperior in thoſe of Fortune.

Something *ſimilar* to this is the fate of all ſuch *early* and *puerile* attachments. They are the creatures of a warm imagination, cheriſhed by ſtrong paſſions, and ending for the

the moſt part in vexation, diſguſt, or diſappointment.

Ninon de l'Enclos underſtood matters of this kind better than moſt people: She has an obſervation very pertinent to the point in queſtion: "We are fooliſh enough (ſays ſhe) on our firſt entrance into life, to conceive the higheſt felicity to conſiſt in mutual love: We then ſuppoſe this paſſion to be founded on eſteem, ſuſtained by the acknowledgement of every amiable quality, refined by the moſt perfect delicacy of ſentiment; and finally corroborated by the reciprocal confidence and unreſtrained overflowings of two fond, chaſte, and faithful hearts, now melted into one: But unfortunately this image flies from us, like an *Utopian* dream, whenever we try to fold it in our embrace: We are ſoon undeceived, and yet generally too late."

It was indeed too late for poor *Antonio!*— Calamities far more grievous were the natural conſequence of this idle attachment.

Having for ſome time penſively reflected on this frivolous affair, he became weary and diſſatisfied with himſelf; and from hence to a diſguſt

a diſguſt with whatever is *Great* and *Honourable* the tranſition is eaſy, and almoſt imperceptible. Every thing becomes a burden to us, and the whole concludes with ſinking gradually into a ſad Miſanthropy, or licentious Diſſipation. Here it ended in the latter. Behold the once virtuous, the humane, the modeſt *Antonio* ſunk into the moſt abandoned Libertiniſm!

To be brief. He betook himſelf to *London*—His expences greatly exceeded his income. Penury, Diſgrace, and Miſery in various ſhapes oppreſs him: At laſt he falls a victim to the intemperance of his life: a melancholy proof—"That Love of all the Paſſions, when indulged *too early* and carried into *extravagance* and *exceſs*, neceſſarily occaſions the greateſt diſorder, the greateſt miſchief, and infelicity."

LETTER XXVI.

ELOQUENCE and Poetry have been always conſidered ſo nearly allied, that an excellency in the one implies a capacity for the other; the ſame qualities being eſſential to them both—a ſprightly fancy, fertile invention, flowing and numerous diction.* And whoever would ſtudy them with greateſt pleaſure and advantage, ſhould ſtudy them as cloſely connected and joined together; taking the Poetical Art immediately after that of the Orator. Having then finiſhed, ſo much to your own and your Tutor's ſatisfaction, whatever relates to Rhetoric and Ancient Eloquence, it is with ſingular propriety you paſs on to the ſtudy of Poetry.

Now I am glad to find that you have already carefully peruſed the two inimitable Poems of *Homer*: To theſe next in merit, though not in time, ſucceed the *Greek* Tragedies:

* See *Middleton's Life of Cicero: Sect.* xii.

gedies: You therefore do well in purpoſing to ſet about them without delay: Indeed there is a particular reaſon for your reading theſe admirable Compoſitions juſt at this period;—for, being about to be lectured in *Ariſtotle's* POETICS, you could not poſſibly underſtand that Philoſophical Treatiſe without a competent knowledge of this higher ſort of Poetry. For in drawing up his Book on the Art of Rhetoric, as he was there chiefly guided by the Orations of *Demoſthenes*; ſo in like manner the rules and precepts in his POETICS are founded altogether on Principles derived from *Homer* and the Tragic Poets.—But ſuppoſe we take our leave of him for a moment, and ſay a word or two of the Art itſelf.

Is it neceſſary to obſerve that Poetry is productive of moſt innocent, moſt conſtant, and the ſublimeſt kind of *delight?* No man of common ſenſe and common feeling has ever called this in queſtion: And to go about proving it would be much the ſame as to make a Theorem of the plaineſt Axiom of *Euclid*, and then proceed to ſhow the truth of it in a regular demonſtration. Whatever has been ſaid of Learning in general, of its

tendency to *poliſh*, to *enliven*, and *recreate* the Mind, may perhaps be more particularly applied to all Good Poetry, the ſort of Poetry I here mean. How thankful then ſhould we be to INDULGENT NATURE,—though ſhe has ordained that TRUTH ſhall be placed at ſome diſtance from us, but has given us withal an irreſiſtible deſire to inquire after it, which Inquiry at the ſame time is to be attended with *labour* and *much trouble*,—yes, nevertheleſs, how thankful ſhould we be to her for having kindly provided this, and the other fine Arts, to *relieve* and *amuſe* us, encouraging us in our purſuit, and rendering it *leſs difficult* as well as *leſs tedious!*

But this is not all. Good Poetry tends alſo to *improve us in Virtue*—to *invigorate* and *confirm* every *liberal* and *manly* notion.

A juſt taſte in the elegant Arts has great affinity and connexion with the moral taſte. Both of them diſcover what is right and what is wrong. Faſhion, temper, and education have an influence to vitiate both, or to preſerve them pure and untainted; neither of them are arbitrary nor local, being implanted in Human Nature, and governed by Principles

Principles common to all men.* Should it be ſaid that a correct and virtuous turn of Mind is to be acquired rather and improved from ſtudying the Sciences, ſtill it muſt be allowed that the liberal Arts, and above all others that of Poetry, aſſiſt very much in giving it that quickneſs, and all that elegance and delicacy, which enables it to exert itſelf, on every occaſion, with *becoming dignity* and *propriety*. — But ſurely it does more.

The Poems of *Homer* in particular are replete with moral and uſeful leſſons of every kind, expreſſed and inculcated with all poſſible ſweetneſs and ſimplicity. The attending properly to ſuch Poetry as his cannot fail of helping to *refine* and *regulate* the *paſſions*, to *root out* of the mind whatever is *baſe* or *illiberal*, to impreſs it with a proper ſenſe of the *Fair* and *Good* — to *call forth*, in ſhort, all the *manly* and *generous* ſentiments belonging to our Nature. Hence the civilized States of *Greece* almoſt *adored* this extraordinary man — and indeed he deſerved adoration more than any of their popular divinities. Hence they repeated his Works, and liſtened

* See *Lord Kaimes's Elements of Criticiſm — the Introduction.*

to the recital of them, with raptures bordering on enthuſiaſm — And for all this I can readily excuſe them; nay, I admire their taſte, and applaud their ſenſibility —

Aimez donc ſes écrits, mais d'une amour ſincere:
C'eſt avoir profité que de ſçavoir ſ'y plaire.[a]

On the ſame principle alſo they encouraged the Tragic Poets. You will ſee at once that theſe abound in moral precepts, and ſhort, pithy reflexions, ſtudying how to catch every opportunity to bring them in, and always placing them in the moſt ſtriking point of view — *Euripides* is ſo remarkable in this reſpect, that they uſed to call him *the Philoſopher of the Stage*. Deſervedly then were thoſe who woo'd the Tragic Muſe, and brought to perfection this ſublimeſt ſort of Poetry, to be conſidered at that time, —

——— *Teachers beſt*
Of Moral Prudence, with delight receiv'd
In brief ſententious precepts, while they treat
Of fate, and chance, and change in human life;
High Actions and high Paſſions beſt deſcribing.[b]

[a] *Boileau's Art of Poetry — Chant Troiſieme.* [b] P. Reg. IV. 259.

And

And even *Plato* (whose objections to the Art seem as imaginary and unreal as the Republic whereinto he would not admit it) allows that *Lyric* Poetry tends to ennoble the Human Mind, infusing into it good and great sentiments, and is useful in matters of Religion — Χρυσεα Φορμιγξ,

—τον αιχματαν κεραυνον σβεννυεις

Αιναυ πυρος —[a]

But it is not my intention, at present, to take notice of the several kinds of Poetical Compositions: Nor indeed is it necessary to do this, to show that all Good Poetry has chiefly in view to exhibit the native loveliness of Virtue, recommending whatever is great and amiable, and exposing to contempt and ridicule every species of vice and folly: And here the Poet is more likely to succeed than either the Philosopher or Historian: The reason is common and obvious: For no scientific or simple account of manners or of actions and events, can be half so forcible, as a just and animated imitation of them: — Now in imitating these properly consists the great excellence of Poetry.

[a] See *Pindar* — *Pyth.* 1.

"Adeo

"Adeò ut (to ſum up the whole with high authority) Poeſis iſta non ſolùm ad *delectationem*, ſed etiam ad animi *magnitudinem* et ad *mores* conferat: Quare et merito etiam *divinitatis* cujuſpiam particeps videri poſſit, quia *animum erigit* et in *ſublime rapit*; rerum ſimulachra ad animi deſideria accommodando, non animum rebus (quod Ratio facit et Hiſtoria) ſubmittendo."[a] Again: *Strabo* ſays that thoſe of old uſed to conſider Poetry — φιλοσοφιαν τινα πρωταν — οἱ δ' ἡμετεροι (he adds in the ſtrain of an enthuſiaſt) καὶ μονον ποιητην ἐφασαν εἰναι τον σοφον.[b] And the ſevere *Stagirite* allows it to be ſomething more *philoſophical* than Hiſtory, ſomething of greater *weight* and *dignity* — φιλοσοφωτερον καὶ σπουδαιοτερον ποιησις ἱστοριας ἐστιν,[c] — as being converſant about things of more general application — as being at liberty to repreſent them in a nobler and more ſcientific order, and capable of expreſſing and inforcing them with ſuperior energy. —

[a] See Bacon. de Augment. Scien. II. 13. — The whole Chapter is well worth the reading.

[b] Lib. I. towards the beginning. See the Context — You will find there an elegant and a pretty long Eulogium on this fine Art.

[c] See his *Poetics* — VII. VIII. &c.

Nec

Nec magis expreſſi vultus per ahenea ſigna,
Quam per Vatis opus mores animique, virorum
Clarorum apparent.[a]

So much then, in a curſory way, of the pleaſure and improvement to be derived from the Art.

LETTER XXVI. Continued.

ONE word, by way of digreſſion, with regard to the method of *reading* Poetry: Here it may not be amiſs to attend to *Quintilian*'s admonition: He ſays it ſhould be done ſo as to reſemble neither proſe nor ſinging: "Sit autem imprimis (theſe are his words) lectio virilis, et cum ſuavitate quadam gravis: et non quidem proſæ ſimilis; quia carmen eſt, et ſe Poetæ canere teſtantur: non tamen in canticum diſſoluta, nec pſalmate (ut nunc a pleriſque fit) effœminata."[b]

[a] Hor. Lib. II. Ep. I. 248. [b] See Quintil. 1. 8.

Though

Though it is probable that the ancient Poets, and Orators even, delivered their Compoſitions in a manner bordering rather on the latter — ſomewhat ſimilar perhaps to our recitative-way, the variation of the numbers here as well as in Muſic being meant to expreſs and move the paſſions; yet when we read any of them, we ſhould incline more towards plain proſe: It is not indeed poſſible that we ſhould in the leaſt reſemble the *Greeks* and *Romans* in reading their Works, for we read them according to the accents of our own Language; and all know that the accents in *Engliſh* differ widely from thoſe of the Ancients: "Their accents were real notes of Muſic, or variations of the tone, by which the voice is raiſed higher, with reſpect to muſical modulation, upon one ſyllable of a word than upon another; and were entirely diſtinct from what we call the quantity of the ſyllable."[a]

In peruſing the Poetry of the Ancients, therefore, we know nothing of that delightful and harmonious Muſic — nothing of the Ρυθμος, the Μελος, the Μετρον, which to them

[a] See a very able and full Account of this matter in *Origin and Progreſs of Language*, Vol. II.

appeared

appeared in the compoſition itſelf, and in the manner of reading it, and we cannot of courſe derive from it half as much pleaſure as they did. However, we ſhould as often as poſſible read ſuch their productions audibly, and with ſuitable elevations and depreſſions of the voice: We ſhall thus more freely enter into the ſpirit of the author's ſtyle and manner, and of conſequence ſee his meaning with greater force, and all the imagery and nicer delicacies of compoſition: There is ſtill a ſtronger reaſon for doing this, if an eminent Poet and Phyſician[a] is not miſtaken: He adviſes you —

To read aloud reſounding Homer's *ſtrain,*
And wield the thunder of Demoſthenes —
The cheſt ſo exercis'd improves its ſtrength;
And quick vibrations thro' the bowels drive
The reſtleſs blood, which in unactive days
Would loiter elſe through unelaſtick tubes.

But to return to *Ariſtotle*, and to conclude this Letter.

[a] Dr. Armſtrong — See his elegant Poem — *The Art of Preſerving Health*, IV. 73. See alſo the lines which follow thoſe quoted.

In

In order to underſtand and reliſh the beauties of Poetry, and reap all the advantages to be derived from it, one ſhould know what good Poetry is, and be qualified to judge of its merit with truth and preciſion. To enable us to do this the more ſurely is the great end of reading *Ariſtotle's* POETICS. No doubt the merit of genuine works of Art ſtands on a foundation *antecedent* and *ſuperior* to all *critical* authority. And all the Books that have been written upon the ſubject of any Art have been formed from the practice of the Art already invented, not the Art from the Books.[a] This is plainly the caſe with regard to the Treatiſe now before us: Perhaps there is nothing in it, which was not well known to every good Poet of that age, except the Philoſophical Principles on which *Ariſtotle* has founded the Poetical Art. But it muſt be allowed, on all hands, that without a competent knowledge of theſe Principles, it would be much the ſame for us to attempt to eſtimate and determine the merit of good Poetry, *Homer's* for example, as it muſt be for a mere ſmatterer in the *Greek* Grammar to judge of and criticize his Lan-

[a] See *Origin and Progreſs of Language*, Vol. II.

guage.

guage.—It is not then *to be made a Poet*, but *to be able to underſtand thoroughly* the Poet's Art, that you read this Philoſophical Tractate. But not to incrpach on another's province.

It is ſcarce neceſſary to obſerve that this little Work is imperfect. This will appear without any other proofs (for other proofs there are) than from comparing the firſt and laſt ſentences of what is come down to us:* He ſets out with an intention of inveſtigating the Principles of Poetry in general, and concludes the Fragment with only having conſidered thoſe of Tragedy and Epic Poetry.

Though we have reaſon to lament the loſs of his obſervations on Comedy (for he has here but juſt taken notice of it) and on the ſeveral kinds of *Lyric* Poetry, yet we ſhould congratulate ourſelves that this precious monument of Ancient Wiſdom has eſcaped the deſtroying hand of Time — Fortunately for us it contains the two nobleſt branches of this noble Art. Imperfect and mangled as it is, 'tis a portion of Criticiſm not unworthy of its Author; executed with

* See alſo the beginning of his Sixth Chapter.

all

all poſſible brevity and exactneſs, and containing in almoſt every ſentence of it ſome truth of weighty moment: So that you muſt not run over any part haſtily, but read the whole with all the attention you found neceſſary for underſtanding his Treatiſes on Logic and Rhetoric. There is evidently a very intimate connexion between the ſubjects of theſe Three Books, Logic being the proper foundation of the other two, and Rhetoric holding a middle place between it and Poetry—Their being then thus connected, they will tend to interpret and elucidate each other.

For as you have already peruſed thoſe his Tractates, and being pretty well acquainted with his method and way of reaſoning, you come to this little Work with great advantage. There will be no need of conſulting the Commentators. There is indeed a paſſage or two a little difficult from the corruption of the text; but theſe your Tutor, and not the Commentators, will beſt explain, if they are capable of explanation.

Upon the whole: Get *Burgeſs*'s ingenious Edition of *Burton*'s PENTALOGIA: Read over thoſe Tragedies with attention; and, if

you

you are ſo diſpoſed, read over again *Horace*'s *Art of Poetry* — this indeed is nothing more than a collection of precepts made out of *Ariſtotle*, and delivered in eaſy, elegant, and harmonious Verſe. As you are acquainted with the language, you may alſo read, at a leiſure hour, *Boileau* on the ſame ſubject: He has laid down, after *Horace*'s manner,[a] all the leading rules of the Art with much taſte and claſſical elegance. *Vida* is not without merit, but will not bear to be compared with thoſe juſt mentioned.—But (I ſay it again) let the *Greek* Tragedians be principally attended to. Having once read *Homer*, I am perſuaded you will be acquainted with him more and more—Whatever is SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL in this Art, or in any other with which it is intimately connected, we find it *all* in that divine Bard—"Whoſe POEM *Phœbus* challenged for his own."

Thus prepared, you will be ſufficiently able to underſtand the POETICS; and that will teach you the true nature, and wherein conſiſts the excellence of GOOD POETRY. Farewell.

[a] He tells you, towards the End, that he was principally guided by *Horace*.

LETTER

LETTER XXVII.

I AM far from thinking myſelf equal to the taſk of writing a proper Hiſtory of the *Greek* and *Latin* Poetry. The ſuccinct account, therefore, which I am now going to ſend you, is only meant to give you ſome general notion of its riſe and progreſs. And I ſhould be happy, if from hence you were excited to employ ſome of your future leiſure in inquiring into the origin of this beautiful Art, and its ſubſequent revolutions, after a manner more exact and philoſophical. Nor are ſuch Inveſtigations, in my opinion, barely entertaining; for to obſerve the gradual expanſion, and exertions of the Human Mind, in whatever line, and upon whatever ſubject they are diſplayed, cannot ſurely be leſs productive of *inſtruction* than of the moſt *rational kind of pleaſure*.

The invention of the Sciences in general, and of thoſe Arts which were ſuggeſted by Neceſſity to relieve the immediate wants of mankind,

mankind, is on all hands attributed to the ancient *Egyptians*. It may be ſaid indeed that theſe Arts muſt have been *every where* practiſed, in ſome rude way, ſoon after men began to enter into and cultivate Society: Be it ſo: *Egypt*, however, was the country where they firſt aſſumed any regular form, and arrived at any high degree of perfection. And as they were gradually advancing towards perfection, their principles were inveſtigated, new diſcoveries were made, and of courſe additional improvements neceſſarily took place.—Hence was firſt excited a thirſt after Knowledge; and hence the Sciences derived their origin.

The *Egyptians* were naturally, even to a proverb, of a moroſe and melancholy diſpoſition. It is not probable, therefore, that thoſe Arts, whoſe chief aim it is to unbend the Mind and furniſh it with elegant amuſement, were at all encouraged amongſt them, or held in any great repute. Accordingly we have no good authority to ſay that Painting, Muſic, and Poetry, ever appeared in any flouriſhing condition in *Egypt*. Some indeed have ſaid that there the men were forbidden by law to play on any muſical inſtrument,

it being conſidered by the ſurly and rigid *Egyptian* as tending to effeminacy and the corruption of Good Morals.

Greece then, tho' ſhe received the Sciences and ſome of the Arts from *Egypt*, was not in like manner indebted for her *Poetry*— nor yet to *Phenicia* or any other Part of the Eaſt; from whence, notwithſtanding, we readily acknowledge the *Greeks* to have derived no ſmall ſhare of their civilization. In ſhort, we may venture to ſay that the Poetry of *Greece* was not, like the other parts of her Philoſophy, an *exotic* plant; but, like the Language in which it glows, was as it were purely *αυτοχθων*: and, like the Mythology which furniſhed it with ſuch a multitude of fine images, we are to conſider it as originating from the Ingenuity and Creative Fancy of the *Grecian* People, perpetually contemplating the ſmiling and variegated ſcenes of their own country.

It would, perhaps, be no hard matter for the Philoſophic Mind to trace the gradual progreſs and improvements of the Sciences, and the *neceſſary* Arts, and mark the cauſes which gave them birth: But it is not ſo with regard to thoſe of the *liberal* kind: The

The origin of theſe, though of a much later date, is yet more difficult to be determined; it being inveloped, for the moſt part, in fable and obſcurity, and ariſing probably from mere chance. Thoſe, however, which we commonly call *mimetic*, are in general derived from *natural* cauſes—viz. From that love of imitation which is inherent in man;—from his great ſuperiority in this reſpect over all other animals;—and from the pleaſure he enjoys in indulging this propenſity and in contemplating the effects of its indulgence. It is from hence that *Ariſtotle* derives the origin of Poetry.*

But of the particular time it began to be cultivated as an Art he does not make any mention: Neither has he, nor any other

* See the Poetics, IV. This opinion, however, has been ingeniouſly diſputed by ſome who would conſider pure original Poetry to be only the language of ſtrong Paſſions, expreſſed in exact meaſure, with forcible accents and ſignificant words. See *Sir W. Jones's Eſſay on the Arts commonly called Imitative*—Perhaps indeed the firſt Poetry was not leſs the effect of the vehement operation of the ſeveral Paſſions upon the Mind, than of that propenſity to imitation which is natural to man, and in which he ſo much excells all other animals given this way; both theſe cauſes ſeeming to unite in producing the effect.—Here a field for ſpeculating opens before you. Inveſtigate the ſubject, and ſettle the diſpute.

writer on Ancient Poetry, given us any regular account of its gradual advancement from its imperfect ſtate to that of its maturity and ſplendor; the few anecdotes, which lie ſcattered here and there concerning it, ſerving rather to awaken one's curioſity, than afford any ſatisfactory information.

However in the dark we may be reſpecting the exact Period when Poetry firſt appeared in *Greece*, and how little ſoever it may contribute to relieve the wants and weakneſſes of man, (to which it is likely we owe almoſt every very early invention) it is certain, nevertheleſs, that its origin bears claim to very high antiquity. The firſt Compoſitions of every kind are generally allowed to have been made in a ſort of numerous or poetical ſtrain; — for, there ſeeming to be a congenial relation between the ſenſes, which Nature hath given us, and the cadence and melody of Verſe, the Memory is much more retentive of what is committed to it in that way, than in any other. Hence it came to paſs that Legiſlators and Philoſophers in the earlieſt times adopted Poetry as the great medium of inſtruction s

ſtruction: And hence the wonderful effects, heightened no doubt by fable and tradition, which are attributed to the numbers of *Orpheus*, *Linus*, and *Amphion*.

Silveſtres homines Sacer Interpreſque Deorum
Cædibus & victu fœdo deterruit Orpheus;
Dictus ob hoc lenire tigres rabidoſque leones.
Dictus et Amphion, Thebanæ *conditor arcis,*
Saxa movere ſono teſtudinis, & prece blandâ
Ducere quo vellet. Fuit hæc Sapientia quondam,
Publica privatis ſecernere, ſacra profanis —
Concubitu prohibere vago — dare jura maritis —
Oppida moliri — leges incidere ligno.
Sic honor & nomen divinis Vatibus atque
Carminibus venit.[a]

Thoſe reformers of mankind juſt mentioned are ſuppoſed to have lived about a hundred years before the time of *Homer*. But from *Homer* himſelf we may learn that Poetry was cultivated as an Art in times probably much ancienter than thoſe of *Linus* and *Orpheus*; for in the *Odyſſey* he fre-

[a] Hor. Art of Poetry, 391.

quently mentions a kind of people by the name of ΑΟΙΔΟΙ or BARDS,[a] who uſed to ſing at banquets conſecrated to feſtivity and the purpoſes of Religion: Theſe banquets were chiefly held upon gathering in the fruits of the earth; and the ſongs of the Bards on ſuch occaſions conſiſted in Peans to their Gods, or in celebrating ſome famous action of their Heroes, who in proceſs of time were commonly honoured with Apotheoſis.

In the *αὐτοσχεδιασματα*, the haſty and extemporal Compoſitions of theſe Bards, we may venture to fix the origin of the *Greek* Poetry: Beginning thus from popular uſe it was modelled at length by the ſtudy and application of future ages into a moſt uſeful, and ſublime and extenſive Art: being made ſubſervient to the cauſe of Virtue, and di-

[a] Theſe old Bards are always repreſented as highly favoured of Kings and Princes, who uſed to appoint them Guardians over their Children, and, in caſe of their own abſence, over their Wives—See Odyſſ. γ. 266—as being men of great Temperance and Learning, univerſally eſteemed by Mankind, and inſtructed and beloved by the Gods—Odyſſ. 9. 471, &c. See alſo *Plato* De Repub. III. Σωφρον δε (ſays *Athenæus* commenting on theſe Authors and partly tranſcribing the words of *Strabo*, Lib. I. towards the beginning) Σωφρον δε τι ην το των αοιδων γενος, και φιλοσοφων ανδρων ουκ ολιγον. See Athen. Dipnoſop. I. 11.

vided

vided by degrees and branched out into different ſpecieſes of compoſition according to the different turn and humour of thoſe who cultivated it.*

The *Iliad* and *Odyſſey* afford abundant proofs that in *Greece* the Arts had arrived at a high pitch of maturity before the days of *Homer*. Of the Art of Poetry, however, after loſing ſight of the obſcure periods alluded to above, we have no veſtiges remaining, nothing but mere fabulous accounts, till we find it ſhining with all its ſplendor in the two EPIC Poems of that extraordinary Man: How it acquired ſuch a ſtate of perfection muſt, in a great meaſure, nay for ought we know, it muſt be *entirely* attributed to his wonderful and tranſcendant abilities.

* See the Poetics, IV.

LETTER

LETTER XXVII. Continued.

HAVING traced the *Greek* Poetry, after ſome ſort of manner, as far as *Homer*, we ſhall be able to obſerve its ſubſequent progreſs with greater eaſe and certainty: For all thoſe, who ſtudied it with any ſucceſs after this period, are in one way or other ultimately indebted to him.[a] Nor are the *Poets* alone indebted to this ſingular man. For the *Hiſtorian*, the *Orator*, and the *Philoſopher*, (none of whom appeared for about Four Centuries after *Homer*[b]) owe to him ſomething of that muſical rotundity of expreſſion, and ſublimity of ſentiment,

[a] It was this obvious remark which made the fantaſtical Painter recorded by *Ælian* draw *Homer* with a copious ſtream iſſuing out of his mouth, and all the Poets that ſucceeded him, placed at certain intervals, buſy drinking of it.

[b] There appeared indeed in *Greece* Proſe-Writers before this period, but their Works are loſt: — I mean ſuch as *Pherecydes* of *Syros*, and *Cadmus* and *Hecatæus* of *Miletus*; the two former lived from about 240 to 320 years after *Homer* — *Hecatæus* about 50 or 60 years after them. But *Herodotus* is the oldeſt, whoſe writings are come down to us, and between him and the Poet are uſually reckoned about four centuries.

which

which render their Compoſitions *pleaſing* as well as *uſeful.* —— But not to wander from our ſubject.

It has been obſerved already that Peans, or Hymns addreſſed to the Gods, conſtituted probably the firſt Poetical Productions, properly ſo called. We ſhould not therefore be ſurpriſed to find LYRIC Poetry making its appearance very early, I mean under a regular form. Though the Poems of *Homer*, eſpecially the *Margites* which *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks of with reference to this point, were of great aſſiſtance to thoſe who cultivated this branch of Poetry; yet it ſeems to have ſprung more immediately from the imperfect ſketches of the ancient Bards: Its *original* deſign, notwithſtanding the different forms it afterwards aſſumed, being to ſing forth the praiſes of the Deity, or perpetuate the fame of eminent Wiſdom and Valour—And hence I believe it is the *only* ſpecies which *Plato* would chuſe to admit into his Commonwealth, and is alſo the only ſpecies practiſed by the *Hebrews*, and by them alone practiſed with propriety. ODE or SONG was the *gene-*

[a] See the Poetics, IV. and paſſim.

ral

ral name it went by: But the many different names given to particular ſpecieſes of it are derived either from the author, or from the meaſure wherein they are written, or from the occaſions and purpoſes to which they were originally applied. The Ode was firſt formed, and cultivated with moſt ſucceſs by *Archilochus*, *Alcman*, *Alcæus*, *Tyrtæus*, *Sappho*, *Steſichorus*, *Anacreon*, *Pindar*, with ſome others; almoſt all of whom flouriſhed in the Second and Third Century after *Homer*, that is to ſay, about the Sixth and Seventh before the *Chriſtian* Era.

A little more than 500 years before the ſame Era flouriſhed the Poet *Simonides*. Though far from being an indifferent *Lyric*, he chiefly excelled in ELEGY, of which it is probable (at leaſt the firſt who compoſed a regular Elegy) he was the firſt inventor. At firſt this name was given to what is commonly called the *Epitaph*, and conſiſted of but one or two Diſtichs. It afterwards grew into a larger Poem, but then contained only funeral lamentations, or ſuch encomiums as it is natural for man to make upon the death of his friend or near relation: Nor was it I believe uſed in any other way,

before

before the amorous Wits of the *Auguſtan* Age adopted this metre to expreſs their love and whine out their frivolous complaints.[a]

The Origin of TRAGEDY is ſomewhat antecedent to that of the *Elegiac* Poem. The beſt Critics trace the firſt dawnings of this admirable kind of Poetry from *Theſpis*,[b] who is thought to have flouriſhed about the time *Simonides* was born. As *Lyric* Poetry took its riſe from the Hymns or thoſe haſty Compoſitions which they ſang in honour of their Gods, ſo did *Tragedy* originate from a branch of the *Lyric*, called the *Dithyrambic* Ode.[c] The buſineſs of this

[a] It has been obſerved by an entertaining Critic, that the writing Epiſtles under feigned characters is a high improvement on the *Greek* Elegy, becauſe of the dramatic air it gives it—See the *Eſſay on the Genius and Writings of Pope*, Vol. I. p. 295. Had the merely introducing of feigned characters been all, this remark would have been true; but the general deſign of the Elegy is ſurely altered for the worſe.

[b] See, for abundant conviction, *Bentley*'s learned and ingenious *Diſſertation upon Phalaris* from p. 224. to 310.

[c] See the Poetics—Διθυραμβος was a name of *Bacchus*. The nature of this Ode was afterwards varied. The Ode of *Catullus*, where he ſo pathetically repreſents *Atys* lamenting the injury he had done himſelf, upon his being ſtruck with madneſs by *Cybele*, is looked upon as the beſt, perhaps the only good ſpecimen of the *Dithyrambic* Poem, which is now extant.

Ode

Ode was to celebrate the praiſes of *Bacchus* in a *ſerious*, though *frantic* and *raving* manner.

In proceſs of time theſe Compoſitions were delivered with ſuch extraordinary enthuſiaſm and geſticulation, as to make it no difficult matter for *Theſpis* to invent what is uſually attributed to him. For he is allowed to have done no more than regulate the Chorus, and introduce an Actor, who, whilſt the Chorus pauſed in their Peans to father *Bacchus*, ſtepped forth and related ſome great event, or celebrated ſome renowned hero: The Fable, if indeed it deſerved the name, was then very ſimple, and not of any latitude — *μικρος μυθος*, as *Ariſtotle* calls it. — With theſe ſorts of amuſements, exhibited at the time of their Vintage, was *Theſpis* wont to entertain the Villages of *Attica*. At the celebration of the *Bacchic* Hymn before mentioned they uſed to ſacrifice a Goat, by way of revenging the injury that poor animal did the young tendrils, to the Manes of the God of Wine: This Goat became now the Prize to be contended for by the Poets. — Hence proceed the firſt dawning,

dawning, and hence the very *name* of Tragedy.

About 60 or 70 years after the time of *Theſpis*, the genius of *Æſchylus* began to diſplay itſelf. He did not ſo much reform the rude and unfiniſhed ſketches of his Predeceſſor, as *create Tragedy anew*. It was in his hands that this Poem firſt aſſumed its proper dignity, and became modelled into a regular, ~~and~~ dramatic performance; being made ſubſervient to Truth and Virtue, acted on a *fixt* Theatre, and adorned with every ſuitable decoration. For inſtead of regarding the enthuſiaſtic ravings of *Theſpis* and his imitators, *Æſchylus* ſtudied the Great FATHER of POETRY, and took from him almoſt all his materials. Indeed he had little elſe to do beſides erecting a ſtage, and converting his Dialogues and Characters into ſcenes, ſo as to make them turn upon one principal action or event with due regard to the unity of time and place.*

Upon comparing the Plays of *Æſchylus* with the Poems of *Homer*, *M. Brumoy* ob-

* See *Lord Shafteſbury's Advice to an Author*, Part 1. Sect. 3. This is by far the beſt production of this pompous and ſelf-ſufficient Writer.

ſerves,

ſerves, in his elaborate account of the *Greek* Theatre, that Tragedy is nothing more than an *Abridgement* of the *Epic* Poem: And *Æſchylus* himſelf uſed to ſay that he had only copied *in relief* what he found ſo finely delineated in the *Iliad* and *Odyſſey*.

But however great the merit of *Æſchylus* may be, (and very great it certainly is) yet Ancient Tragedy wanted many of its eſſential parts, till *Sophocles* and *Euripides* came to finiſh it.[a] Theſe Great Men have ſtood unrivalled. Their beauties and various excellencies, though they may lie in a different track, ſeem not nevertheleſs to have raiſed the one above the head of the other. In a word, this Poem in their hands appears to have arrived at the higheſt pitch of Human Perfection.

And ſo much, by way of a ſhort ſketch, of the riſe and progreſs, of the *Lyric*, the *Elegiac*, and the *Tragic* Poem.

[a] Some time before the death of *Æſchylus* — about 450 years before *Chriſt*.

LETTER

LETTER XXVII. Continued.

WE come next to COMIC Poetry. At the feaſt of *Bacchus* before mentioned, beſides the *Dithyrambic* Ode, there were ſung ſome wild and ſcurrilous Compoſitions called Φαλλικα, tending to *mirth*, *ridicule*, and *buffoonery*. Now as Tragedy took its riſe from the former, the latter in like manner gave birth to Comedy.[a]

[a] Και ἡ μεν (Τραγωδια) απο των εξαρχοντων του διθυραμβου, ἡ δε (Κωμωδια) απο των τα φαλλικα—See the Poetics, IV. The Feſtivals, at which they uſed to ſing the *Dithyramb* and theſe Φαλλικα, were uſually held in *Villages*; when they expoſed in this kind of compoſition the faults and foibles of licentious individuals. The word Comedy then may be derived from Κωμη and ωδη—Others would derive it from ωδη, and Κωμος or Κωμαζω, becauſe on ſuch occaſions they uſed to ſing and live *riotouſly*.—The reward that was given to thoſe who came off conquerors in this ſort of literary conteſt was a caſk of Wine: Hence it was at firſt called Τρυγωδια; but it ſoon changed its name into Κωμωδια—And it is probable (as our great Critic conjectures) that this laſt was the old and common name both for Tragedy and Comedy; till they came to be diſtinguiſhed by their peculiar appellations, and cultivated as two ſorts of Poetry. See the *Diſſert. upon Phalaris*, p. 308.

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A due ſeparation between theſe two kinds of Poetry, I mean the *Tragic* and *Comic*, did not probably take place before the time of *Æſchylus*; for is it not likely that the rant of *Theſpis* favoured almoſt as much of the one as of the other? both of them being originally all of a piece — all Σατυρικη και Ορχηστικη, dancing and ſinging after a wild manner: And indeed we find that ΚΩΜΟΙ was a name ſometimes given to the Plays of *Theſpis*.

Comedy was at firſt looked upon as unfit for reforming or improving the manners of mankind, and as totally incapable of that elegance and refinement which it afterwards attained. Hence no doubt the reaſon why it continued ſo long in a rude ſtate: For it conſiſted for a long time of nothing more than ſinging ludicrous and unpoliſhed verſes, and then dancing to them — ſimilar, perhaps, to what our Great Navigator found at *Otaheitè*, and in the neighbouring Iſlands[a] — But to go on.

We are left rather in an uncertainty reſpecting him who invented this ſpecies of

[a] See *Captain Cook's Second Voyage, page* 156, *and* 174. *et ſeq.* 4to.

Poetry,

Poetry, and who firſt formed the Comic Drama? A regular plot or fable is ſaid to have been firſt [a] compoſed by *Epicharmus* and *Phormis*, who lived in *Sicily* in the time of *Gelo* and *Hiero*,[b] and but very few years before *Æſchylus* began to diſtinguiſh himſelf.[c] But, like moſt other branches of Polite Literature, it had made but few and ſlow ſteps towards perfection, before it found its way into *Athens*, where the Sciences and fine Arts were beginning to ſhine with uncommon ſplendor. In *Athens Crates*, *Eupolis*, *Cratinus*, were among the firſt who applied themſelves to Comedy, and improved it: — But theſe are men of whom we know little beſides their names —.

— Κλεος οἱον ακουομεν, ουδε τι ἰδμεν.

[a] See the Poetics, III. — See alſo V.

[b] About 480 years before the time of our Saviour.

[c] Indeed a great many reſpectable Authors unanimouſly attribute to *Epicharmus* the *invention* of Comedy. A few others are of opinion that this honour belongs to *Suſarion*. If theſe are in the right, the origin of Comedy muſt be about 40 years *older* than that of Tragedy: If the advocates for *Epicharmus* are ſo, (which is moſt probable) it is about 20 years *later*. *Suſarion* was of *Megara* in the neighbourhood of *Attica*, and *Epicharmus* of *Megara* in *Sicily*. See Poetics III. — See this point learnedly diſcuſſed in *Bentley's Diſſertation upon Phalaris*, p. 199. & ſeq.

About 400 years before the *Chriſtian* Era, the *Athenians* were entertained with the witty productions of *Ariſtophanes*. To him it may be ſaid that Comedy was as much indebted for its regulation and improvement, as Tragedy had been to *Æſchylus*. The *Margites* of *Homer* was of ſingular aſſiſtance and advantage to this Poet—ὁ γαρ Μαργιτης (as *Ariſtotle*[a] has it) αναλογον εχει, οσπερ Ιλιας και Οδυσσεια προς τας Τραγῳδιας, οὕτω και οὗτος προς τας Κωμῳδιας.

But *Ariſtophanes*, whatever his wit and humour may have been, ſeems to have miſtaken the proper end of Comedy: For inſtead of expoſing the follies and foibles of men, and reprehending ſuch vices as are too trivial or too fantaſtical to be noticed by the Magiſtrate, he aſſumed a privilege which by no means belonged to him, and took upon him to call them to an account, in plain and direct terms, for every public tranſaction they were engaged in: And beſides, his ſcurrilous abuſe of the worthieſt character that lived

[a] See as before, Ch. IV.—The *Margites* was a ludicrous Poem of *Homer*, which has not reached our times. It is ſuppoſed to have been written in the *Iambic* as well as in the *Hexameter* meaſure. There is no forming an opinion of it from the four or five lines that are now extant.

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in his time and country was to the laſt degree indecent and unpardonable. — The kind of Comedy, which he and his Contemporaries practiſed, is uſually called the OLD Comedy.

But upon the concluſion of the *Peloponneſian* War, when the Government was totally altered, this licentiouſneſs of the Comic Poets was checked, and in time abſolutely prohibited. They then began to have recourſe to fiction, and draw known characters under ſuppoſititious names; but this was done in ſuch lively and ſtriking colours as to leave no room to doubt where their Satire was directed. This, however, which is called the MIDDLE Comedy, was certainly no ſmall improvement upon what had been in vogue before.

But this ſpecies of Poetry was not yet come to that pitch of perfection, which it arrived at in the hands of *Philemon* and *Menander*.* Theſe Writers excelled *Ariſtophanes* and his buffooning imitators in an elegant deſcription of private life, and more

* *Philemon* is ſaid to have begun to diſplay his abilities for Comedy about 340 years before *Chriſt*. *Menander*, who diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the ſame way about 10 years after *Philemon*, has obſcured, or rather obliterated the fame of his Rival.

particularly in the plan or plot of their Drama. Their Wit alſo was more natural and delicate, and the Moral more inſtructive. The few Fragments we have of *Menander* ſerve only to excite our regret for the loſs of his Works, and to confirm us in the opinion — That he was, perhaps, the moſt *correct* and the moſt *elegant* Comic Poet that ever exiſted.[a] — This is what we commonly call the NEW Comedy.

Some attribute this gradual improvement in Comedy to the changes which happened in the Government: Others flatly deny this, and account for it from the natural and growing influence of the fine Arts — But as this would be a ſpeculation ſomewhat foreign to our preſent purpoſe, I ſhall leave it to yourſelf to inveſtigate and determine the queſtion — ſatisfied with having propoſed it.

About 40 years after the death of the elegant and ſententious *Menander*, that is to ſay about 260 years before the beginning of the *Chriſtian* Era, *Theocritus* invented a *new* ſpecies of Poetry. When we conſider that

[a] See *Menand. and Philem. Reliquiæ* — publiſhed by Le Clerc.

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the employment of the ſhepherd is of the higheſt antiquity, and was then reckoned an *honourable* as well as an *innocent* way of life; when, beſides, we call to mind the celebrated beauties of *Arcadia* and of ſome other Provinces of *Greece*, together with the ſtriking ſimplicity of ancient manners, one is apt to be ſurpriſed that it was ſo late before the PASTORAL was found out, and cultivated. But yet at the ſame time we ſhould remember that great is the difficulty, and ſlow has been the progreſs of invention. "However obvious a thing may be to us, nurſed in the boſom, as it were, of Arts and Sciences, yet we ſhould not from thence conclude that it was an eaſy thing for thoſe, who lived in the earlier ages and who had every thing to invent, to make any new and valuable diſcovery."

We ſhould alſo remember that almoſt all Human Learning and Genius was long confined, in a manner, within the walls of *Athens*; and *Attica* we are informed was not a very fruitful or variegated country. The ſullen proſpects it afforded, (ſullen at leaſt in compariſon to many other parts of *Greece*,) and the occupation of its inhabi-

tants, would have never furniſhed even the rural and fertile Imagination of *Theocritus* with ſuch a variety of ſweet and natural objects as are crouded together in moſt of his *Eidyllia*. For, generally ſpeaking, we find there has been, and perhaps muſt be, a concurrence of many favourable circumſtances not only with regard to the *time*, but alſo to the *country* of the Author of any thing *new* and *unheard of* before.

It is upon this principle that *Mr. Blackwell*[a] has, in ſome meaſure, accounted for the unrivalled excellence of *Homer*'s Poetry: And juſt in the ſame way *Dr. Warton* refutes an erroneous opinion reſpecting the Paſtoral, and aſſigns the true cauſes which gave it birth. The account, which this entertaining Critic has given of the matter in hand, being much better than any thing I could have advanced, I will therefore take the liberty of tranſcribing it for your peruſal.

"That the deſign of Paſtoral Poeſy (ſays he) is to repreſent the undiſturbed felicity of the GOLDEN AGE, is an empty notion, which, though ſupported by a *Rapin* and a

[a] See *his Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer.*

Fontenelle,

Fontenelle, I think, all rational Critics have agreed to extirpate and explode. But I do not remember, that even theſe, or any Critics have remarked the circumſtance that gave origin to the opinion, that any *Golden Age* was intended. *Theocritus*, the father and model of this enchanting ſpecies of Compoſition, lived and wrote in *Sicily*. The climate of *Sicily* was delicious, and the face of the country various, and beautiful; its vallies and its precipices, its grottos and caſcades were *ſweetly interchanged*, and its flowers and fruits were laviſh and luſcious. The Poet deſcribed what he ſaw and felt; and had no need to have recourſe to thoſe artificial aſſemblages of pleaſing objects, which are not to be found in Nature. The figs and the honey, which he aſſigns[a] as a reward to a victorious ſhepherd, were in themſelves exquiſite, and are therefore aſſigned with great propriety: And the beauties of that luxurious landſcape ſo richly and circumſtantially delineated in the cloſe of the *Seventh Eidyllium*, where all things ſmelt of Summer and ſmelt of Autumn —

Παντ' ωσδεν θερεος μαλα πιονος, ωσδε δ' οπωρης,[b]

[a] Eidyll. I. 146. [b] Ver. 133.

were

were preſent and real. Succeeding Writers ſuppoſing theſe beauties too great and abundant to be real, referred them to the fictitious and imaginary ſcenes of a *Golden Age*."[a]

I ſhall only add—That *Theocritus* was not only the *inventor* of the *Paſtoral*, but, like *Homer* in the *Epic*, and *Archilochus* in the *Iambic* Poem, carried it at the ſame time to ſuch perfection as ſucceeding Writers in the ſame way have aimed at to little purpoſe.

Perhaps I ſhould have taken notice much ſooner of a ſet of men, who, though they wrote in verſe, ſeem not nevertheleſs to have properly deſerved the title of Poets—thoſe I mean who compoſed the EPIC CYCLE. In all probability this Cycle conſiſted of thoſe who put in metre the Hiſtory of *Thebes* and all the exploits of *Hercules* and *Theſeus*, (whoſe notions reſpecting the true *Epic* Poem *Ariſtotle*[b] has juſtly expoſed) together with the whole tribe of verſifiers, ſuch as *Onomacritus*, *Leſches*, *Arctinus*, *Eumelus*, and *Staſimus*, the reputed author of the *Little Iliad*:

[a] See *the Eſſay on the Genius and Writings of Pope*, Vol. I. p. 3.

[b] See the Poetics, Ch. VIII. &c.

Theſe

Theſe wrote in verſe a full account of the fabulous times of *Greece*, bringing them down to the period when fable and tradition began to vaniſh. Their works, taken together, were called Κυκλος, or Επικος Κυκλος, or ο των Επικων Κυκλος — But why it was ſo called, cauſam non video aliam, (ſays the learned Commentator on *Athenæus* [a]) niſi præſtantiam figuræ ejus: Nam quia orbis figura omnium abſolutiſſima et capaciſſima eſt; propterea id corpus, quod hiſtoriam fabularem contineret univerſam a capite ad finem, propè totam, *Orbem*, aut *Circulum* nominarunt.

So then this Work contained a regular, complete, and continued ſeries of events which happened in the early and fabulous ages — Quicquid vetuſtiſſimi Poetæ de origine mundi, de generatione Deorum, de hominum ætate primâ, de Gigantibus ſive *Titanibus*, deque antiquis Heroibus eorumque geſtis cecinerant, eo opere continebatur. It was held in ſome eſtimation, not ſo much on account of the merit or excellence of the

[a] *Iſ. Caſaubon*, VII. 3. Here you will find the beſt account of the *Cyclic* Poets that I know of.

Poetry,

Poetry, as becauſe of its comprehending a circumſtantial relation of the Mythology of ancient *Greece*—ουχ ὁτω δια την αρετην, ὡς δια την ακαλυθιαν των εν αυτω πραγματων. Hence proper ſubjects might be formed and ſelected for the exerciſe of abler talents.

As to the *Poetæ Minores* among the *Greeks*, there is none of them who invented any new ſpecies of Poetry; unleſs indeed we except thoſe fantaſtical geniuſes, who, in the language of *Dryden*,

——— *wings diſplay, and altars raiſe,*
And torture one poor word a thouſand ways,—

forming the ſhapes of eggs, wings, globes, hatchets, and I know not what, with the meaſure of their verſes, protracting and clipping them ſo as to repreſent ſuch and ſuch figures:—Of theſe whimſical Poetaſters it is not worth our while to take any further notice.

Something probably ſhould have been ſaid of thoſe petty, but ſmart and agreeable Compoſitions, the EPIGRAM and the EPITAPH. The ANTHOLOGIC Poets flouriſhed at different times and in different countries, and we have

have ſtill extant many beautiful ſpecimens of their productions.

In the Epigram we are not left far behind the ingenious Ancients. But as to the Epitaph, (which indeed, as was obſerved before, is a branch of the Elegy [a]) in no kind of Compoſition (unleſs we except that dramatic and entertaining way of writing, the DIALOGUE)—I ſay, in no kind of Compoſition is their ſuperiority over us more conſpicuous than in this: *We* have too much fulſome panegyric: *They* have all that is natural and all that is affecting.

By way of concluding this part of our ſubject, I will ſend you two celebrated imitations of the Ancient Epitaph—the beſt perhaps that have been made in modern times—The one by the very learned and ingenious *Dr. Jortin*: The other by the no leſs learned and ingenious *Dr. Lowth*—The one was written on the death of a wife: The other on the death of a daughter.

[a] Ελεγειον was a name given to the Epitaph. In the old times they generally made their Epitaphs in a ſingle Diſtich, Hexameter and Pentameter; whence in proceſs of time an Epitaph at large came to be called Ελεγειον. See the *Diſſert. upon Phalaris*, p. 499.

By

By Dr. JORTIN.

Quæ te ſub tenerâ rapuerunt, PAETA, *juventâ,*
O utinam me crudelia fata vocent!
Ut linquam terras inviſaque lumina ſolis;
Utque tuus rurſum corpore ſim poſito.
Tu cave Lethæo *contingas ora liquore,*
Et citò venturi ſis memor, oro, viri: —
Te ſequor: — *obſcurum per iter dux ibit eunti*
Fidus AMOR, *tenebras lampade diſcutiens.*

By Biſhop LOWTH.

Chara, vale! Ingenio præſtans, Pietate, Pudore,
Et pluſquam natæ nomine, chara, vale!
Chara MARIA, *vale!--At veniet felicius ævum,*
Quando iterum tecum, ſim modo dignus, ero:
Chara, redi!—lætâ tum dicam voce—paternos
Eja, age, in amplexus, chara MARIA *redi!*

LETTER

LETTER XXVII. Continued.

WE have now taken a curſory and general ſurvey of the different kinds of GREEK Poetry: It remains for us to take ſome notice of the LATIN; and that ſhall be done in a few words.

Greece, which had long been the Seat of LIBERTY and of LEARNING, being at length ſubdued by the *Romans*, the Sciences and fine Arts began immediately to ſhrink under the rigid Diſcipline of thoſe ſevere and haughty Conquerors. Here therefore we ſoon find them withering away, and ere long totally decayed. They were indeed ſoon tranſplanted into *Italy*.[a]

In *Italy*, however, though that romantic Mythology, with which the Compoſitions of

[a] The introducing of the fine Arts into *Rome* is uſually dated from the time that *Claudius Marcellus* took *Syracuſe*, about 200 years before the *Auguſtan* Age. See *Livy* xxv. 40. See alſo xxvii. 2. The productions of the ancient Artiſts were for a long time conſidered in *Italy* only as a part of private luxury, and ſought after from vanity and oſtentation, rather than any true taſte for their beauties.

the

the *Greek* Poets are ſo finely adorned and animated, had been already eſtabliſhed there, yet it was long before the POETICAL Art made its appearance. For the *Roman* People, greedy ſtill of conqueſt, aſpired after rivalſhip in no other Art or Science than thoſe of War and Government—*Hæ tibi erant Artes*: This was their great boaſt—this their ſole ambition.

But, at length, when they had little left to conquer, and when PEACE had diffuſed her genial influence at home, they began to ſtudy and by degrees enter into the ſpirit of the fine productions of *Grecian* Arts and Ingenuity: Soon to attempt to imitate theſe was but a natural conſequence—Take the whole matter in thoſe well known words of *Horace*:

Græcia *capta ferum Victorem cepit, et Artes*
Intulit agreſti Latio;—*ſic horridus ille*
Defluxit numerus Saturnius; *et grave virus*
Munditiæ pepulere:—*ſed in longum tamen ævum*
Manſerunt, hodieque manent, veſtigia ruris:
Serus enim Græcis *admovit acumina chartis*;
Et poſt Punica *bella quietus quærere cœpit*:

Quid

Quid Sophocles *et* Theſpis *et* Æſchylus *utile ferrent:*

Tentavit quoque, rem ſi dignè vertere poſſet:

Et placuit ſibi naturâ ſublimis et acer —

For now we find *Nævius*, *Ennius*, *Plautus*, *Cæcilius*, *Pacuvius*, *Terence*, *Afranius*, *Accius*, and *Lucilius*, beginning to cultivate the *Greek* Poetry, and imitate, or rather *tranſlate* certain ſpecies of it, particularly the *Dramatic*, with no little fame and ſucceſs. *Livius Andronicus* indeed had diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the ſame way ſomewhat before *Nævius*, and was the *firſt* deſerving the name of a Poet that ever appeared at *Rome*.

Not long after *Lucilius*, *Lucretius* ſhone in DIDACTIC Poetry;[a] — a ſpecies of compoſition which had been very early practiſed by *Heſiod*, and afterwards by the Geographer *Dionyſius*; unleſs indeed you would include theſe among the *Cyclic* Poets.

About the ſame time *Catullus* began, in a nervous, though not the moſt poliſhed ſtyle, to give his countrymen ſome notion of the excellence of the *Greek* Ode, the Epigram, and Eidyllium. And then in the *Auguſtan* Age, when liberal purſuits were liberally

[a] About 70 or 80 years before Chriſt.

encouraged,

encouraged, when Modeſt Merit was munficently rewarded and cheriſhed by the foſtering hand of the Rich and Great, whoſe duty it is to reward and cheriſh it, not on account of the Fair Fame they thereby acquire, but rather for the ſake of making our Common Nature as generally beautiful and as generally uſeful as it is in our power to make it; — it was then, I ſay, that *Virgil* and *Horace* brought the *Latin* Poetry to its full ſtandard: Theſe ſtudied "*night and day, and day and night*" the *Grecian* models: They imitated the beauties they found there with the ſkill of a maſter: They therefore of all the *Romans* have approached neareſt to perfection.

The nature of the *Latin* Poetry, we conclude, is altogether analogous to and immediately derived from that of the ingenious *Greeks*; ſo that it would be unneceſſary to give any minuter account of it. Some, however, are of opinion that the invention of the SATIRE belongs to the *Romans*. *Quintilian* ſays expreſsly: *Satira quidem* TOTA *noſtra eſt*[a]—And *Ennius* is called by *Horace*—

[a] See Quintil. X. 1.

— *rudis*

—*rudis et* Græcis INTACTI *carminis auctor.*[a]

But in another place, ſpeaking of *Lucilius*, who is allowed to have only improved much on the Satire of *Ennius*, he derives this kind of Compoſition from its true ſource: For having taken notice of the cutting manner of *Eupolis*, and *Cratinus*, and *Ariſtophanes*, and thoſe others, who were writers of the Old Comedy, he immediately adds:

HINC *omnis pendet* Lucilius, *hoſce ſecutus*,
Mutatis tantùm pedibus numeriſque[b]—

So that he muſt mean, where he ſays that the Satire was a ſpecies of Poetry *untouched* by the *Greeks*, that they had never cultivated it in that regular manner firſt adopted by *Ennius*, ſo as to make it a Compoſition *totally diſtinct* from Comedy; but that its principles and the firſt notion of the thing, as he explicitly mentions in the paſſage laſt quoted, were derived from the *Greek* Comic Poets, the feet and numbers being only

[a] Lib. I. Sat. X. 66. [b] Lib. I. Sat. IV. 6.

changed from the *Iambic* into the *Hexameter* kind.

Evanthius, a Critic who lived in the Fourth Century in the time of the famous *Donatus*, derives Satire from the very ſame origin: His words are theſe: Per Priſcos Poetas, non, ut nunc, penitus ficta argumenta, ſed res geſtæ à civibus palam, cum eorum ſæpe qui geſſerant nomine, decantabantur: Ideo ipſa (ſcil. Comædia) *ſuo* tempore moribus multum profuit civitatis; cum unuſquiſque caveret, culpa ne ſpectaculo cæteris eſſet, et domeſtico probro. Sed cum Poetæ abuti licentius ſtylo, et paſſim lædere ex libidine cœpiſſent plures bonos, ne quiſquam in alterum carmen infame proponeret, lege latâ ſiluere. Et *hinc* deinde aliud genus fabulæ, id eſt, SATIRA, ſumpſit exordium.*

Perhaps now the more regular way of tracing it would be this: The *Greek* IAMBIC appears to have originated from thoſe ſcurrilous compoſitions, the Φαλλικα: Hence alſo the OLD COMEDY: Hence the SATIRE: The Φαλλικα without doubt gave birth to them all.

* See a Fragment of his *de Tragœdiâ & Comœdiâ* prefixed to the *Delphin* Edition of *Terence*.

Upon the whole, then, we can by no means agree with *Quintilian*, that the Satire was *entirely* theirs; but only that it was firſt formed by them into a *regular* and *diſtinct* Poem, and was afterwards cultivated as ſuch and greatly improved.

This was the kind of Poetry which kept its ground longeſt in *Italy*. On the death of *Auguſtus*, Poetry and Eloquence, and indeed all the fine Arts, underwent a great change. Their growth was checked by the foureign of *Tiberius*; and the Vanity and Tyranny which enſued gave them the finiſhing ſtroke.*

SATIRE, however, in the hands of *Juvenal*, wielded its ſharpeſt weapon againſt the Oppreſſion and horrible Depravity of thoſe times. But in the death of *Juvenal* was involved the total extinction of all True Poetical Genius among the Ancients: For after his time Poetry continued declining more and more, to the time of *Conſtantine*, when all the liberal Arts were ſo far loſt, that the *Romans* then had ſcarce any thing to diſtinguiſh them from mere Barbarians.

* See *Spence's Polymetis*—near the beginning.

Let ſo much have been ſaid, in a general way, of the *Greek* and *Latin* Poetry — And now to put an end to this long Letter. Farewell.

LETTER XXVIII.

HITHERTO you have been engaged in digeſting the Principles of thoſe Arts and Sciences, which man, conſidered ſolely as a *Rational* Being, might practiſe in ſome degree; inaſmuch as they treat chiefly of the faculties which are peculiar to him as ſuch, exhibiting the nature of theſe, and their different modes of operation. Paſſing over to ETHICS, you come to the moſt important part of Philoſophy, and the ultimate ſcope of the whole: man having been formed a *Moral* Agent and adapted to a *Social* State, and it being the buſineſs of this Science to inſtruct him how to behave himſelf in both theſe

theſe capacities—to diſcuſs and explain the various duties and relations belonging thereunto.

It is a Science of vaſt extent. As it leads to the ſtudy of mankind in general and all thoſe duties which they ſeverally owe each other, it comprehends neceſſarily whatever relates to them being formed into a Political Body; and thus it brings us to an acquaintance with the different kinds of Government, or thoſe regulations which contribute moſt to the Happineſs or Miſery of Society at large — Hence it was not improperly called by the Ancients ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ: With us it is uſually known by the name of MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

But not to ſpeak quite ſo looſely and incoherently. The principal aim of this Science, conſidered independently of all others, (which however is by no means the proper way of conſidering it) ſeems to be: To inveſtigate the various paſſions and affections of the human heart; and examine the proper difference between Virtue and Vice, defining their peculiar qualities, and ſhowing their effects both with regard to the Individual and the

Community. From hence we ſhall learn the names of the different organs and impulſes of our Intellectual Frame, their various connexions and combinations, and the ſeveral ſentiments reſulting from theſe combinations: and hence become accurately acquainted with the proper definitions of the ſocial and moral affections of our Nature, with the immediate cauſes which incite them to action, together with their good or bad effects on life and manners. And for the Moraliſt to be ignorant of ſuch things, would be juſt as ſhameful as for the Botaniſt (for example) to be juſt able to ſpeak of the different colours, or forms, or fragrancy of herbs and flowers, without knowing any thing of their names, or of their beneficial and noxious qualities — Nor are we to look upon this *Intellectual Anatomy*, (if one may ſo ſpeak) as being neceſſarily difficult and diſagreeable: Speculative and even metaphyſical Inquiries, as long as they proceed on clear data, being withal conducted with modeſty and ſobriety, are no leſs productive of amuſement, than of ſome of the beſt ſort of inſtruction.

Such

Such, considered merely as a Science detached from and independent of all the other Arts and Sciences, appears to be the principal end of Ethics. But, as has been already hinted, it would be absurd to consider it in that point of view. The end of all our acquisitions is to be able to *practise* them with some propriety — Το τελος εστιν, ου γνωσις, αλλα πραξις.[a] Now the Science of Ethics is the point to which the other Parts of Learning are principally directed, and indeed the only proper foundation of almost all PRACTICAL Knowledge.

To run over particulars. With respect to your Mathematical and Logical Pursuits, what better end could they answer than to root out of the mind whatever was base, or insolent, or erroneous, and prepare it for the reception of what the *Greeks* used to call, with inimitable brevity, ΚΑΛΟΚΑΓΑΘΙΑ; inuring it to habits of clear and correct reasoning, so as to enable us to convince ourselves, in time, of the eternal and immutable nature of Virtue and the excellence of Good Learning, as well as to see the una-

[a] See *Nichomach.* Ethics, I. 3.

voidable

voidable infamy and deſtruction which lie lurking in the paths of Vice and Folly?

In Rhetoric again and Eloquence, where theſe habits are improved and called to action, the end is ſtill the ſame. Indeed it would be impoſſible to practiſe this part of Human Learning, with any ſucceſs, without a competent knowledge of men and manners, without having imbibed ſound and manly principles, and making our abilities in the Art ſubſervient to the cauſe of Virtue and the Well-being of Society.

"The notion of Morals (as is allowed on all hands) implies ſome ſentiment, ſo univerſal and comprehenſive as to extend to all men, and render the actions and conduct, even of perſons the moſt diſtant, an object of applauſe or cenſure, according as they agree or diſagree with that rule of Right which Nature and Reaſon have eſtabliſhed." Foraſmuch then as that fixt and general Law, whereby we judge of what is right and wrong in all the intercourſes of life, is founded on this Science, *Demonſtrative* and *Judicial* Rhetoric has no ſource, it is plain, from whence to derive arguments without a

ſound

ſound and accurate Syſtem of Moral Philoſophy: The *Deliberative* ſort alſo is, in general, intimately connected with it.

In Poetry in like manner and moſt of the other fine Arts, no leſs than in Rhetoric, as excellence herein conſiſts in the being able to intereſt the ſeveral Paſſions, to deſcribe their effects, and delineate in proper colours the affairs of life, and the manners of mankind; ſo an acquaintance with Ethics becomes an eſſential thing to form the character of a Good Poet: Ποτερον δ' ουδ' αρετην Ποιητε λεγοιμεν αν ηντιν' εν αλλην, η την μιμητικην τε βιε δια λογων; πως αν εν μιμοιτο απειρος ων τε βιε, και αφρων; [a] — Nay, there ſhould be more than a *bare knowledge* of the Science: Ου γαρ ουτω φαμεν την των Ποιητων αρετην ως η τεκτονων, η χαλκεων· αλλ' εκεινη μεν ουδεν ωφελει εχεται καλε, και σεμνε· η δε Ποιητε συνεζευκται τη τε ανθρωπε· Και ουχ οιον τε αγαθον γενεσθαι Ποιητην, μη πεφυκοτα η γενηθεντα ανδρα αγαθον. [b]

If we go a ſtep farther, and look up to thoſe higher ſtations in life, where it is incumbent on thoſe who fill them to govern a People, to enact and ſtabliſh Laws, or, in

[a] See *Strabo*, Lib. I. ſub init. [b] See *Strabo*, ibid.

any

any eminent character, to inſtruct mankind and inform them of the ſeveral duties and offices belonging to them as rational and ſocial creatures, there will occur at once additional reaſons that they ſhould acquire as much Ethical knowledge as poſſible: Here likewiſe the bare knowledge is not ſufficient.

Δει τον Πολιτων προστατειν αἱρουμενον
Την του λογου μεν δυναμιν ουκ επιφθον,
Ηθει δε χρηστῳ συγκεκραμενην εχειν.[a]

Example ſhould always go hand in hand with Precept. And the higher the ſtations are wherein we ſtand, the more cautious ſhould we be in this particular. If Vice and Immorality prevail among the ſuperior ranks of life, they will rapidly deſcend to thoſe below. Good Morals, whatever be the form of Government, are the only ſure foundation of Public Happineſs; Where theſe are wanting, things are going faſt to decay and ruin.

Upon the whole: Should it be affirmed, that a ſcientific knowledge of Ethics is not

[a] See *Philem. Frag. Edit. Cler.* p. 316. Butſee particularly *Ariſtotle*'s Rhetoric, I. 2, and 3. See alſo the beginning of the Second Book, with other places.

to

to be acquired by Study, but by Converſation and Intercourſe in the world — I would obviate the aſſertion by this other: No man of ſenſe will put as much confidence in the Empiric going about with his noſtrums and half-formed notions of things, as in him who has philoſophically ſtudied the Oeconomy of the Human Frame, and is able to trace with accuracy the riſe and progreſs of the ſeveral diſeaſes to which it is liable. In good truth, Study muſt lead the way, but Practice and Experience muſt follow after.

Proſecute then, with courage, the *Nicomachean* Ethics: It is by this means, and not from reading the looſe and unfiniſhed Tractates of ſome modern Writers on the ſubject, that you are to lay down a proper foundation. *Ariſtotle* does not indeed dwell much on the paſſions and affections of the mind, probably becauſe he had already diſcuſſed theſe in the beginning of his *Second* Book concerning Rhetoric;[a] yet, neverthe-

[a] As this ſubject is ſo intimately connected with Ethics, you would do well to read over again, at this time, that fine and philoſophical account of the Paſſions which he has there given of them.—There is alſo a good Chapter to the ſame purpoſe at

leſs,

leſs, you will find in him all the principles and ſcientifical parts of the ſubject conſidered with that accuracy and deep penetration, and treated after that perſpicuous, analytical and philoſophical method, for which you have long ſince acknowledged him to be ſo very remarkable.

And beſides the good matter contained in this Book, you will find the ſtyle of it more elegant than perhaps what we meet with in any other work of his, and not undeſerving of the compliment which *Cicero* pays him, where he ſpeaks of the incredible copiouſneſs and ſweetneſs of his language: See the Firſt Chapter of TOPICS to *Trebatius:* Quibus eo minus ignoſcendum eſt, (ſays he, cenſuring the Rhetoricians of his time for their inattention to the Great *Stagirite*) quod non modo rebus iis, quæ ab illo (ſcil. *Ariſtotele*) dictæ et inventæ ſunt, alici debuerunt; ſed *dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cùm copiâ, tum etiam ſuavitate.* And *Dyoniſius* of *Halicarnaſſus*[a] conſiders him, alluding perhaps

the end of *Andronicus Rhodius*'s Paraphraſe on the *Nicomachean* Ethics: It will be of uſe to you to read this book; more ſo perhaps than that of *Euſtratius*, Biſhop of *Nice*, who is reckoned no bad Commentator upon them.

[a] See his Book concerning Compoſition, Sect. 24.

more

more particularly to this Treatiſe and that on Rhetoric, as worthy of being ranked among thoſe who have happily blended the *florid* and *auſtere* ſpecies of writing, and whom therefore he properly lays down as the beſt models of ſtyle and compoſition.

Need I add that I approve entirely of your intention to read about this period the moſt elegant moral Pieces of the Heathen Writers, eſpecially thoſe of *Plato* and *Cicero*? Thereby you will be able to underſtand this Science more perfectly and perceive its great importance and extenſive application.

Whilſt you are engaged in theſe ſtudies, it will appear at once that thoſe who have written beſt upon the ſubject of Morals, and who came neareſt to the truth, derived their notions all of them from the excellent *Socrates*, which luckily they have handed down to us in all the variety of compoſition and elegance of language. Nam, cum eſſent plures orti fere a *Socrate*, quod ex illius variis & diverſis, & in omnem partem diffuſis diſputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat; proſeminatæ ſunt quaſi Familiæ diſſentientes inter ſe, & multum disjunctæ & diſpares,

diſpares, cum tamen omnes ſe Philoſophi *Socratico's* & dici vellent, & eſſe arbitrarentur.[a]

— From his mouth iſſued forth
Melliſluous ſtreams that water'd all the Schools
Of Academics, *Old and New; with thoſe*
Sirnam'd Peripatetics.[b]

It was this Great Man, we all know, who firſt called off Philoſophy from phyſical purſuits, from obſcure and intricate inquiries into Nature and the conſtitution of the heavenly Bodies, applying it to queſtions of Morality which he conſidered of greater help to guide man through life with happineſs and innocence, and expoſing and confuting the ſeveral doctrines and opinions of thoſe who affected ſuch purſuits as were either above or below their intellectual capacities. And it is in the Works of his accompliſhed Scholars, *Plato* and *Xenophon*, and in thoſe of their great admirer, *Cicero*, and moſt elegant imitator, that we find the nobleſt ſpecimens of what mere unaſſiſted Reaſon can do towards teaching man his true nature, his ſeveral duties as a moral

[a] See Cic. De Orat. III. 16. [b] Par. R. IV. 276.

agent,

agent, and the rank he bears in the grand ſyſtem of the Univerſe.

But (to conclude the whole) however ſublime may have been the notions of a few Geniuſes of this kind, yet when we compare them with the *pure* and *exalted* Morality of the GOSPEL, we cannot but confeſs, if we judge fairly of the thing and with underſtanding and ability, that the latter is incomparably a much more perfect rule of life, than what *Socrates*, or *Plato*, or *Ariſtotle* could ever pretend to teach: So that we ſhall not only ſee the neceſſity and the gracious deſign of the CHRISTIAN DISPENSATION, but alſo the futility of boaſting of the ſtrength and penetration of unaſſiſted Reaſon; its ſobereſt deciſions being often

—falſe, or little elſe but dreams,
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm.[a]

And hence, when we find the *Academicians*, with all fair and honeſt inquirers into Nature, involving themſelves in doubt and confuſion as to the great end of Human Life, we ſhall be no leſs diſpoſed to admire theſe and commiſerate them, than look

[a] Par. R. IV, 291.

down

down with chagrin, as well on the froſty virtue, the oſtentatious and paradoxical tenets of the *Stoics*, as on the aſtoniſhing abſurdities of the *Pyrrhoniſts* and *Epicureans*.

If we conſider the Science in *this* point of view, it will be a moſt proper and uſeful introduction to the ſtudy of DIVINITY; and certainly it cannot be applied to any other ſo good a purpoſe—PHILOSOPHIA MORALIS in famulitium THEOLOGIÆ reciperetur, inſtar ancillæ prudentis, et pediſſequæ fidelis, quæ ad omnes ejus nutus præſto ſit, et miniſtret.[a]

Let theſe hints ſuffice juſt to apprize you of the end and excellence of Moral Philoſophy; and being apprized of it, there is no doubt but you will ſtudy it after the beſt manner, and with becoming diligence and reſolution. Farewell.

[a] De Augment. Scient. VII. 3.

LETTER

LETTER XXIX.

THE humourous account you ſent me of your diſpute with the ſtarched Scholaſtic, who would maintain the propriety and advantage of ſuch a plan of ſtudy as was followed in the 16th and 17th Centuries, gave me infinite ſatisfaction: Many there are, I fear, much of the ſame opinion; who harraſs young perſons, raw from ſchool and deſtitute of all preparatory diſcipline, with the "*Intellective Abſtractions*" of ſome modern unfiniſhed Treatiſes on Logic, or Metaphyſics. Others, again, guided by nothing deſerving the name of a Regular Method of Education, involve themſelves and their Pupils in a labyrinth of confuſion and dreary darkneſs. They indeed lecture them with a vengeance, making them read in part half a dozen different books within the compaſs of a day; but after a patient hearing of four years, it is ten to one if their ſtock of learning be at all improved — May theſe Chaotic Geniuſes go on and proſper!

Give me but the humbleſt competency, and let me ſlide through this life free from the guilt of having employed it in contributing to extend the baneful influence of Ignorance and Error!

There is no need of explaining to you, at this time, how both the ways, juſt hinted at, tend infallibly to give the tender mind a diſguſt to every Science and elegant Art, and are much more likely to *impede* than *aſſiſt* it in its purſuit after Sound Knowledge. But I am glad to find that you have had the good fortune to fall into better hands; having been conducted, ſtep by ſtep, on a plan of ſtudy free from all ſcholaſtic jargon, all metaphyſical quirks and ſubtleties; beginning with thoſe things which were moſt ſimple in Literature, and going on in a regular, perſpicuous manner, to what were more abſtruſe: and the different branches of it riſing by an eaſy and beautiful gradation, ſo as to make every article reflect all poſſible light on the adjoining parts. Happy thoſe, did they but know their happineſs, who in their youth are guided after ſome ſuch clear and effectual method to the threſhold of Virtue and of Learning.

As

As you are now nearly at the end of your Courſe, it may be worth our while to take a ſhort review of the whole; though in doing this I fear I ſhall be repeating many things that have been already mentioned: but I will rely on your uſual candour and good-nature — So difficult it is to divert the attention from what is truly fair and good in itſelf, and calculated for the beſt of purpoſes.

Inſtead of inveloping in a cloud of abſtruſe ſpeculations the intellectual ſparks which ſoon appear in the Human Mind, thoſe who have the guidance of youth will (if they are wiſe) fan and cheriſh them with the utmoſt gentleneſs, watching over them with all diligence, and directing them to things which indeed require attention, but are ſimple and agreeable, and not of difficult acquiſition: Thus accuſtomed to think, and reaſon on ſubjects that lie before them, they will obtain by degrees a *habit* of reflexion: Now a habit of this nature will, in time, furniſh them with proper vigour and ability to make their way into the more intricate parts of Literature.

Hence, I imagine, the ELEMENTS *of* GEOMETRY, when you had already laid up no ſmall ſtock of ſchool-learning, were committed to your hands — With propriety no doubt. Hence too (for I wiſh not to broach any new opinion ſo much as ſupport an old one by the beſt authority) *Pythagoras* uſed to conſider theſe Elements as the KEY to all PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE: We all know the inſcription on the front of his School: ΟΥΔΕΙΣ ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ. And *Plato* calls them, *κατα παιδειαν ὁδον*[a] — *the road to all Good Diſcipline and Inſtruction.*

At this time it would be altogether needleſs to expatiate on the utility of this Science: You have obſerved yourſelf that all the other parts of Literature are intimately connected with it, and many of them founded thereupon; — that it tends to clear the mind of all illiberal prejudices; of errror, and pride, and credulity, — to enlarge its powers, and prepare them for the acquiſition of the other Sciences, making them alert, attentive, and anxious to look beyond the

[a] Repub. VII.

bare

bare ſurface of things: You have alſo ſeen that, without a competent knowledge of it, 'tis ſcarcely poſſible to underſtand the writings of the old Philoſophers—thoſe of *Ariſtotle* in particular: for you could not but take notice that in his Treatiſes on Logic and Rhetoric, and even in his Ethics, he ſometimes uſes Geometrical and Arithmetical Proportion to explain his precepts and illuſtrate his opinion.

After ſpending a year in diligently ſtudying theſe Elements, and in being made acquainted with ſome of the higher branches of this ſublime and extenſive Science, you proceed to thoſe Organic Arts, which (to uſe the words of our Great Claſſic [a]) enable men to diſcourſe and write perſpicuouſly, elegantly, and according to the fitteſt ſtyle of lofty, mean, or lowly: LOGIC, therefore, ſo much as is uſeful, is referred to this due place, with all her well-couched heads and topics; until it be time to open her contracted palm into a graceful and ornate RHETORIC, taught out of the rules of *Ariſtotle*.

Obvious it is to every one that *Rhetoric*

[a] *Milton—in his Tractate of Education.*

holds a *middle* place between *Logic* and *Poetry*: 'Tis with great propriety, therefore, you ſtudy it *before* the *latter*, and *immediately after* the *former* — according to the direction intimated in the above paſſage.

Having now digeſted its true principles, you paſs over to thoſe of Poetry; This will pave the way to the right underſtanding of the *other* Elegant Arts, and the laying of a proper foundation for all juſt and liberal Criticiſm. But "I mean not here (if again I may uſe the nervous expreſſion of the ſame Great Man [a]) the proſody of a verſe, which one could not but have hit on before among the rudiments of Grammar; but that Sublime Art which, in *Ariſtotle's* POETICS, teaches what the Laws are of a true *Epic* Poem, what of a *Dramatic*, what of a *Lyric*, what Decorum is, which is the grand maſter-piece to obſerve: This will make one ſoon perceive what deſpicable creatures our common rhymers and play-writers be, and ſhow what religious, what glorious and magnificent uſe might be made of Poetry both in Divine and Human things — And now the choice *Heroic* Poems, and *Attic* Trage-

[a] See *Milton* — as before. W.

dies of ſtateſieſt and moſt regal argument, with all the famous Political Orations, offer themſelves; — which, if they were not only read, but ſome of them got by memory, and ſolemnly pronounced with right accent and grace, would endue us even with the ſpirit and vigour of *Demoſthenes* or *Cicero*, *Euripides* or *Sophocles*."

And juſt before you tread the ſtage of Life (ſo as to enable you to do it with greater honour and ſecurity) the Science of ETHICS will teach you the accurate diſtinctions of the ſeveral Virtues; — will ſhow you how congenial they are to the nature of man, and how the real Intereſt and Happineſs of the Individual is connected, by an *irrefragable* chain, with that of the Community. It being the profeſſed aim of this Science to inquire into the nature and various modifications of VIRTUE, both Moral and Intellectual, it will of courſe comprehend "the beginning, the end, and reaſons of Political Societies:" For there cannot be Virtue, properly ſo called, "till after man becomes a Rational and Political animal: Then he ſhows true courage, very different from the ferocity of the brute or ſavage, — generoſity, magnanimous contempt

of

of danger and of death, friendſhip and love of country, with all the other Virtues which ſo much exalt Human Nature."—Here lies open a wide field for uſeful and inſtructive Inquiry.

In the mean while you have furniſhed yourſelf, during your Private Studies, with a competent knowledge of Ancient Hiſtory, and ſome neceſſary miſcellaneous parts of Literature; and have attended, *in* due order and place, the ſeveral Lectures that are read by the Univerſity-Profeſſors, with reference to which your College-Exerciſes ſeem to be wiſely planned and regulated.

In this pleaſing, this perſpicuous and regular Method, there is no fear of being "*toſt and turmoiled*;" no fear of being bewildered and fatigued:--*Tantum ſeries juncturaque pollet!* And this ſeems to me to be that "hill-ſide, where may be pointed out the right path of a Virtuous and Noble Education; laborious perhaps at the firſt aſcent, but elſe ſo ſmooth, ſo green, ſo full of goodly proſpect, and melodious ſounds on every ſide, that the Harp of *Orpheus* was not more charming."[a]

Now all this you are to conſider as

[a] See *Milton's Tractate*—— as before.

nothing

nothing more than a good and ſolid foundation whereon to build: Nor is it ſecure to build on any other foundation—on any other I mean than *ſome ſuch* Elementary, Philoſophical, General Courſe of Diſcipline. Scientiarum omnium robur, inſtar faſcis illius Senis, (ſays my Lord *Verulam*,[a] alluding to *Æſop*'s Fable) non in ſingulis bacillis, ſed in omnibus vinculo conjunctis conſiſtit.

As in theſe preparatory inquiries you muſt have obſerved a wonderful dependence and connexion between the ſeveral parts of Human Knowledge, ſo by having taken an accurate and regular ſurvey of their firſt principles you will be able to enlarge, at ſome future period, any particular portion of it, and purſue with greater eaſe and ſafety and ſucceſs, whatever Art or Science you would wiſh to cultivate. For in order to make a decent figure in any thing, you muſt uſe what you have already acquired as ſubſervient to your future Profeſſion, reſolutely foregoing whatever may be an obſtacle to this, contracting your ſtudies, and, if not confining them within that particular circle,

[a] See de Aug. Scient. p. 39.--12mo.

yet

yet directing them ſo as never to loſe ſight of that particular point. It is not poſſible, without very great abilities indeed, to make a decent figure in a multitude of things — So ſhort is the life of man, and ſo narrow are the boundaries preſcribed to his preſent capacity! Farewell.

LETTER XXX.

VEniamus nunc ad eam Scientiam, quâ caruerunt *Græci* et *Romani*, (neque enim tanta illis felicitas conceſſa eſt) *ſacram* dico et *divinitùs inſpiratam* THEOLOGIAM — cunctorum laborum ac peregrinationum humanarum Sabbatum, ac Portum nobiliſſimum.[a]

Firſt of all let me congratulate with you that you have not been "haſtened with the ſway of friends (as *Milton* expreſſes it) to an *ambitious*, or *mercenary*, or *ignorantly zealous* Divinity;" but that the choice of this

[a] *De Aug. Scient.* VIII. *cap. ult.*

Profeſſion

Profeſſion was your own, and proceeded from the beſt of motives: It is matter of joy likewiſe that your Education has been conducted in an able and virtuous manner — Theſe are conſiderations of the utmoſt conſequence.

As you have been ſtudying the Four Evangeliſts in the original, (the way certainly in which they ought to be ſtudied) and have carefully read GROTIUS *Concerning the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion*, and PEARSON'S *Expoſition of the Creed* — books replete with good and profound knowledge; having, I ſay, already done this, I am well perſuaded that you have a proper notion of the principles and deſign of our Holy Religion, and are no doubt competently qualified to diſcharge the Miniſterial Office with great credit and advantage.

But for thoſe, who are poſſeſſed of abilities and of opportunity to improve them, it is by no means excuſable to ſtop here.

Though you cannot but deſpiſe the mad notion of thoſe wrong-headed Fanatics, who, in the dark ages, did all in their power to diſparage and indeed deſtroy every kind of Literary Compoſition of the Heathens, without

out conſidering in what numberleſs ways they tend to the right underſtanding and confirmation of the Sacred Writings; yet you muſt remember, on the other hand, not to ſet a higher value on the claſſical productions of *Greece* and *Italy* than what they really deſerve, making ſuch uſe of them as will render them truly valuable: And let me here remind you, that human learning and attainments can never be applied to ſo good a purpoſe as in ſupporting the intereſts of that which is Holy and Divine.

But being myſelf a mere novice in what you are going to enter upon, I will not preſume to lay down any particular rules for the conduct of your preſent ſtudies: Of this in truth there is little need: Your Regius Profeſſor of Divinity is allowed to be a man of deep, and extenſive, and elegant erudition: You cannot therefore do better than attend his Lectures in this Science.

With the view then of being benefitted by your obſervations, I will ſit down to give you a few general hints reſpecting the Plan of ſtudy I had partly formed for myſelf, and which (unleſs I have good reaſon to alter it) I hope to put in execution; deſiring you would

would ſpeak your mind with all freedom, and inform me of whatever you think amiſs in it.

Now in ſtudying Theology we ſhould certainly conſider it as a SCIENCE; founded indeed on ſound and infallible principles, but yet conducted and brought to its perfect ſtate not by any human means, not by any invention or inveſtigation of man. And here, as in other affairs of Literature, the ſubject may be divided into two *general* parts; DOCTRINAL and HISTORICAL. With regard to the former, numerous are the books which will aſſiſt us in acquiring the knowledge of ſuch things as are within the reach of our preſent capacities; but the Works of Biſhop *Bull* in particular, and *Stillingfleet*'s ORIGINES SACRÆ come recommended to us from very high and reſpectable authority. The *myſterious* parts of Chriſtianity — it becomes us to treat of theſe with all modeſty and awe; not wiſhing to underſtand thoſe things thoroughly which it was never meant we ſhould now underſtand, and reſting ſatisfied that they are accompanied by circumſtances proclaiming the Wiſdom and Goodneſs

neſs of God, and calculated to promote the real welfare of his creatures.

But as to the *Hiſtorical* part of Religion; *Shuckford*'s CONNEXIONS, and thoſe of *Prideaux* will probably be of help to one in tracing it down from the firſt account we have of it to the time of our Saviour Chriſt. In this inquiry we muſt expect to find no ſmall ſhare of difficulty and obſcurity, ariſing both from the great diſtance of time, and from the neceſſary conciſeneſs of the Narrative: Here then we ſhould carefully compare with each other the different parts, and with whatever other faithful Contemporary Hiſtories we can find: The Holy Scriptures (to uſe the words of a very learned Antiquary,[a] referring to this point) are remarkably preciſe and exact; but, when collated and compared, they wonderfully explain themſelves, and diſcover a great many intereſting truths; it is therefore injurious to treat them ſuperficially: And if we would but be at the trouble to look into the ſcope and meaning of the authorities we have recourſe to, no writings in the world would ſo amply reward our pains.

[a] See *Mr. Bryant's Obſervations on the ancient Hiſtory of Egypt*, p. 85.

Here

Here the neceſſity of underſtanding *Hebrew* will at once occur to us. As we are both equally ignorant of this ancient and venerable Language, and are both equally deſirous of learning it, let it be our care, *Eugenio*, to lay by a certain portion of each day for this uſeful employment: The very conſideration of our being thus engaged at one and the ſame time will rouſe our ſpirits and alleviate our fatigue. To bring you over to this reſolution and to confirm you therein, let me recommend to your peruſal *Dr. Jubb's*[a] learned and claſſical Diſcourſe on the Study of the *Hebrew* Tongue — It is certainly, on ſeveral accounts, highly worth your reading.

After coming down to the time of our Saviour, the moſt important part is ſtill remaining. We cannot be too careful in conſidering the ſeveral circumſtances relating to that ſacred period when he and his firſt Diſciples lived on this earth, and in inveſtigating, in their own words, the true principles of that moſt important Doctrine they were employed to propagate. Now alſo we ſhould learn the ſcope and tendency of the

[a] *Canon of Ch. Ch. Oxford, and Regius Profeſſor of Hebrew.*

ſeveral

ſeveral EPISTLES written by the Apoſtles, and ſearch after the cauſes which gave them birth.

From their time, again, to the Reformation, we ſee a large field for inquiry opening before us. Our knowledge in this reſpect is to be derived chiefly from ſtudying the original Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtorians, ſuch as *Euſebius*, *Socrates*, *Sozomen*, and *Theodoret*. Nor ſhould we paſs unnoticed, if leiſure be not wanting, the Ancient FATHERS: Their meaning no doubt is always good; and not ſeldom, we are told, is their matter ſo.—In traverſing over this diſmal ſcene there is need we ſhould have much caution, and cool judgement to ſeparate truth from fable, and trace the origin of the different Sects and Hereſies: attending minutely to the circumſtances which led to that great and glorious revolution brought about by *Luther* and his learned aſſiſtant, the mild and amiable *Melancthon*; obſerving with diligence the gradual progreſs of religious Knowledge; and in ſhort making throughout that ſtrict, that fair, diſpaſſionate, and ſober ſcrutiny, which the ſubject ſo well deſerves, and which it will ſo well bear.

From

From the Reformation to the preſent times comprehends another conſiderable period, which we muſt inveſtigate with the ſame ſpirit of ſedateneſs, and impartiality; never ſuffering ourſelves to be influenced by any other motive than the love of Truth and a regard to the well-being of Society.

As to Sermon-Writing and other particulars of the like ſort, Dean *Swift's* "*Letter addreſſed to a Young Clergyman*" will afford us much uſeful information. Should we not habituate ourſelves, (what the Dean ſeems to ſuppoſe every Clergyman does) always to preach Sermons of our own compoſing? We ſhall thus be better able to adapt ourſelves to the particular circumſtances of our audience, and the moſt ſtriking character of the times. There is indeed a notion got abroad, ſhameful in itſelf and altogether ſubverſive of liberal induſtry, that this is only expected of the moſt ingenious and experienced. Noviciates certainly, in every line of life, ſhould not be over-confident of their own abilities. I only wiſh that thoſe abilities (be they what they may) were properly uſed and exerted. And if they were continually

improved by gentle and gradual exercise, there is no doubt but they would soon be equal to the making of a plain, sensible Discourse.

Let us then, as we have leisure and abilities, deviate from a custom which is so prevalent, but which is laudable, nay *excusable* I should say, only in *particular* cases. Let us fix on a good plain model for style and composition: Imitate him with the pen of a master: Endeavour even to excel him. With this proper model many of the more modern Publications in this way, however splendid and laboured they may be, will by no means furnish us; for (as I judge) they are to be considered as Pulpit-Harangues or Declamations, rather than religious, argumentative, and classical Compositions; or in other words, rather than Good Sermons: There is often more Good Taste and Good Sense in a single page of *Sherlock*, *Butler*, or of *Jortin*, than in whole Volumes of some of them — I will say no more.

In this imperfect sketch you see an extensive field for speculation and inquiry. But it is certainly the *duty* of every man, who engages in this Profession, to make himself *competently*

tently acquainted with theſe things. And I would fain know in what more uſeful and comfortable manner can a young Clergyman employ ſome part of the leiſure which falls to his ſhare. In all other Liberal Profeſſions, there is abſolute need of unwearied induſtry and perſeverance. And thoſe who arrive at any real eminence in them muſt needs ſpend many an hour, and many a day in laborious and well-directed ſtudy. Here too the *neceſſity* of application is at leaſt equally great. How then can it be excuſable that we ſhould ſpend the prime of our life in unmanly indolence, or in vain and trifling occupations?

Being employed in ſome ſuch Courſe of Studies, we ſhall ſpend our days with ſatisfaction; we ſhall be better able to underſtand the true Principles, and the gracious Nature and Deſign of our Holy Religion; and ſhall qualify ourſelves to explain it to others, and maintain its cauſe, as well againſt the ſilly, the inconſiſtent and random attacks of Infidels, as of thoſe who ſtudy (from whatever motives) to pervert its Doctrine, and miſrepreſent its Hiſtory.

May I whiſper in your ear one word of *advice*?—Beware, nevertheleſs, of Religious Controverſies: It is a ſubject of high and ſerious importance; never to be undertaken but in caſes of neceſſity, and then with reſolution indeed, but not without modeſty, and candour, and ſerioufneſs, and circumſpection: A Pen in the hand of the Polemic is a dangerous weapon, requiring the niceſt ſkill to wield it with propriety: The *Heat* and Inexperience of Youth, the Superciliouſneſs of Age, the Pliableneſs of Courteſy, and the ſarcaſtic Humour of Ridicule, all or either of theſe will render a man totally unfit for the taſk. What need of mentioning facts to ſupport theſe aſſertions? Facts are but too common and obvious.

So much, in a general way, for our preſent ſubject.—So much alſo for the different ſubjects of this Book.

Here then (if I could do it with any modeſty) I would apply to the *whole* of what has been written thoſe beautiful words of my Lord *Verulam*:* Tandem paululum reſpi-

* De Augment. Scien. VIII. 3. ſub fin.

rantes,

rantes, atque ad ea, quæ prætervecti ſumus, oculos retroflectentes, hunc Tractatum noſtrum non abſimilem eſſe cenſemus ſonis illis et præludiis, quæ prætentant Muſici, dum fides ad modulationem concinnant: Quæ ipſa quidem auribus ingratum quiddam et aſperum exhibent; at in cauſâ ſunt, ut quæ ſequuntur omnia ſint ſuaviora: — Sic nimirum nos in animum induximus, ut in citharâ Muſarum concinnandâ et ad harmoniam veram redigendâ, operam navaremus, quo ab *aliis* poſtea pulſentur chordæ, *meliore* digito, aut plectro.

And now, *Eugenio*, to take my laſt leave of you — May you ſpend the reſt of your days in the continual cultivation of your Mind, and in doing every thing in your power for the real welfare of your fellow-creatures; thus making yourſelf an honour, as well to the Nature, as to the Profeſſion you are of! May you enjoy all the rational pleaſures and comforts of this life! And when the eve of it is about to cloſe, may it cloſe ſerenely — may we die in peace, and in the full and firm perſuaſion of the truth of our moſt Comfortable and moſt Holy Faith!

Faith! May our Friendſhip be prolonged with our Life!—In a word: may we, and all men living, employ the whole of our exiſtence, both the preſent and the future, in the rational ſervice of God who made us, in the improvement of ourſelves, and in furthering (as much as in us lies) the true intereſt and happineſs of every being we ſhall have to aſſociate with! Theſe are the great and leading wiſhes of my ſoul: With theſe wiſhes I firſt undertook, and with theſe I here conclude this our Correſpondence. Farewell,

PHILANDER.

Oct. 3. 1785.

THE END.